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wichin unalterable limits. It is the land of truth 
~nchanting name: - surr8unded by a wide stormy ocean, 
and :he native home of illusion, where ma~y a fog bank 
and ~any a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive 
appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous 
seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in 
enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable 
to carry to completion. 
Immanuel Kant, Th.=> rr~tiau.=> of Pure Reason 
~ i m•::: : 2 n a - spree ' , - carousal ' . !\ party , c 8 l e brat:. ion 
r~ r event; esp. a. communal gathering with danc:..ng and 
~ntertainmenc. Essentially, a -time' is an occasion 
~E sanctioned deviation. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
Th~ =·:Jll r::nving abbreviations will be used to refer to the works o f 
~artin Heidegger. These works include published books and 
individual essays published in collections and journals. The 
specific translated editions will be initial ly footnoted and 
~her~after appear as these abbreviations. 
JN THE BEING .r.....NC CONCEPTI ON OF t , . ~ ~ - IN ARISTOTI..,E ' S 
?!-IYSICS 8, 1 
.~ .S ART A.L\JD SP.A.CE 
3:7 3C!LDING DWELLING THINKING 
3FP THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLCGY 
- · BE I0IG .'\1\J'D TIME 
T~E :CNCEPT OF TIME 
H~T HISTORY OF THE CONC EPT OF TIME 
~M AN :NTRODUCTIGN TO METAPHYSICS 
!\.?!Vl KA.t'-IT A..."l'D THE ?ROBL2iV1 OF METAPHYSICS 
:VFL THE i'-'lETA.PHYSIC.A.L :;;"OUND..'\.T IONS OF :.,oG~C 
) 'tiL CN ':'HS WAY TO LANGUAGE 
WM WHAT :s METAPHYSICS? 
W7 WHAT IS A THING? 
ABSTR..A.C'T 
I. 
This t::.hesis examines Martin Heidegger's phi:!.osophy o f 
3 r: .:t t i 3 l i t 1,. . The cerm "spatiality'' is i~clus:.ve o f Heidegger' s 
::l-'.i:.ki n g on "space" and "place", and their related stru·=tures. 
T~1-::: iist::.i!"'.ct i c n l::etwecn "space " 3nd ''p lac.:= " is .:. conten::.i ·-Ju s 
:r_:r:::=:: :: i..:: :-: i:: 4-::idegger·' s p~:il o s ophy and ccnt.empor.:n·y ::hinkin·~. : n 
,.-. ,-.. ..., -~ J ............. '7 ' .. -.. ' ~ h -v• ~ ..J ,.-., ~ 
_....a • t=" '"- . , _ ~ .. ... -...- - _... '::) - , 
:'-1assac~1uset:r:s: 4arv ard Un iversit·y' Press, 1 3~'3 \ , x2.i-xiii, Alber:: 
~instein summarizes the pro blem as f ol _cws: 
If t:'NO different authors use che words ";:ed ," ''hard," 
o r "d i sappo inced ," no ·::Jne doubts t hac chey IT'.ean 
appro xi ma tel y che same thing, because these words 
3.re ccnnecced wich ·~lementary exper iences 1n a 
IT'.anner •.vhich i s difficult::. co misir.c.::rpret. Buc in 
::!:.e case of words such a s "place" o r " s pace," whose 
~e:acicn wit h psycholcgica l exper ience is less di recc, 
t::.he~e ~ xists a far-reaching uncercaint y cf 
incerprecacion. as t o the c oncept o f space, it 
seems that this was preceded by the psyc ho logi c ally 
s imp l er concepc o f place . Place is firsc of all a 
(small ! portion of t~e earth's surface identified by 
a n ame. The :::hin'} whose "place" is b~ing specified i s 
a " mate;:ia l ;:Jbject" or body. Simple a nalysis shows 
"p lace" also co be a group o f macerial o bJecr.s. :Joes 
t.he word "place" ha're a meaning independent cf this one , 
o r c an o ne assign such a meaning r: o it? 
Is "place" ; when c:Jmpared with ''space " \ a s simp le 3. ccncept: as 
E i. :1 s t ein wculd :v1'1e '.lS beL.e'le? In ".Smoo th .Spaces a. !1d Rough-Edged 
l?laces: The Hid," 3-5, {*a wo rk in pt·ogress cu rrently ::1.vailable on 
the internet ) Edward S. Casey conc ludes: 
Time insists on its own oneness, whereas Space tends 
toward twoness in i ts disparity from place, its binary 
o ther. 
The diffe~ence between space and place is one of 
che best-kept secrets in philosophy. Above all in 
modern philosophy, where the very distinction came to 
be questioned and then discredited: one way of 
L! nderst.anding modernity is by its very neglect of 
this distinction ... . the pre-modern and the post-modern 
join forces in a common recognition of the importance of 
place as something essentially other than space, 
something one cannot afford to ignore in its very 
difference from space .... Koyre has aptly described ... 
this triumph of space over place as a movement "from the 
closed world to the infinite universe." [*Quote is from 
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'T '.- --
- • LC: c omplex continuity and importance of Heidegger's chinking en 
s9at~a~icy will be exami~ed in this thesis. 
c~nci~uicy and change or Heidegger's thinkir.g on 
spat~a:icy throughou t his career is an often negl~cted aspect o f 
·I - • • - ' . 
_ ... 
·....J.C: t-- L ~ • 
a~t a close examination of spatiality provides 
-:..-~1-- ---i..-. .... 
~.:...o.+"""-'-'..J-t:"' .. ·.: 
....... .. ""'\- 1 -.., ... ... t- . -..~ 
---::)~-----~ 
:: ~e. 3eing, event and l~nguage. 
~y c ~a i m is that Heidegger's thinking on spatiality underlies 
1nd rro vides the justification for, the changes in direction in hlS 
chinking thro~ghout his career. Hcw~ver, t~is is not easily seen. 
I:: --:~-:e rna j orit.y .;;: H•3idegger's writir:as a:t:er Beina a!ld Tim..:>, 
:;: i::ki!i;:: :-:;:--, spar. ia l i:y is embedded in his ana l yses o f a vari-::ty o f 
:. .::p i :::s, .:...e., :1rt., tru. t.h, poetry, ethics, lang·..1age and event. 
Heidegger does not acknowledge that his thinking is guided by a 
spacial preoccupation or why this is so. 
This thesis will examine how the importance of spatial 
~hi~king develops in Heidegger's early philosophy; how his 
concepcion of "place" and "space" operates and changes ir. his 
the title of Alexandre Koyr§'s From The Closed World To 
The Infinite Universe (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1968) .] 
Martin Heidegger reconsiders modernity's conceptions of spatiality. 
This move can be seen as a pivotal occasion chat marks the 
transition from modern co post-modern. Heidegger's problem with 
spatiality in his early thinking leads him to re-examine the 
complexi t: ies and intrigues found between "space" and "place". 
Heidegger leaks the secret of modernism. 
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T."-..:idl~ p-=.!::"iod; ar.d how Heidegger examines spatialit y in hi s l ate 
·,v:_· i :: i :1gs. Th e success of this analysis depends on a demonstration 
2f fou~ prepositions: 
l • ~~idegger deconstr~ccs the cognitive subject by demonstrating 
:::--L1.t: :he subject is r ea l ly tb.e aeschet.i c operacion o f time. 
___ _ _, __ _ 
_ t,. .._ - _:. • ~ L !_-' ..._ ..._; 
~ei degger ~3:Ls : c iemcnstrace chat spa::iality =an b e derived 
::_·om time c r s ubc1:dinated to tlme. Time a lcr,e c annot f o und 3.n 
Therefore mecaphysics o n a purely :empo ral 
ground is ~ntenab l e. 
~ecause Heidegger's time-hegemonic pro j ~ct for metaphysi2s 
·,.,.,_·-=- ·:o'-:s i t:selt . .:; n r:.i1 e ·.:r -:..t ~sr. i c n of spatiality, Heidegger alters the 
i~:_·e :: :i · =· r. _:,f hi s :hinking : a wards spatialit y . Evidence for this 
~'l.ai:n is s c at::ered th!:"oughout his writings from t h e late 19 28's 
-l In Heidegger's late '..vritings, talk of cime as hegemonic o r 
iire c :ive c f spatiality disappears. Heidegger moves to ~lace as 
·~:E: ,_:cnt enr:. of his thi:-1.king. 
II. 
Cur.!::"ent cu lture appears to be preoccupied with spat iality. 
Prominent thinkers from a wide assortment of traditi o ns and fields 
have recently caken up examinations of spatiality. Some current 
terms used in spatiality thinking include: -noma do 1 ogy ' , 
'·3eophilosophy', and 'deterritorialization' (Deleuze and Guattari l 
-net.ero topci' (Foucault } ; 'human geography' (Buttimer) ; 'the 
7 
\ Irigaray \ ; -topo-nornology' (Derrida); -divine places' 
Na:::cyi; -behavior in its place' ·:l'v1eyrowitz l ; -enclaves' (Lyocard l ; 
-d~lccalization o~ che local' -cyberspace' and -virtual space' 
'iir::..lio ' ; a:1d -sacred space' (El.iade ) . M::..chel Fo·~tcaul t, in "0£ 
- ~:.::~~ . .- .S~- aces, '1 saf"S: 
,__, 1 • - ~. 
-- ....... ..... . L.. . . ..: I= t:-''--" ....._ .o..:, ~"w ..._ ....1... ..;._ . ............... -.. ~- .......... ";__:: 
the e9och ct space. ~he anxiety cE cur 
~ra has co do Eundamencaily with space, 
~o doubt a great deal ~ore than with time. 
~i~~n ~he current preoccupation w1th spatiality in 
_:: ::::1 c.-= mr:;c r a ~.-y thinking, is surprising ':.hat examinations of 
~~~degger's conception o f spatiality ar~ so ~ew ~ at lease in the 
~vhen compared co the mammoth numb-~r of 
1rticles and books en Heidegg~r's notion o f time and o ther themes, 
~~e c~rr~nt literature o n spatiality looks very small indeed. 
The majority of these writings miss the influence that 
exarr.inaticn o f spatiality has on his th:nking 
If this :hesis is intended to demonstrate 
3nything at all, it is this: Heidegger's thinking on spatiality is 
:vl:!.chel ~oucault, 
Diacri:.ics, 16(1 ) , 24. 
Pawer ' Knowledge: Selected 
ed. C. Gordon (New York: 
"Of Other Spaces, 11 trans. w. Miskowiec, 
See also "Quest ions on Geography, 11 in 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, 
Pantheon, 1980). 
The small list of commentaries are as follows: Yoko Arisaka's 
r. l997 ) "Spatialit.y, Temporality, .Z\nd The Problem of F01.1ndation in 
3eing and Time, 11 Michael Heim' s (1981) "Topics, Topicality and the 
New Topes, 11 Otto Poggler' s ( 1975) "Metaphysics and Topology of 
Being in Heidegger,'' George F. Sefler's (1973) "Heidegger's 
Philosophy of Space, 11 D. !?ranck' s ( 1986 i "Heidegger et le probleme 
de 1 'espace," Maria Villela- Petit's "Heidegger' s Conception of 
Space, 11 Luce Irigaray' s ( 1984) An Ethics of Sexual Difference, 
EdwardS. Casey's (1997) The Fate of Place. 
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~ ~ : a side issue for Heideggerian criticism but one of t~e central 
p~2tlems o~ ~is think~ng. Given che 2urrent precccu~ation with 
s~aci.a.::._icy in c~lture, Heidegger' s thinking on "space" and "place'' 
is a major ~in~ of thoughc chac is characceristically Heideggerian, 
INTRODUCTION 
I. 
In a ser i es o f seminars given at Le Thor (September, 1969 1 , 
:-r~idegger explains thac his 'path' of chinking had r-anged o ver 
::::-:!.-ee distinc t :.errit.:Jries: " rl!eaning, Truth, and Place. '' · The 
;:~ ::t~ :tse Ortschaft des Seins is ~xplair1ed :Oy Hei ·jegger t o mear1 11 tru:.h 
~ --~ ~ :a. _i. L . .. i J f 2eing, '' 
:: ·-:r:.c t-e hensi o n o f the p ~ ace-Being o f place: hence the expression 
-::' :: pclcgie jes Seins." Heide9ger· fur-ther explains his move t o c he 
~n B~i ng and Ti~e, however, 'the q uescicn c f Being' 
:a.kes ~ ve ry d if~er-enc direction. There it is a 
:n.::tr.::::er· 'Jf the q·..1esticn <':)f 3eing qua Being. This 
=!L:est:i :.) n b·::a rs chemacically, in Beina and Time, 
:he r:arne ·~f '::he ._:ruest.i on ·:JE the meaning or Bei:-tg. ' 
-~h i s ·:::rcest.i'Jn .:.s abandoned la::.er f ol': ti'lac cf '::.he 
.~t..;est.ion o f the ::rut h o f Beir-,g' - and finally fa!:' 
chat o f "the question of the place, c r o f the 
l. o ca li ty of 3eing' - wh.::nce the name Tc p o :i. ogie des Seins. 
Three terms , whi ch carry each ether f orward 
even as they mark the stages o f ~he path of 
[my ] ~hough t: Meaning- Truth - Place ; t o p o s l 
As qu o ted in EdwardS. 
enci=led T he Fate of Place, 
Casey's mcGumencal treat~ent o f place 
!Berkeley and Los Angeles, Cali~o~nia: 
Un~·;e J:"sir:y of California ?;:-ess , 1 997 ) , 24-!:. 
Ibid., Fn. 227, -!:5 G - Casey's c itation 
Questions IV, trans. J. Beaufret, F. F~dier, 
Reels ( Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 278. 
i s Martin Heidegger, 
J. Lauxerois, and C. 
Ib i d., 456 . Heidegger defines 'place' here as '::opes'. 
Heidegger's examination of the 'tapas' of Being during his 'late' 
period is subtle and further complicated by numerous analyses of 
spatiality that span his entire career. From his Marburg lectures 
given in the early 1920's, to his last published work entitled "Art 
and Space, " He idegger' s philosophy contains extensive and 
prob lematic spatial analyses which employ a complex array of 
spatial terminology. Otto P6ggeler ("Metaphysics and Topology of 
Being in He idegger, " [lllan and World, Volume 8, No. 1 ( February 
1 9 75 ) : 3-27 ) argues that Heidegger's examination of the topology of 
Being is a turn to the old title of 'topics', that is, "Topics is 
the ars inveniendi, the art of finding arguments and basic concepts 
for a dialogue about something. ( 25) Heidegger proceeds in 
1.0 
ll 
Heidegger's admission that ' . !1lS thougb.t had traversed three 
iisti~cc territories gives us a mea~s of thematically expressing 
..:c':ns~itLttion ..Jf each t~ese c.hree c.erritcries. Each 
t ~ ~riccry of chink~ng (Meaning, Truth and Place ) has a particular 
~recccu9atio n, namely, cime, event, and place. 
,_ - .... ~ ... -
- J"-'o,.,_jr .. .;::;;' , - -. ..... .... --. ..... .;.. Co._"--' U..J.. •.=:.:;, 
s~attallty c.hac. span these three 9reoccupati8ns. 
I I . 
This c. he sis '"'ill 
-- ....... ·--. -C 
• '-'-" I,_, L4 . .l... (,_: 
sue~: ::t way as ::.o concentrate on ir.dividua:i. guiding-terms and 
:JU~j.i.:;g-prspositions, ::hat is, co tocus on topoi ... by using the 
:.eL·rninology of Topics . . .. t opology means a saying i legein ) :J f the 
:c-egion •"Jr site <tcpos ) o E the truth, a determination of the region 
·.vr--.:.cn '...tnfclds a s 9la.ces of gatheri:~g, and gathering-toget:her 
~ >::c s o E gl:idi:1':J terms \ topo1 ! of Euro pean thought and i.n this 
~ay 3 gathering o f the basic terms of one's own thinking. Topo i 
:t:.:·e ~ci.:ii:19 teD1S :i.ike al · ·theia, idea Topological t.hi nki:1g 
cries to achieve s omethir.g very s i mp l e: it calls o ur attention to 
pt·esuppositions t1idden in concepts we '.ise, it seeks to speak 
language meditatively by asking us to keep in mind that i.n speak ing 
J.s '.-Je do, namely from our site, we get incorporated in the coming 
to pass of truth.'' ( 26 ) Poggeler's account of Heidegger's 
topological examination of the basic concepts of European thought 
i s valid and valuable. However, Poggeler does not address the 
question of "why' Heidegger moves to topology. Heidegger's move to 
ccpclogy is not accidental. Heidegger' s move to topology is 
foreshadowed and embedded in his early problematic treatment of 
spatia:ity and cime, and in his middle period's use of locational 
analysis in the formulation of che event of appropriation. This 
thesis is an examination of Heidegger-' s move to topology as a 
direct consequence of certain problems in his philosophy, namely, 
the inability to derive spatiality from time. 
This thesis will not examine in any depth the complex and 
influential relation that He idegger ' s concept ions of spatiality 
have on the nature of language, poetry/ technology, event/ etc., 
after his period of thinking on the primacy of time. Rather/ this 
thesis attempts to restrict itself to Heidegger's direct analyses 
o f spatiality. 
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~he s~~uc~ures o f constituted existence are signif ied by the use o f 
:. t: e ~e n11s ' onr. ic' 'exist.ent iell ' , 'pragmatic' , factical' , and 
': :-,scrumental' 
The term 'spatiality' is used in chis thesis to encompass 
~~ijegger's account or space a nd space -re~ ated s t r uctu res , whi c h 
. . • • • l - · ~ 
__ , __ ~ -- - ~ _....., ..... 
- c .. _ 1....., .....,...., I 
- ' ~ - - ...... -...40::::.;:, ~-..::: ."'l. ..;: '- 111- .. • '-" '- ..... ....... l. .. .:::J ~ ........... l ..._ \..,.: 
':::iistan·=e' and 
.. ~ · l. .) s ~ r: ~ s s I ::he ~xist.enc.ial st.ructu:.-e :)f ·se.:.ng- .~ n·, and r.:!:e 
and his acc :J ur.ts cf 'dw-::llir..g ' · bui.:.ding' , .:tnd 
Th.-:: :errn ~ place' has a triple rL:nction in this thesis. Fi~:.: st, 
;'~:1. · ::--:: ~sa specific asp·=ct of Heidegger's account o f ir1strumental 
Ser:.·ondl '! , pla c~ 1 ·-
-"" 
used t o signify Heidegger's 
-=::-:i.::::t. e!"'.::i a::. :..) r .)nto logical spacial: .. ty, i.e ., che ~t here ' [ *Daj 
:C ..:: ir:s, structure o t Casein. Thirdly, in Heidegg-:=r's post-Dasei.n 
~ xamina~ i ons, plac e is gradual.:.y given a distinct.iorL apart from rhe 
~cder~ =o ~cepticn of calc~lative space. 
III. 
Heidegger's elucidation o f Meani~g consists i n a demonscration 
::hat : ime alone is the gro und of existence. Heidegger's concern 
wi::h r:he primacy of time pervades works such as Being and Time, The 
Basi c Pro blems of Phenomenology, The Metaphysical Foundations o f 
Loaic, and the destruction of Kantian metaphysics in Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics. 
These three works are not exhaustive of Heidegger's territory 
of Meaning, e.g., The Concept of Time, History of the Concept of 
Time, and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. The works cited 
13 
Heidegger's -fundamencal ontology' of human being in Being and 
~::.. me 'cases the origir: of Dasein's ~micy in time. In order :o 
~eal::..ze his projecc in a~ing and Time, Heidegger must demonstrate 
:::. ::a"L l.:atior.a l cogr1i"Lion is noc needed co found an on co logy of human 
b~ing , and : ~a c c::..me i s 2apable of unifying che care-scructure o f 
= ...: l :::ir:::"-- ! .i. 1 
. . 
_ t L ~ 1Lil i\ct1! Lc:= .... !!Y. 
~ : ~me r in Kane and c h~ Problem o f M~taphvsics and L.he l atcer in 
~e~degger 's demcnscration of che unique primacy c E time is 
W~y? I ·..vill 
~~~~~ :hat t~e exhaustive exclusivicy oE c::..me offered i nstead o f 
:: :1e ,:::conic i ..,,·e .::ons tit ut ion o [ human exist:. ence -.:: annoc be ~ade 
:e~able because spatiality is ~narticulated. Heidegger ' s problem 
~i:h spatiality is s o pronou nced in Being and Ti me that Heidegger 
:-:L::ik.:;s ::-:·= : ;:;~ ll. owlng rare r-etraction in a late essay enticled "Time 
~ttempt in Beino and 'T' . c lme, section 70, :. o de 1.- i ''e 
lLman s!:Jat. i al::..cy from tempora l ity is u ntenable." · Heidegger dces 
no t tell us how chis untenability occurs. It is the project of 
~ar-t O; ,e o E chis thesis to do what Heidegger passes over in 
siler:ce, tr.at is, to analyze the untenable nature of making 
spatiality derivable from time. 
IV . 
?art T1.VO will examine Heidegger's analyses of spatiality 
in the text can serve as boundary markings of Heidegger's thinking 
o n the primacy of time. 
"Time and Being," in Martin Heidegger's On Time and Being, 
trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1969), 23. 
14 
wi chin his thinking 0::1 che event. Spatial thinking becomes 
~~--.c:-easir.gly important du:!::"ir:g this period o f his thinking. For 
.:. ::s::. a nee, in "P..n IncroduC':.ion to Metaphysics" '. 1935 Freiberg 
::..~ccures i , "Dasein should be understood, within che question of 
3..:: i.ng, .:ts t.he place (Stat:te } which Being requires to disclose 
. . . . . c 
..... t __ o- 1~--- -
._ ~ .:,':":: ...:.... L • 1...-LJ.C '- L•C•e 
The ~=cus o f Pare Two will be Heidegger's pro blemacic analyses 
spa ::..:.a.L.:.t'j and time ::. c gecl:er; oolitical spa c i J. l i::. y 1 n " .-'\n 
:"!ec::tphysics "; He idegge t-' s examinaci o n 
.-\!.· i s: :Jt2.e' s concepci o n of spatiality; .:~.nd mo sc i_r.opcro:.ancly, the 
·:::ssay "Buil.d.:.ng Th i nking Dwellir.g, '' which is ci ted by Heidegget· in 
"Tim-::: ::tnd Being" as being his discourse on the o rigin of space. 
V. 
? .:t!-·t. :'f1r-~~ rJ f ~h .is t.hesis ·vV Lll exarni:1e Heidegger's move to 
";;~ .3 •.:.:::" ':.~~!:·augh r::he essay "Ar t ::tr.d Space" \ 19~ 9 ) -
~xplct-es t:--~e d .i scinction and tension bet•,.,reen modern techni c al-
sci ,3nt:ific "space" and "place" in the plascic arcs, especially 
s culpt ;.1re. In this essay, Heidegger also implicitly defines what 
"p l ace" is. 
Martin Heidegger, 
Manheim (New Haven: Yale 
The FatF of Place, 261. 
"place" as a translation 
An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans R. 
University Press, 1959), 205, in Casey's 
I have kept Casey's changing of "site" to 
of Statte. 
:'I :viE 
16 
I. The End of Ccanition? 
Eeidegge!:'s analysis of Kant's o:.reatmenc. of time in the 
~~icigue of Pure Reason provides the substructure and justification 
E.::.: ::is '=·~:ndame:1c.al cntc l ogy' of Dase.in. Kant and the P~oblem 
, _ Y~:aohvsi c s ~an be viewed as a v indication cf Being and Tim~ . 
0·~ :t part o f Beina and Time, we see clearly ~eidegger' s debt. t.::::> 
Kane 's :ranscende.nc.a~ philosophy. The j uscific3.tion f o r the 
p ~0 jec':. 0 f Be i ne and Time c an only be adequac.e l y undersc o od thro ugh 
~ ~ ~j~gg~r · s :~ea t me n t cf time in Kant's Critique o f Pure R~ason. 
~l nC 3~d The ?r~bl~m o f M~c.achvsics i s Heidegger's ~xaminati on c E 
: ~ ~e. i:1 Kant's Fi~st. Critique . In KPM, Heideggec c laims he has 
. :i e t ·~nc ""'= : ') !:" t-!eid.:::gge~·s 'fundamental o nt ·:: logy' o f :1lt rnan being, 
'l'l ho::r ·2 t.ime, no t rac.ional cognition, is tho:: ur.ique source o!: huma::-L 
lc<:::ing' s unity. 
~eidegge.r's ~nterpretation of Kant's Cricigue of Pure Reascn 
is a tracing o f the primacy of 'finitude' in Kant's transcendencal 
philosophy, and through a repetition of this "fundamenc.al problem 
we understand the disclosure of the primordial possibilities 
tvlart in Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
t~anslation and introduction by James S. Churchill (London: Indiana 
lJniv.:::rsity Press, 1962), pp. 3&4. Heidegger states: "The task of 
t.he Eollowing investigation is to explicate Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics in order thus 
to present the problem of metaphysics as the problem of a 
fundamental ontology. By fundamental ontology is meant that 
ontological analytic of man's finite essence which should prepare 
the foundation for the metaphysics 'which belongs to human nature.' 
Pundamental ontology is that metaphysics of human Dasein necessary 
if metaphysics in general (of Being] is to be possible." 
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.:..n i r.:. " . ~-Jhat is disclosed as a ~primordial 
pcss::.c.:..lic :yl' .:oncealed in che Critique of i?uv-e ~eason is :::~e 
~ ~ ssicilicy c ~ metaphysics through an ontology of the finitude of 
:-. L:man teing ir:self: human Dasein. Being and Time is Heidegger's 
- ~r-.a:.ycic' 0 f r1uman Casein. 
namely, che primordial onc o lc·gi c: al 0~ i '.Jl" i c '/ 
- -
:: :.. :r . ..:: ~:q::~::esse cl. in :ne finicude o f. h 'Jman beinr;. 
~ - :~e ~inicude o f human be.:..ng. 
::1 · :::t· · :i,~::.· t o secure the justification f o r· .:tn o nt o l ogy ,~f 
::::=t s~ ~r:. Heidegger :nust first establish that the Cric.iaue ·:=:Jf !?u~e 
..... i rr.~ 
- ........ _' 
Kane treats time as a "f o rm o f 
i~:::u i ti cn' tha::: is transcendentally l o cated prior to :he rest o f 
:he :ranscendent.al c onditions af possible experience. 
For Kant, :ime is an ~aesthetic' formal intuition. Ti~e does 
In B~ing and Time, Heidegger's philosophy can be viewed as 
at.:empt.ing a fundamental ontology of finitude. In Kant and :::he 
Problem of Met.aohysics, pp. 224-228; Heidegger states: " 
fi~itude is not merely an accidental property of human reason; the 
finitude of human reason is finitization, i.e., "concern" about. the 
ability to be finite. [224] The laying of the foundation of 
metaphysics is rooted in the question of the finitude of man in 
such a way that this finitude itself can first become a problem. 
The laying of the foundation of metaphysics is a "dissociation 11 
(analytic) of cur knowledge, i.e., of finite knowledge, into its 
elements. Kant terms it ~a study of our inner nat.ure.' [225] ... if 
the task of a laying of the metaphysics admits of an authentic 
repetition, :hen the essential connection between the problem of a 
laying of the foundation and the question inspired by it, namely, 
that of the finitude in man, must be exhibited more clearly and 
with greater precision. 11 [227-228] 
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:-: o c any cogni t i 'le synthesis. Time's int c. i::. i::ma l 
i::r~d·...1c::..bilicy means that it is apprehended as a non-conceptual 
•..;hole and cannot be derived from anything that is non-temporal, 
~.g ., ~ancepts . This does not mean that time is not intelligible. 
-~~~ is an irr~ducible ·intuit::..cn' ':hat has .3.n iatelligib:e 
~~~e ~s ~asi~ for :he constitution of the a priori conditi o ns 
,_:f ;:ossi:Cl.::! expel:ience, out it is t.he act. of ·~ognicion :hat 
~~~sti:Lces the pc ssibil1ty of the empirical world. ?cr Kane, :he 
t: J t3~ ~per3tion 2 f the a pri o ri conditions ot possible experience 
.::: ·.::1s ::it.c.t.::: a synthetic act. of cognit:ion. 
·· "") g::L;::i ,:J n -~,:mst.itiltes the empirical world. 
A synthetic act. ,J f 
Kant's tot3l transcendental 
machinery o f ~ognition in o rder co secure the o ntological priority 
·Jf t i:ne as t.he basis for metaphysics. IE Heidegger ca.n demonstrate 
::.r:-~ ·Jn : ologica.l priority of time over t i"le transcendental ·::perat:ion 
0f cognition, then he has secured time as the ground for 
mecaphysi ·.::s. If Heidegger is successful in establishing time as 
the primordial ontological constic.uent of existence, chen he has 
·deconstrucced' Kant's need for a synthesizing cognitive subject as 
the foundation of metaphysics. 
Heidegger's project is nothing less than a deconstruction of 
the requirement for cognitive subjectivity as the ground of 
metaphysics. Heidegger requires human finitude, not the 
transcendental cognicive subject, as the appropriate ground to 
investigate the possibility of metaphysics. 
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However, Heidegger transforms the Kantian 'critical method' 
i:sel.f. Transcendenca: condic~cns have been appropriated co mean 
:: nc -.::::..cgical condic:..:.ons of Dase.:.n•s faccical being-in-the-world, 
·..v here cempcrality, no t cognition, is che primordial conscicucing 
·t1i ..:_ J... l_ ~ r_:: i i ju~i._ ' r l.J<:::LULC:: 
:-teidegger pcinc.s ClUC in 
- .. -1 ... , -·- - c 
t - .Lwu- f..::ll l ..._,J._ 
-:.:~ac ":here is an .intrinsic c ·:::mnection between the a pri o ri and 
~·'o!1'.pcrali:.y ," :.hat ::.s, " ~·:Er-ected coward and by the 9ro blem of 
0-:::ing, :.empo ra l ity muse be shown :.o be thA basic ccmst.icut.i on •Jt 
ma c ~inery 2 f c ognition iniciates a 'fundamental o ntology' of Dasein 
because it 1s finitude, not synthetic cognition , :hat is the most 
oas1c struc ture o f human being .. ~he fundamental c nt. o logy of Dasein 
l.S tho:=: til:"st stage in est.ablishing metaphysics. Met.aphysics is 
in i:.i.1l.'..y invest.igated in an analyt.ic c f Dasein's finit.ude, i.e., 
Br=>ina and Time. 
In Kant and the Problem of Metaohysics, Heidegger's reading 
of Kane's Critique of Pure Reason is based on Kane's first edit.ion 
o f the Critique of Pure Reason. According co Heidegger, this 
volume contains a key account of the relation between the 
transcenden~al imagination and time. This account is absent in the 
second edit. ion and all subsequent. edieions. · This aspect of 
Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 
translation by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1984), 149-150. 
Heidegger, Kant, p. 168. 
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~~idegger's reading of Kant's Critique of Pur~ Reason becomes a 
:~~ci a! paine of departure for his analysis of time in the First 
·~::_·it; ;rue. Heidegge1.· puts er:crmous critical weight. on Kant:' s 
[apparent] 'recoil' fron: che original function 
c~anscendencal imaginacion and its relation to time. 
'f/' ................. 
0. \.'-~a .0. .._ 
\;f,-.. ....... ..., .,..... h ... .,,.....~ ..-.,..... 
• •'- .._ t?'1 • ... r _.; ..- ·- ....... I 
cf che 
~3rtial:y successful in :Jve rt urning the tor.al t rar1scenden t3l 
= ~~r-3t~an .: t :h~ co ndicians cf possible experience. 
~~ ~t:l:3necus ~peratiar: c~ ail che a pri o ri c o nditi o ns cf possible 
experience constitute t:he act: of cognition t":-lat furt.her const:icut:es 
. . ' . ld t. : :~ --::rnplt~lCal. w· l~r . aut Heidegger restricts his interpcetation 
of Kant's ~irst Critique to the 'Transcendental Aesthetic', up to 
'l.n·:l including che cat.egories of the underst.anding'. That. is, 
E--=:id.-::gge1.· never add~:::esses the primary question cf Kant ' s analysis 
~ E 'Pure' ~eason itself. Further, Heidegger claims that time alone 
is enough to unify Dasein and provide the foundation for 
metaphysics. But he never addresses the problem of spatiality's 
relation to time in the unification of Dasein. 
If Heidegger's cri-cicism of Kant and the Problem of 
Metaohysics centres on Kant's -r~coil' from the primacy of time in 
the Critique of i?' . .n-e Reason, we will equally see Heidegger' s 
repetition of Kant's recoil, which is expressed in Beina and Time 
Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, trans. Terrence 
Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 41. 
Heidegger says: "For Kant, the transcendental has to do •11ith the 
"possibility" of (in the sense of that which makes possible) the 
kind of knowledge which does not illegitimately "go beyond" 
experience, i.e., which is not "transcendent" but is experience 
itself." 
21 
a2 a r~coil from spatiality. 
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I~. Reo~ticion and finitude 
3. Mapoina and Reoetit ion 
it is best :o give a preliminary mapping o f 
:~~minology in both Kant's and Heidegger's philosophies to see the 
i~o~~e :2 whi ch cerms from their different languages, systems, or 
:lt:. l 
.L • ~ • I 
·:r.~a:-::r:gs' . ::• ..;o t:erms have comparable or even identi.cal meaning if 
~ an be demonstrated chac co some degree chey bach apply, :1nd c an 
i:.>~ >::el.·-:i:.:tnged, ·.vit:hin 3. given r:or·izon of empl -:;yment ·:Jr possible 
:\:a:1 :. ':::; d:'..visi •.:>n o t che t:r3nscendental and ::he empiric3.l, and 
exi.s~. entiell ', a ntic ; , ~a\re compatible :nea:-1ings. ·. KP~, 20-22 ' 
:.:1e'1 a.r~ !10t ident:i ca. l. What is the difference? Heidegger's 
,, ,: ti -.:;n J f ·r·::EJetition' is t:he key to che cransf ormation ot the 
:ranscendental into the ontological, and experience into the antic . 
We will trace the difference between t.he ontological and the 
t 1.· 3.nsc•=ndent.al through an examination of the concept cf 
'repetition' in Heidegger's analysi.s. ( KPM, 9 3 & 208 ) 
-Repetition' is t.he repeating of metaphysics' "act of 
origination." The act cf origination arises out of c.he "strength 
and w~akness of a tradition whi~h designates 1n advance its 
possible points of departure." (KPM, 5 \ 
The -strength I of Kant r s transcendental philosophy is the 
'transcendental method' itself, and what it secures as the 
possibility of a metaphysics, namely, the primacy of time within 
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~:.'-'mar: D as e i n . ( K PM , 2 2 8 & 2 5 2 } The t r anscendental method i s t he 
' ::u-:al. :rc. i.c' ·::)r c riti c a l metho d. The a na::..ycic me t h od, in Kanc i an 
::~~-ms, i s a :rans c e ndental phil o s o p hy' s cr i r. ical ab il it y t o mark, 
i!:::ie x , .:md ~ xp lai!1 t he c ondit ions t hat con s ti t u te e xperienc e. The 
1naly: ~ c me:::. hod , i n Heidegger i a n c erms , i s c he abi l ~cy c o ' unpack ' 
· · ·-- _ ..... - -, - ~..:-..-- 1 -. .-....-. rl ..: - ..:-...~ ~ - :...... ...... -
- .. _t= · ~ . .1. ._ ~ -- -.....l ':j - "- ,_-l,- - - .... .._, ..... .._ - ... "' .... ...J ........ ....... .._ -.. -- ....... - ~ - ·- -­.._ - .... -· ..... -- .... -- _; 
~1 ~ t~ ~ 3::_ s:ru c : u re s o E ~as e i n . · KPM , 44-45 & 2 28 ) 
- 1 ... -._ --- - ..: ·-
-..... .. .. - ...... &. -- - , 
-::'~:. e - •. .,~a kn~ s s ' in Ka:1t ' s t r 3.nsc-::nde r. t. 3. 1 phi l o s c p h y is i c s 
~ ~ n~r.ud~ o f human e x istence . Acco rding to Heide g g er . Kant 
Erom es tabl i s hi ng time a s c he co n di : 1o n of human 
Kan e reco i l s by r edef ining the f u n ct i o n of t ime within 
::. ::-:; : :- an s cend.:::nc.~=tl imag i. :1a tio n in :::1e se •.: o nd ed icio n c f ::.he 
Af ce ~ t he firs t ed i c.i o n o f The Cric. igu~ o f Pure Reason , Kan t 
-..:har.ge s ::. ne ima g i na ti o n fr o m a - fu nct i ::m o f :he s oul ' t :) :he 
L~ag ina r.i on bei ng a 'function of the understanding ' 
in f i rst edi:io n o f the Crit i qu e o f ?ure Reaso n 
whe r ein Kant first in troduces t he imag i n a ti o n as a n 
' i.r.di spensab l e f· ... m c t i ·.::m of the s o u l' [A 7 8, 8 1 03 , 
NKS, p . :l2 } he late r modi fi e d i n a. way wh ich .:. s 
highly a i gnificant. I n p l ace o f ' the f unction o f the 
s oul,' he substituted 'funcr. i on of the understand i ng .' 
Thus , r.he pure synthesis is assigned to pure 
u nderstanding. The pure imagination is no longer 
indispensable as a faculty in its own righc.. Thus the 
possibility of making it. the essential basis of 
o ntological knowledge is apparent l y eliminated, even 
though the chapter on schematism, wherein this thesis is 
presented clearly enough, remains unaltered i n the second 
edit i on . (KPM, 168 } 
~c r Heidegger, Kant's redefining of the imagination as a f uncti o n 
c f :.h.:: understanding signifies a move back o r '~ecoil' from che 
p:.-ima.c_,: oE ci:ne as the basis of ::mtology. That:. is, if t h e 
~:nagination can provide an "essential synthesis" o f time wit.hcut 
cho::: c..:nde:t:standing, c. he need fer c::Jgnitive 3 Ub j ecti v e synthesis 
Heidegger cit es Kane's dcct~ine c f sche~acism as the 
; . .. - - , ; .~ - ... ; - ...... 
.l... I~ l ._t.~ .- • 4, 1_ l, 1,._ ..;... -.J J.. .._ ~ ...._"") '- - - -
i t is i.n :he .:t:1al.::sis ·) f t::a n t' s scherna.tism 
:hac Heidegger demonstrates the 'essential synthesis' o f time in 
'""h~ imaqinatio:1. On the basis of the primacy of time in Ka:1t's 
:J' . 
-! d emons trating cho::: o riginality ~ f t.: rn~ in r1uman 
In order to co~duct d ~undamental onto l ogy a f 
According to Heidegger, Kant has to recoil Ercm the original 
s :n:tr1e:sis oE c i:ne in t.he imagination in order to preserve the 
syn::1esizi:.-~g 3.Ct o f cognition as the ground o f metaphysics. 
~liminacing cognition establishes human temporal finitude as the 
ground ~f metaphysics. 
b. Tracing Finitude 
Heidegger wants to 'repeat' Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as 
a. 'netaphysics of metaphysics' or the method of establishing 
me::.aphysics, and "put to an end" a.ny interprecati.on 0f the Critique 
J f Pu~e Reason as a theory of knowledge. ( KPM, 238) For Heidegger, 
metaphysics is first 'originated' through t.he acknowledgement of 
finitude as the initial point of departure for metaphysics. (KPM, 
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::237-233 1 Heidegger claims t!-lat the primacy of human finitude in 
:ne:c.aphysics is something Kant discovers but recoils from. 
. ;.::-.:crding :.o Heidegger, Kant assumes chat. human reason takes 
~~~ o ri :.y over human finitude as the basis of met.aphysics. 
!-!~idegge!:.· ..::aims '::.hat Kant. cakes human fin i t.ude for gr.::tnt.ed; 
- . . 
:. ~ ~ .:t L.. ..;... ::::::5, :~ Uili d !1 : .l. rll. ;_ -lllc , iltu l.e 
~~ asan as che scar:ing point of metaphysics. H~idegger ..::ricic~zes 
i':arJ.t' s caking 11 s.:> l f -ev.:..denc presuppos it. .:..ons 11 :or ,Jrant.ed. · KP~-1 , 2 7 ) 
:":-: ,===.::: ';:res u p~~·.::siti. o ns' :nay be S'...:.r.1marized in Heidegger's f ol l owi ng 
~~e: ~undamencal sourc e o f che iaying o f che 
~ cundac.:.. on af metaphysics is human pure reason, 
so c~at the human c haract.eriscic o f reason, 
~.e., its Einitude, becomes essential for the 
pra blemat.ic of the laying of the foundation. 
:t is a dvisable, th~ref o re, chat in characterizing 
:he :i.el:::i af origir. we concencrate ·::m t he 
c larifi ca t ion o f t.he essence of c.he finitude 
·:: f human knowl edge. ( KPM, 27 ' 
:--:..::i.deqge!:.- l.S net directly criticizing Kant's ·::ritique of che 
~o~dic.ions ~hat constituce cognition, because, "in order to 
~lSC~8s.::: :he essence of the finitude of knowledge a gen~ral 
characterizatio~ [critique or analytic ] of the essence cf cognition 
is requil-ed." (. KPM, 27 ) For Kant, the laying down of the method 
which constitutes metaphysics takes the form of a Critique of ?ure 
because reason constitutes human cognition. Human 
::ognition constitutes the empirical world. 
What Heidegger is criticizing is Kant's neglect of the human 
'existential' factor found within any .::J.t.tempt to critique 
cognition: the finite character of human understanding or reason 
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i::.self. ?init ·.Jde is our "fundamental way of being." F'or 
:-:~~degger, finitude is ;: he expression of time within human 
'-lnder s;:anding. Insofar as cognition i s finite, thinking muse also 
t~ 22~stituced by the primordial working au t cf time. Thinking is 
r\. .  =tr.: ,,..,. ou~:::i ac:imi c cnac cur· '..lna-::=.t:sc.:tnciiny 1s Lln.L-.:-:::, ouc. c.r.ac 
·_:::.:.::.•/ . ~,., ::.:Ce C3.SlS OC time a.nd the imaginat:ion alone lS !10( 
-:·":- ~Eii::<. ·-::. 'tLthouc. t·.:::ascr:' s regulation and synt:.hesis cf subjecci•;ic.y 
:::,~r-:: .::::=tn oe ~10 unit:.y of fi:,ice being. Wi:hout:. reason there 1s 
= ~~y :r:agm~n;:ed unconnec::.ed inst:.ances oE experienc~. Reason 
subsumpt.ion of fragmented experiences under 
~~c~lligible :oncept:.s which provide t.he int.elligible cont.inuit.y of 
Kant, Heideggerian. :ime .:t2.cne 
:-:eidegger posies time where Kant o l aces t.he :at.al operation 
::.::-:: :r:t::.sce~J.dent.al cond itions ;:hat c..::ons:it'lte our ·-.mderstan:::iing c t 
·::1-:::: ~mcirical wo1·ld. The fundamental :.::ruesti on '"'e .:u ·e addressing i:1 
~ar= ~ne is whether chis ·replacement.' is tenable. 
Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: 
Wcrld, Finitude, Solitude, Trans. William McNeil and Nicholas 
Walker \ Bloomington: Indiana Universit.y Press, 1995 ) , 6. 
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IlJ:. R-"coil 
-~- Soac~ and Intuition 
~o r Kant, space and time are pure intuitions. ?ure intuitions 
ar~ :h~ irreducible primordial a priori conditions that are located 
~~i 2~ :=all ~ ther a prior~ conditions chat ccnstitute experience . 
.::: - • ·-- - 1 
:.... V.:... l ~.Cl....L.. 
and hence, Eor Kant, 
pr~c~dence ~ver space. 'tlhy? 
cime 
- "! , 
... 1.- .... 
takes cranscendental 
Sp.:..ce, f o r Kant, '' se r·ves as the a prior i condition c nl y J f 
:.: uter· arpe.:.::.rances," and si:1 c e ''all repr-::sentat~ons" .=tre deri·.Jacive 
'' ir.:.-.er intuic.:.on," which is :he term o f time, "t ime is an a 
p2.·.:.:!.·1 .::cndi:ior; o f all appearance whacsoe'Jer:. Time is L he 
io f c ur soulsl, and 
:h--::!.·eny c.he rr.ediate condition of outer appearances . " 
.~s :::ime is th·:= constitutive conditional intuition of inner 
:::ep!.··::sentaticns, it is tr.:mscendentally prior to space, which is 
t~e intuitional c ondition of outer appearances. The inner formal 
intuition must first be evident in order for outer intuition to 
become a possibility. In a 1935-36 lecture at the University of 
F'reiburg entitled "Basic Questions of ~etaphysics," i-le i degge r 
explains the relationship between Kant's notions of space and time 
Heidegger, Kant, 52. Quote from Immanuel Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan Press 
Ltd., 1929 ) , A 34, 77. Further, Heidegger states: "[Time], as 
universal pure intuition, must be the dominant and essential 
element of pure knowledge and hence of transcendence as well, since 
ic. is pure knowledge which makes transcendence possible." 
CPurR., A 34, 77. 
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as :allows: ".Space is the form wherein all outside appearances 
Time, howe·ver, is not limited to these; i:: is also 
~~~ fo~m of inner appearances, i.e., the appearing and succession 
~~our mode s o f ~elation and experiences. ?or this reason time is 
::,-::: f,:):t:m of ali. appearances in general." 
- .. - ..: - -·. 
~L '.._)J'= '-'-
f 0 r :~~ :ransformation of Kant's notion of time runs as follows: 
The fcllowing interpretacion will reveal ~ow time 
in the co~rse 0 f the develop~ent of the several 
sta9es o f the f ·oundation of metaphysics comes 
more and more to the Eore and thereby reveals 
~cs p:coper essence in a mere original way than is 
possible by means of the provisional ·:haracterization 
in the 'Transcendent:al Aesthetic'. ( KPM, 52 ' 
-:'~:ne pr··ovides the t_Jrinciple of unity that constitu tes finit.e 
~: r'.ow l ~dge . Heidegger must. demonstrate that. "The finic.ude of 
~nowl edge manife sts an original and intrinsic dependence of thought 
: n intuition o r, conversely, a need for the latter to be determined 
cv ::--.~ ~ : n-:ner." 1KPM, Gl ) H::=idegger deconstr·ucts Kant's 'need' Eor 
c~~e as intuition, time as the constitution of the pure productive 
imagi~a:ion, and time as the unity of apperception. 
t' o !.- Kant, t ;-,e unity of the intuit i on o f time p!:"ecedes and 
co~stitu tes the pure transcendental synthesis of imagination. The 
synthesis of imagination is given prior to the unity o f 
Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing, trans. W.B. Barton, Jr. 
and Vera Deutsch (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 19~7), 
230. 
Heidegger, Kant, 81. Heidegger states: "The unity which 
un1.r ~es a pr1.or1. must anticipate the encounterable. Tflhat is 
encountered is itself, however, already included in advance in the 
horizon of time pro-posed by pure intuition." 
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3.ppe:rc:eption. The unity of apperception is the unifying a priori 
:t c t ;F ~· u:c-= chought or synthesis: c.he 'transcendent.al cognitive 
subj~ct'. Since ''the pure synt.hesis [of apperception] must unify 
3. t=Ti o ri. \'1/hat. it unifies muse be gi';en to it a prio ri.'' ( KP~-1, 
=3.:J · Ti.rne l.S ch;:; univ;:;rsal pur;:; int.uiti o n which i s a prio ri, 
~ ss~nt.::.3l:y related co time. Only in t~is way is pure imagination 
c~ v~3:~d as :he mediator between :::.ranscendental appercepti o n and 
~ i:nt:.:; • II 
Kane defi nes the working out of t.ime i n the conditions that 
: a nstit u ce :h;:; act of synthesizing cognition. Heidegger rev~rses 
~a nt's c cnstruc ticn o f these transcendental conditions. If 
~~~ j ~gg~~ can gi ve a 'reduction' o f the total cperatia ~ o f Kant's 
: ~- ~'ir:s ,.: e n::l e r.ta. l condit.i ·..:::ns t :J the tJr-irr.o rdial -...mity o f time ic.se l f, 
t ~ -=n he has gro unds for replacing the transcendent.al conditio ns 
:=onscicute ::he synthesizing rational subject.'s act o f 
·.:cgnition with the ontological conditions of temporality that 
constitute Dasein. 
~e re specifically, the 'triplicity' of elements pure 
i:-: t1..:i. t i ·2 n, pure imagination, and pure apperception no l o nger 
appear as a juxtaposition of faculties. The status of the unity of 
apperception, as the synthesizing operation of the categories of 
the understanding, will lose its unifying status when it is 
demonstrated that it has to be grounded in the pure imagination. 
Heidegger, Kant, 86 . Further, " the 
j c ining and forming connections is possible is 
universal pure intuition." 
medium 
time 
wherein 
as the 
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This -~escruc=ion' of the transcendental subject by the primacy of 
!::initude .L s deta.iled in i-feidegger's criticism of Kant's "The 
Sc~1ematism of che Pure Concepts of the Understanding." (K PM, 9 4 ) 
a. Heid~aaer's Critique of Schematism 
~-::ij2gger posies a stro ng :onnection between schematism and 
:: :. :: :. ::. '--~ j e : 
A:: conceptual representation is essentialiy schematism. 
~ow, a l l Einit.e cognition 1s, as c~inking inc.li.:ion, 
necessarily concept~al. Necessarily contained, 
r:herefore 1 in t::le immediate percepti o n o f 3 '.]iven cru:.g 
Thus, schematism takes p l ace necessarily because o ur 
ccgni t ion is . . . a E ini te ..::ogni t ion. This is •...;hy Kant. 
:nus e. st.at.e, "This schemat: ism ... i s an ::trt. concealed in 
the dep ths -:Jf the human soul." Her:.·.:::e I if schemat ism 
be l o nas :c :he essence o f f i n i :e k~owledge, dnd ; ~ 
~~n~tude is ~entred in transcendence/ chen transcendence 
·'!ust ~~ :1:.-.:e p l ace as :t :3chema:isrn. Ther:efore/ Kar,t :nust 
r. e c -::ssar- :;. _y be ccncer-ned with .3. "r:ranscer.deni:al 
sc:-,ernatism" as seer. as he ~:::- .:.es ~ c ~.:.ght t~1e .:.llt:::·~:1si..::: 
9os s i b i 1 i t y o f t ran s c end en c e . ·. K P ~-1 , l <) 6 ) 
r ~e ~i~:tude of =ranscendence is comprehended as the ground o f the 
~ nt~ ~ nsic possibility o f metaphysics. ~o r Heidegger, the 
· ::n ~ c l. cgical ::-::o:-".ditions of transcendence are manifested in 
s chemacism, a nd not. in the unity o f apperception. Schematism is 
:~e ~peration o f the conditions of finitude. The conditions o f 
fini=ude are const:ituted by the temporalizing possibility of time 
within the operation of the transcendental imagination. We need go 
no f~rther in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Kant must. -recoil' 
fro m t~is conclusion/ and -conceal it in the soul'. Why? 
Fo r Heidegger I metaphysics is not to be founded upon the 
regulat.ive/ unifying conditions of the understanding. Kant. cannot. 
justify going that far in his analysis, because transcendence is 
not dependent. on any synthetic unity of apperception. 
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T~anscendence does ~ot depend on the cognitive operation of 
~~idegger presents his overturning of r-ant's subject in the 
:=3•=:..::: :. icn ~n c. i t. l ~d 11 The ':'ranscendenta 1 I:n.=tg ina t ion and ':. he Problem ~:; f 
In t: he subsec t i ·-Jn, "r:'i;p.e as ~ur.-~ :3e l f-
- ' 
.. '"= i !.ttJ \....-l.'ct..:... ~.-u:i.i.· ~ c ::.. e: i · - j _ - :: 11 ~ · .::--I ' __.'.;_ 
<.:t:.~s :.;lat h e ie:nons:.rates the identity oE :.i:ne .:~.nd sui:J j ect . ·. KPM, 
~i me ~s pure intui:.i o n o nly in that it spon tane ously 
pr~tor~s :he aspect of successi o n ~nd, .:~.s an ace b oth 
receptive and Ec rmative, pro-pos :::: s this aspect. as suc h 
~ o itself. This pure i ntuiti o n s ol i c its itsel f by 
chat which it i ntuits ! forms ) and without the aid o f 
experience. Time is, by nature, pure affecti o n o f 
itself. But more than this, it is chat in general 
whi~h farms something on the o rder o f a line of 
o rientation which going from the self is d i re c ted toward 
in suc h a way :hat the objective thus constituted 
springs f o r th .:~.nd surges back along this line. ( KPM, 134 1 
::.: :{ t:- l. i :::: d t i or. l. . 
Fa ~ Heidegger, time is an act both receotive and formative'. 
~:1 ar.. i s, :::.i rne ~:.=, a g o ing forth and a return back: t:i:ne is c!1e 
ir~educible substratum that acts as a peculiar system o f 
c reativity, self-containment, indivisibility and irreducibility. 
The root o f the imagination ' s transcendence is, for Heidegger, :o 
be identified with original time as pure self-affection. That is, 
"':'ime i s the condition of the possibility of every act which is 
t o rrnacive o f representation, that is to say, it makes pure space 
manifest.." (KPM, 205) He adds: "To admit the transcendental 
f~nct.i on cf pure space does not in any way imply a refusal of the 
primacy of time.'' Heidegger never demonstrates how c.hese claims 
are justified. Unlike Kant, who gives a demonstration of why space 
is derivable from time, Heidegger, who has apparently collapsed the 
As quoted in Maria Villela-Petie's ''Heidegger's Conception 
of Space, 11 in Critical Heidegger, translation Christopher MaCann 
f London: Routledge, 1996), 137. 
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s t:bjecc inca original cime, does not demonstrate how space lS 
i~ri~ed ~ram cime. Moreover, it is difficulc co understand how it 
:s possible (without Kane's cecal transcendental apparatus 
~9eraci ng 1 co derive space from time within Heidegger's formulation 
~[ pure self - affected time . Rather than succeeding in deriving 
spa=e from o riginal time, Eeidegger appears to exclude space 
a:::::cgether from his metaphysics based solely on original time. 
7ime is the only ontological condition of the possibility of 
:::::1e - ~tj ~cti ve' •qua ::Jncic l world. vJhat Heidegger i s proposing 
::e~· -:: is tile nature of time as prese:nced in Being and Tim.::>, namely, 
:...::.:t:. Li!llc .i.:::: (_i!.'= tJl . .L ( UuL....l.i..:t~ vli.i.: .. : .l.ug.i....:..:..: .:.:,itdi~i..:..L~. ~f ::a.:;r:::.i.:-:. 
: .~sei~ i~ being inauchencic or 'going from the self ' c anno~ escape 
i:sel~, ~ecause all there is is finitude or the operation af time 
:.. :: : i :--: _:_-: e bt= i ng . 
?er haps, the most significan~ departure point between 
~eidegger and Kant on cime is the notion of activity. Heidegger's 
-3nalytic' a~ time in Being and Time is an examination of time as 
:::he sole unifying construct o f the possibility of existence. In 
:-.h is se:,se, He idegge r can iJe seen as col.l aps ing the total opera t icn 
.) f Kant' s ::.ra~scendental machinery into the primordially active 
.::.::nstit'~ttiv..::: substratum o f ci:ne. Kant's view of time is more 
passive. 7hat is, Kant's working ou t af time is dependent on the 
~ c ta l c peration af the transcendental machinery. Each piece of 
Kane's transcendental machinery has a different function in 
Some parts primordially assemble cime, :.. .~ ., 
~nt·J..:.:.:..:)n, ·.J thers act as a temolate over time and se:1aation, 
s -.::~'l ·2!r.acism, .:tnd still other parts regulate the ~achinery 
3sse~bies and works out ti~e, i.e., reason. 
i.e., 
chat 
?assage 2. 
As pure self-affection, time is not an active affection 
concerned with the concrete self; as pure, it forms the 
essence of all auto-solicitation. Therefore, if the 
power of being solicited as a self belongs to the essence 
c f the finite subject, time as pure self-affection forms 
the essential structure of subjectivity. ( K?M, 194 ': 
::: :< p l i c a t ion 2 . 
Time in its primordial o:-1tological state, as pure self-
affection', is the condition of the possibility of an empirical 
self ot- 'concrete' antic identity. -Pure self-affection' and 
-auto-solicitation' are phrases Heidegger employs to emphasise that 
we are maintained in our everyday contingent finite experiences of 
personal identity through being unified and constituted by time's 
futural ecstatic dynamism [* Futural ecstatic time will be examined 
in Part I, Section IV, C, ( iiii]. 
If the 'essence of all auto-solicitation' or condition of the 
possibility of 'becoming' an ontic self is time, and if the 'finite 
subject.' is so constituted by time as to be 'the power of being 
solicited as a self', then time is the exclusive, singular 
constitutive condition of subjectivity. 
?assage 3. 
33 
time as pure self-affection is not found "in the 
mind" 11 beside 11 pure apperception_ On the contrary, as 
the basis of the possibility of selfhood, time is already 
included in pure apperception and first enables the mind 
:o be what it is. 
The o~..:re :inic.e se..L!: has in itself a temporal 
~ haracter. ~herefore, if the ego, i.e., pure reason, 
:._ s ess e r.t i al l. y tempo riJ.l, t. he fundamental determina t i :: m 
~h i c h Kant prov ides f o r transcendental appercepti o n 
:nu.::;;_ Ci t. . ::::i L Lc"-- U tftc: ~J.i~~~:.i ~ i0:.~ ~::L- ..:.,ug ii ::. ~ ~i.s ~ {~ i-l l ~J ~ l: ~=.. l. 
-~ : 1a r: a c ter . : KPM, 1 '9 7 ) 
Exp l i.::ati c n 3 . 
. -\s ':ime is :he singulal-, i :rr-::ducible, a c cive and pur~ self-
lf ~e c ced cond i ti o n o f :he possibility o f :he empirical sub j ec:, s o 
• ..; ::a c is !.>::garded as the subject, _ __ _ , ·put-·:: r-eason', is it.self 
~i :-:i ::-.e, and t r,er.:::fcre, r.:::ason is on~y :.;. t,.::l::.igible r:m t h e: basis o f 
:.>=:: i :--.<j S :) ~ ·.:-nstit.'.lt ed cy t l:ne 3.S ': 0 :Oe a possibil i ty ·-::>f being a 
s~ c: ~c :. ~o r · ~ s i mp l y, :i~e is pri e r o r p~imcrdial a s t he conditi o n 
~ : ·.v t: a r i s t:. n i t e i n D as e i n · s u r. de r s t a r: d i n g , name l y , rea san i c s e 2.. f. 
... :: t- :ie!.- r: 2 -:-endel:' intelligible Kant's functi o n of :.ranscendental 
:t pp~r c ..::pti c n, ::. . ..:: . , as c.he synthesis o f conceptual knowledge 'ri --'l 
:~~ ~~gu ~ating ideas of reason which constitutes the act o f che 
:ransc endent:al subject, cime must first be rendered intelligible as 
the ~nly ~..::a: -active' condition [ *t o the exclusion o f space ] cha t 
~ ~nst i c.utes i ts possibility. 
?:t s sage 4 . 
Time and the "I think" are no longer opposed co o ne 
3no ther as unlike and incompatible; they are the same. 
Thanks to the radicalism ·.vith which, in the layir;g of the 
f o undation of metaphysi c s, Kane for the t1rst time 
s u bjected time and the "I think," each taken separately, 
t o a transcendental i nterpretation, he succeeded in 
bringing them t.ogether in their primordial identity-
without:, to be sure, having seen this identity expressly 
as such. ( Kl?M, 197 ) 
Explication 4. 
Given the accumulating evidence that the subject is nothing 
wit hout time, Heidegger claims time and the subject are identical. 
Mo re precisely, the subject is time, because in or·der for the 
subject to be a subject it must be primordially constituted, in the 
strongest sense, by the activity of time. 
Heidegger claims that Kant's philosophy brings this implicit 
conclusion to light through being the first philosophy to submit 
the -r think' and time to a rigorous transcendental analysis. For 
Heidegger, Kant draws the line of connection, priority, and 
identity between time and the subject so subtlely as to secure the 
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cr~nsce~de~tal subj~cc (reason itself ) 
p o ssible ground of metaphysics. 
and not ~ime, as ~he only 
:=:3.ssage 5. 
Can one scill consider i: to be of no importance 
:.hac in speaking of :.ime and cf1e ''I chir:.k, 11 KarlL used che 
same essential predicates? 
In ::he transcendental deduction, "The 3.biding 
3.nd unchanging -I' \pure apper·c~pt i o n :: f o ::::·ms ch~ 
~ul·t:e.ict.ct:: ~....:[ dJ..J.. u [ u 1..J..L !.. - ~t-'L · c~~::: i l.tciL.i ·..:..:i 1 .:3" .: ~:23, :~i(3, 
~. 14:6 ) . And in ::he chapter on schematism 1,.;herein che 
~ranscendental essence of time is brought to light, Kant 
says : "Tr.e existence of what is transicory passes away in 
cime but not cime icself" \ A 143, 8 133, :.JKS, p. l 84 ) . 
And f u rcher on: "Time does not change " : A 182, 8 225, 
~-r t<:s , p . :z 1 J .' ·: t<: Pr-1, 1 9 7 ! 
~ :-: p ~ i ::: .3. t. i c n s . 
:\s f '...!!.-the r 
~~idegger poi~ts 
'.vhen de scr ibing 
'ur.•:-hanging' . 
e•;idence of the subject's ident.ity with cime, 
out that Kant uses che same 'essential predicat~s· 
both the s1.;bject a.nd time, i.e., 'abiding' and 
.::n :h.:.s prcof, !-l:eidegger maintains he has demor.strat.ed t:he 
9y proving their identity, 
H~liegger ~ laims that the subject is t ime's pure self-affection; 
::::;ac .:.s, ; .= :he s ubjec t. is nothing but che acc.:.vit:y ,)f :ime, reason 
is ~xclcded from the subjecc's const.itution. If reason is excluded 
from the subject's constitution, then there is really no subject at 
all. There is only time and time's temporalizing. Time does not 
require any synthetic centre, i.e., transcendental subject, in 
order co provide the unity of the temporal order. Time is purely 
aesthetic and provides unity by its relational activity between the 
tenses. Time is the pure self-affected unity of Dasein. 
In The Metaphysical 
states that time ''does 
[ *transcendental subject] 
Foundation of Logic, 207, Heidegger 
not centre in a kind of thing 
. which would be the common centre for 
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Far Heidegger, an analysis of exiscence does not c enter in a 
An analysis o f existence needs only time's c ntolog ical 
and ~ntic structures. These structures arise ou t o f time's self-
?t[tecting, self-integrating r.::lationa l activity. ':'he unity of 
--:::<.is:.e:1c e, tt"ie g!:"'ound cf metaphysics, can be rnain:.ained by time 
iniciating and unfolding" the tenses. 
i:1sertion. 
[ * ... ] is the author's 
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IV. ~nicv, Time and Space 
I~ sec uring time as constituting the o nt o logical conditions 
t.hat further constitute existence, what has Heidegger achieved 
~:o. c ::: l y? :<ant himself recognized the primacy o f time i n his 
3na l ys~s; but time a lo ~e, without the empl oymen t of the a prio~i 
' Ul. 
-- - . . , ~ 
"-VU ...L..\...l ~J.VL. 
t: - .• 
. · - . - . -
- . -._J • .L L 4 LJ. .- L. f . 
: ; ;:~t'/, :..!1 Kane's sense::, is the integrat.ed a c t. of cogniti o n thac. 
~c:h secu res the ~dentity o f t he sub j e c t and the constituti on o f 
T~le c l·i tical quest ion o f how spat.ialir::.y tics ~ nco inr.eqrac. ing 
:.s neve~ addressed ~n Kant and the ?robl~m o i: 
The existencial stacus of Dasein's spat i alit.y is the 
to t=:urely finite rendering 
:=;1 :1dame!1tal o ncol ogy o f Dasein. 
I f time c annot. provide che unification o f Dasein by 
ac=cmmodat ing Dasein's spatiality within that temporal unity, 
~eiJegger 's proj ect of replac i ng rat io nal cognition wi t.h time as 
:~e u~ ity o f human being is undermined. As Didier Franck remarks, 
'spac.:..a l it.y' has to intervene in the derivati o n of inner-time 
from o riginal temporality, the whole project ca l l ed Being and Ti me 
wo uld chereby be called in question." 
Heidegger's project. appears to be the maintaining of 
consticut. ive unity through the imaginat.ion alone, through t.he 
·o . Franck, Heidegger et. le orobleme de 1 'espace ( Paris: 
Edit.ions de Minuit, 1986 } , p. 115, as cit.ed in Christopher Macann's 
(Critical Heidegger) t.ranslation of Maria Villela-Pet.it's 
"Heidegger's Conception of Space," 135. 
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of r:-::rnporality within finite human existence. 
~~id~gger's position has a problem wich spaciality . This problem 
~a k~s maincaining the u nicy of Dasein 3 critical problem. In order 
: ~ ~xp l ain c t i s pro blem ~n che c o ncl uding seccions o f Pare One, I 
wi l : 3nalyze Heidegger ' s ac c ount o f time and spat~a:icy. :irst., 
-~ -- , ··- - -~--·- . ........ ..;.:..; ____ ; _ ,.,. -+= T"-,.--.-..~ ....... -i.-.,-- - ·~ · ...... ·-..:-
. \ ... ~ t... \.J... :t ~ · -= .,_ ,.;.,. LLL'-= ~ .._... ..... ...._.._..._._,_\._..._ .._, .. .., '-"~ ._,._l...J"-..-.0..1. _.~, • .._.._.,._L":j.o.• •• ..--.J ..... ~ -· -.. ... _; _, ._. .. \ : 
~ n~ i : : ~d The Concept of Time. Sec o ndly, I will exp l ain Heidegger's 
~=tL:._·/ ~ ,~r:l'.ula t i on o f Dasein' s spatiality in Hist o r.·y of the Co nceot 
.: r.: ~i rn r.:::. in B.::>ino and Time, I wi ll exa:11ine Dasein' s 
s ;:a.cia.:icy, c:1e e c stati •.: nature or time, and Heidegger's a.t:empt co 
j e ri~e ~asein's spatialicy from Dasein's temporality. 
r n 3 l e c cure d~liv~red t o che Marburg Theo logical Societ y in 
~~ i i~gger i ntrodu c es h is ontol ogi c a l way o t asking che questi o n 
c ime?' ~ i me is rendered int2lligible through human 
e xistence. 
Heidegger quickly points out that the :mtological way of 
asking 1and answering ) the question of time di~fers from chat of 
:n-:: c :;. o gy, physics and cognitive transcendentalism, i.e., from "acts 
..1 f c o nsciousness. '' The ontological way of investigating cime is 
not grounded in theological notions of 'eternity', physical notions 
of punctuating instances, i.e., 'clock-time', and nor does it "get 
around" th-= problem through "mental processes." (CT, 7E) 
Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, translation by William 
MacNeill (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 6E. 
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"Ihe question of '.vhat. t.ime :.s points toward Dasein, "if by 
2ase:.:-1 we mean ':hat entit.y in its Being which we know as human 
li.fe; this entity in its specificity" is "the entity that. we each 
o u 1· s e 1 •.r e s are . " i CT , 6 E ) - Spec i f i c i t. y ' i s i n d i vi d u a 1 i t. y , or i t i s 
: :1 a:::: •.vl:ic~ "in sc :ar ::~.sit is what it ca.n :Ce, it is .i.n ead: case 
:t! :.._: l~-=. '-- - I .:.. '- • !:.,. J 
-:'~~e ocint :J[ depa~·ture f o r asking what. t.ime is is not an 
; :::a "- · / s l s ,J E :: :: e " l. i. m i t a t. ions , u r. c e r t. a i n c y o r i :1 c c m p 1 e t en e s s o f o u r 
:: :·g::.iti'Je fac:..tl:y," but by asking what: human life is. : cT, l•J E ! 
'The :ru est.icn ~ f :ime ''is grounded in a fundamer.t:al possl.bilic.'/ •.Jf 
:.t:::= ~ *:)aseL:-t's i 3eir.g, '' which gives "::t EJCssible connect.i :: m oetween 
:: :: ,'1: whi..:::h i.s in :i:ne as .:l.Uthen:::.i c tempo!:ality to b::c:ome ·1i.sible 
vJhat bec ::JTnes v isible from human life t·egarding the r.ac. ure of 
: irr,e ·,· 
Heidegger 1ntroduces his peculiar ontological definit ion cf 
"t. l;.~ fun·jament.al phenomenon of time'' . :ts the ••futLlre.•• (CT, l4E) Tf1e 
9rimc rdial phenomenon of time within human life is futural. The 
J c minanc e of c.he present is not c.he authentic way of living. 
As Heidegger formulates it: 
Dasein is authentically alongside itself, 
it is truly existent, whenever it maintains 
itself in this running ahead. This running 
ahead is nothing other than the authentic 
and singular future of one's own Dasein. 
In running ahead Dasein is its future, 
in such a way that in this being futural 
it comes back to its past and present . Dasein, 
conceived in its most extreme possibility 
of Being, is time itself, not in time. (CT, 13E-14E) 
To be alive as a human being is to have the possibility of 
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:::;s::::illa.cing in or..tological distance from future to present, and 
t~cure co present-past . This "coming back" to the present creates 
two possibilicies for human life: l ) to be consumed wich 'everyday' 
c;. ,_:-:_i-/ities, i.e., "idle talk," "restlessness," and "bustle and 
L>.: s : n e s ;;;; ; " 3. n d .e: · i n .::: c m i n g back co t: he pre sen;: D as e i :::1 " i s i :: s 
. : . . . . : "• - , 
1: ..L =::;, l_ \.) .!.. ..!.. I.._. ..:-1. ..l.. 
~::e :JPJtmd of "conscier.ce. '' •CT, 13E-l4E S£ l9 E ) Heidegger dces noc 
iiscus s a ny furcher what. "conscience' means here. 
present. and ::ut:ure t.enses co: lapse in c o 
:.~; mpoLJ.lity's futural constitut.ion o f Dasein. For Heidegger, 
Sxistence is futural 
~u:.ura.l motion takes existential priority ave r extensLon 
1~ancicy 1 as the dynamic of past and present.'s const.itution. 
Heidegger's ontological way of answering the question o f time 
1:1 t.erms of f uc ural priority offers a striking critique c f present-
_:-.:=r:t.l::ed tempc1:ality. To view time as the quantifiable present, a 
is t o take time to mean the ·now' o f the present. . In 
che "no~· of the present, we reside with everyday sensory empirical 
o bjo::cts, and bodily and psychological preoccupations: "in 
everydayness the happening of the world is encountered in time, in 
the present. The everyday lives by the clock, that is, concern 
incessantly comes back to the now; it says: new, from new till 
then, till the next. now." (CT, l6E-17El 
Measuring temporal distance by clock and calender, which is 
based on the predictable empirically quantifiable rotation of 
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c~lescial spheres, places the now as the primordial interpretation 
c E ~ime as present tense. Time "is already interpreted as present, 
;:; .ast is interpreted as no-longe.:--present, futu.:-e as indete.:-minate 
:: ,:c.· ·:.:er: -present: past is irretrievab~e, future indetermi nate." ICT, 
:,,le encounter what occurs and exisc.s as "t·unn i ng chr·ough a 
_ ;_ ._ •• 1~ - - -·--l 
...:J ..Ll.L'::j '....L~ L!...L ....:.t.l. .. "'-4. 
~ ~ ~eve~s ib l e sequence from an irretrievable past to an infinite 
~e~degger asserts two t h ings that are characteristic o f time 
F i rst, the dogmat ic: .:-igidit.y o f 
:::e -:: 'reryday ac c epted plv~nomeno n o f the ir .:-e'rers i bi li ::.'! of time , 
whi ch f ur ther maintained and propagated by s cience :tnd 
r-:.-::c:hncl ogy, covers wha cever may r·emain ·:> f ::tuthent i c time tc' b•:= 
~ende red intelligible. Case in ' s au t he n t i c E u t u r i t y i s '' e i 1 e d 
because :::h i s wa y c f looking at cime "l :::>oks a way from t !1e fl!ture 
towa rds t!1e pr:~sent, and from ·:Jut o f the present i t.3 vie w ~:uns 
a:t~r time ·which flees into :::.he past." (CT, 18E ) Inauthentic now -
ce ntred time severs the futurity which makes it possible. Time ' s 
irreversible rolling through the now into che irretrievable past 
"is grounded in the fact that time was reversed beforehand": that 
is, authentic time runs from the future into the present-past, not 
from the past-present through the present-present into the future-
present. 
Secondly, present-centric time homogenizes authentic time into 
space. The process of homogenization expels all futurity from 
itse l f into a present. The present is the integration of time 
4l 
coo rdinates within a mathematical co-ordinated system of spacial 
"time becomes the coordinate t alongside che 
spatial coordinates :<, y, z." (CT, 18E ) The assimilation of time to 
spa c ~ is the homogenizacion of time to spacial ''Presence pure and 
s i mel e . " i CT, 18 E) 
._ I __ - -· ~._ _ _ _; _____ _: __ 
Ll!.l::::: '-C1.L. ~-.C.;::,..J...Cl J. L lL\....tL. --'-'l.:. -- -· .... --1.... 1 ~.J t-" l...• .. '....,; 
T ... ~ =t :: c i f .:_ a r: l e e x c e n s i o n . Heide·3ger uses Cart.esian space as a 
·s c rawman' to show the metaphysical prejudice contai::ed in time's 
disappearance into met~ic spatiality. Why is space not given a 
cam~ l e~enting ontological re~ormulation? Why are the o ntological 
;:-·: ssi.i:::.:..l.ities o f space passed ever in sile!1ce by Heidegge!:? In the 
~!1d, :-!eidegger's ontological revolL:.tion transforms the question of 
::.::~e ~ra r.: "what: is ::ime?" to "1.vho is t:i11.e?," where the answer -'.S: 
":::.i.:ne ~s Dasein." (CT, 20E ) But can the question "'.oJhat is space?" 
o.-:: c.:. ransfcrmed to "who is space?," where the answer is: "s[Jace 1.s 
0as.:in"? 
B. Histor'/ 
Heidegger's ear~y treatment of time and spatiality in Historv 
~ f :he Co~cept of Time (Marburg, 19~5 ) prefigures Being and Time. 
I.Vi ll not examine Heidegger's treatment of time and it.s 
canst i cut ior. of Dasein (concern and everydayness ) in the History 
because those themes are more fully developed in Being and Time, 
and will be discussed with reference to that work. Heidegger's 
analysis of spatiality in the History is a problematic explanation 
fer spatiality being derived from time. 
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I!:i che section entitled "Spatialit y of the ~-Jorld," Heidegger 
~~ ick ly r~jects ~escartes' formulation of extensio as the primary 
E= u ndacicn of being in che world . Spacialicy "is a cons ti t ucive 
-:: 1 -=rr>::n:. of c.he world," but:. is not, :..n Heidegger's formulation, the 
~-=alic.y :.he '.-..'orl ·: .l. ~eiiegger' s ·:.mderscandi:--,g 
· spaciaL.ty ' here lS ma c hemac1cai. "!Jure metr1c space ." 
:-:eidegg..::r' s proje;::c. i s co make spat ial ic.y 1 in '::he sense or " pu1·e 
-n~c ;:ic space" 't ·.::ierivable ft·om the "env .:. roning .,.,rorld." 
WocLi is t:.he conten::. of t.he o ntological consti:::.u c.ion o f 
~as ein . ~c :.~1s point in Heidegger ' s lectLres, world has t:.wo other 
J~~:~ry e l ement.s co- ccnst.it uting Dasein's oncological structure , 
:-.. :unely , ::.~me concern\ and everydayr..ess. Heidegger has -::labor ~=tt:.ely 
demcnscraced time 's constitution af everydayness i~ ccnstitut.i~g 
:.h-:: ~arid of Dasein. The question now arises , can Heidegger derive 
s p atiality fr om time? 2 u t f i r s t I w i l l in v e s c i g a t e w hac t :1 e 
~nit:.ary structure o f spatialicy 1s. 
:-!eidegger attempts to avoid a dualistic posicion o n spat iali t y 
chat defines "res cogitans negatively against res extensa , 
co:-,ceiv ing spirit always as non-space." \ HCT, 2241 Heidegger's 
proj~ct is to free space from ics association with corporeality and 
the " constant fear of materializing the spirit:." ( HCT, 224 l As 
Dasein i s strictly finite, so "Dasein itself is spatial," and 
further, "there is absolutely no reason to oppose this and to 
Martin Heidegger, Historv of the Concept of Time, trans. 
Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 198 5) , 
223. 
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chink, o n the basis o f whatever metaphysical presuppositions that 
s~i~~:, person, the aut hencic being cf man, is same sort of an aura 
whic~ is not i n space and c an have noch ~ ng to do with space.~ (HCT, 
22 ~ IE space is not abstracted mathematical extensi o n or 
~ sscc iated with a descriptive mapp~ng of corporeal matter, what is 
: ._ ...... 
Tl:-= phenomenal struct ur:e o f the worldhood o f space is 
" J 1.· .::tJn·ir:. ~=: s.s. " The pf:enor:1ena l structure aroundness i s 
:.: .~nst :.::.1t-:::d l::::;v r·emotion, regi o :1 and or i,.=ncatio n idirec:ionality ' . 
~emcc~:n :~vclves 'nearness' and "distance' underst ood noc as 
spacing [Abstand ] between two points but as r:.he 
~efere~:ial connection cf thi~gs that are removed o r remote from 
:=1se i:1. r-ieid.::gge~· u ses the example of a 1:oam wich a chai r .:.nd a 
The c ~a ir is remote fr 0 m the windo w 
:r-:._y :::n r::he basis o f the ''particular nearness o r remotion o f the 
.-~·r:air- .::;r windo w to me." ( HC:T, 225 ) Dasein becomes a kind o f zero 
p o int c f o rigin for the spatial world. The primacy of Dasein's 
spatiality makes geometric spacing a possibility. 
The c haracter of remotion is the "where to' of a "place." Re-
mat ing [Ent-fernen] is removing distance which both brings near and 
distances places. 
chair (place) and 
Places 
move 
imply regions. 
near (region) 
If I gee up from my 
t:.he window (place) I 
simultaneously distance myself from my chair . 
Place is the ~where 1 of ~where to' . Region is the ~to' of 
'where to' That is, region is the orientating direction . 
Nearness, distance and direction give the basic structure of 
~- _;s..:::.n• s spat. i alicy as aro"Jndness: "The aroundness in :.he world is 
:~~ ~egicnal nearness and distance of the intimate with-which of 
.. :c:-:cern." (HCT, 226 :· Concern is constituted by time. Heidegger i s 
i~troducing a subtle move chat makes concern, therefore time, more 
~asi2 chan space in t he unitary constituticn of Dasein. But before 
-- ,_ 
~.._ .. ..._ ... ..... 
:~: v~ . ~~idegger muse pcsicion place as t.he axle on which spins ~is 
H..::idegger's treatment o f place is cne key move in hi s 
:reac~ent ~f spat.iality that seeks co avoid the Ca rcesian noci o n o f 
spac e ~s corporeal extension. Place exp l ains how somet.hing ca n be 
:>~ .. :u: :;~· t-3.1: :.Jr Dasein without. be i ng a geometric spacing. Place 
Place explains hew a roundness 
as u nitary spatial phenomenon o f Dasein's 
.::o ns cit u. cion . Place ..::xplains why Dasein' s spatiality does not 
n ,:;c:essarily entail a split between non-spatial cognition a nd 
ma t.erial extension. 
:-teidegge:::- states, "all environmental things are placed," and 
;_ t~ac "some thing is near or far insofar as it has a regional place, 
a p-:.ace c rientac:.ed to Dasein." ( i--iCT, 226 ) !?lace has a unitary 
spatial 'doubling' affect regarding Dasein's constitution. First, 
c:.here is the everyday natural experience of things 'being-on-hand.' 
He idegger uses the example of the sky, where the sun "has its 
particular places . " (HCT, 226) Secondly, immediately handy 
-=nvironmental things have their allocated place: "'Place' is the 
where of belonging of what is handy or on hand in concern," and 
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:ncr:~ i:.~portantly, "coP..cern has the possibility of allocating its 
t::ar·t.icu2.a.r place to a thing, 'llhich is not at all obv:.ous." (HCT, 
r,-.fhac is not "obvious'' aP..d never demonstrated is hew concern 
· : i me l all o cates places for things. 
c · 
. _ace t>..:ncticns as 3. pra.gmat::.. •:: · . .ric•.N o f space. 
·· - - ' ~ --~ ' ; _ _ _, ., t-. ~ ~ - :..... - --- ..-. ~-- ................ 
• .l.. ,.....; ':j ~ -· i.. ~l---- .... t:: '-....4 • }... .; ! ..._ " .. ·~ - '~L ••'--' ._ _.._,._ i. 
:tr'.:-1 :ii.s::::.ance • between places. ?lace has a double employment :n 
~asein'.s p~agmatic spatiality. First, place exp l ains how we v iew 
~v~~yday spatial:.ty as the regionalized remotio n between places by 
s ~ ~v ing as beth ~oi nt of origin and destination. On this pragmatic 
:. ~·.·e l. , ;:)asein' s everyday move between places is familiar and 
ConcetT., 1.vhi c h 
.::: :) nsci::uced by t.i:Tle, somehow allocates che i. ndi,:idual places of 
c=-:.:.ngs. Heidegger positions concern as the ontological 
:::J ::.s r:. i.: : .1 t. ~ e n c f ..:::•:eryday pragr.1at ic places, and through place, 
. h l . 1 :· c n •:er::. :.::: t .•:! onto og~ca const~tution oE Dasein's spatiality. 
C~ ncern provides the possibility oE the remotion of Dasein in 
it.s ..:::ver·yday directive regionalizing between places. Heidegger 
views concern as a constitutive explanation of how these places are 
al l ocated in their everyday instrumentality. Why Heidegger sees 
concern as the ontological constitution of pragmatic place is 
understandable. If concern is constituted ~xclusively by time, 
c.heP.. time constitutes the allocation of places. Through the 
allocation of places, time constitutes the cent.re of Dasein's 
ontological spatiality. The implication of concern allocating 
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places is chat che unity of Dasein's constitution can be reduced co 
: 1r:.e. ~asein's spatiality can be derived from time. 
:-ieidegger:'s turn co place attempts t.o solve c he problem of how 
s pa c e c an be u~derstood apart from quantifiable (mecric J extension. 
:he metric view af spac e maintains chat abscracted 
- -- ...... - : "'' -. 
SlLL .... '1. J.. ~.::J 
s e9arat:cn Qf cognition from that cor~oreality due to the 9rocess 
-:: ::e 3.c::. :J E ;t:Cstra c ci o n-cogniti o n itself. Place, for Heidegger, 
1s ~dward Casey points o ut "a via media between body 3nd mi nd, 
·:>J th ·.J f whi ;: !-1 a :::e sec aside in o rder t o .::o nc-::ntrate ::m '.vhat. happ,:;.; n s 
:his o pen between - chis between ·.J f :he :.)per:." 
~~ ~ Jegser calls ic a " ;:learing ' in t~ese early L ect~res. 
r. c '.vever. 9lace has n o o ntological power o r 1 r:: s own. T h e 
s:' ~ -::1 · . .:: es ·::.J f Dasein 1 S 2 '1-::::::yday oeing .:> n hand, which all o ws the 
s:::.r~cture to fc.mct ion as the L~ni t y o E Dasein's 
spatiality, is allocated by concern. What is not "obvious' is how 
cc ~ c ern a l locates places, name ly, how time constitutes space. 
Heidegger's 'clearing' has no ontological possibility outside 
i ::.s purely p!.·agmatic use in concern: "The placing of environmental 
r.:-:.:..ngs, the determination of where they belong in a region, is in 
: u rn founded in the primary presence of concern." ( HCT, 226 ) The 
characterise ic of concern 1 s placing is ·clearing 1 • Concern's 
placing is 3. presence ( time's presence ) Placing is a 
determination of the use or unusable character of things in the 
The Fate of Place, 244. 
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~~vironmenc, where whac is unusable muse be ··-cleared' out of the 
HC'i I 2 2 6 ) 
~'lhat Heidegger subt ly glosses over 1n his purely every day 
p~agmatic creatmenc of place, which becomes ~ore obviou s i n Being 
a~a Tim~. is ~he possibilities of Dasein 's spacia lity functioning 
~.:._ :n~ ." hc\v spacia.li:::y c an b.:: d e!:.-i 'Jed Et-o m t:..:._me is •:::oncealed 
oeca~se H~ldegger does nac say what po ssibi liti ..::s spatialicy 11as 
:: ·d:-_ sid..:: it s use in concern an a purely fac ti c a l ~veryda·; :.e vel o t: 
Could it not be t~at Dasei~ 's spatiality has a 
.-:·::!'1..St.itu:::i,_re '.l~ified scrucrc.ure c f its ·:)wn? Could the - clearing' 
:~ ::'!::-. ::: ::1kes cL::tce ::> n any .:::ve r yday l e're l be ::onstit::.uted by t.he 
~~imordial ground of Casein's existential spat ia lit.y or 1n some 
kind o f co - ccnstitutional relation to time? It is ~hese spacial 
9recc cupacions thac ori enc a te Heidegger's thinking fro m the 1 930 's 
·:) nward . 
:. he remainder of these early lectures, Heidegger 
:cnscan t ly repea ts how Dasein's spatia licy i s conscituted by ci me, 
-::. 3., "nearness i s nothing buc reduction in the l oss o f time," and 
"remot ion is determined here according to how I have t:ime." (HCT, 
227 & 231 ) Unfortunately, however, repetition without demonstracion 
doe s no t show that spatiality is derivable from time. Heidegger's 
~eccil ~rem the possibilities of spatiality reaches far into the 
hea rt. o f Being and Time itself. Heidegger' s project to unify 
Dasein through time alone is not tenable without a demonstration of 
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spatiality can be derived Erom time. 
3-:::ina and Time 
Int:coduction 
As H~id~aaer's ~laborate onco l og ica l scructu~e of Casein 
Heidegger concisely summar-izes his 
9c siti o~ i n c~e following theses: 
Time ~s primordial as the temporalizing of 
~ emporality, and as such it makes possible 
~~e Constitution of care. Temporality is 
essentia l l y ecstatical. Temporality 
~ emporalizes itself primordially out of the 
~uture. Primordial time is finite. 
T~e fundamental change in Heidegger's notion of time in 3~ing and 
T J..me 1 s time's ecst:at ic charactel:.-. Does this move help Heidegger 
pr~v i de an acceptable demonstration of spatiality being derived 
: ~ - .·:m ::. ~:--r;e? 
:-;,_.:..s sec : ion \vi ll examine three quest ions. What constitutes 
~asein's spatiality? What does it mean for time to be 'ecstatic'? 
Does Heidegger offer a demonstration far Dasein's spatiality being 
derived from ecstatic temporality? 
What constitutes Dasein's spatiality? 
EdwardS. Casey gives an exhaustive and masterful analysis of 
Jas e in' s pragmatic spatiality in Being and Time in the chapter 
entitled "Proceeding to Place by Indirection" in his The Fate of 
Martin Heidegger, Beina and Time, translation by John 
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc . , 19 6 2 ) , p. 3 8 0 . 
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Plac~. · Therefore, this thesis will not attempt to repeat Casey's 
~~r~vai ~ed and economical (although s o me fcrty pages ! ) treatment of 
=:.:~.sein 's spa::ialit'l in Being and Time . What this thesis will 
.J.t :: empt t.:l add co Casey's analysis of Dasei:1' s spatiali::y is a 
~l aser examination of the ·oa' of ~asein gi ven in of Section V of 
----. --
-JC\...- L. _ ...._.£.£. 1 
~~idegger gives an account of Da se i n's ·existent ia l spatiality' as 
·there' ar ·disclosedness ' of Da -sei n. 
:~ his 1927 Marburg lectures , Heidegger makes a bri e f a s 1de: 
";Jpenn-::ss oelongs tc its L*Dasein ' s] being . ~he Dasei n is its Oa , 
i::s :-:ere-there, i n which ir: i s here for itself and in which others 
=t !.. "~ c :1 e r e '"' i t h i t ; and i t i s at t hi s D a t hat t he handy a n d t. he 
-: :·:: :~ n t .=t. re met w i. t h . " Th is i:Jr·i ef bre a k from the purely time-
: e~::red na::ure of Heidegger's 1927 ~arburg lectures is enough to 
pe .:tk c:1e -::urios ity G f Heidegge r's :ranslator Albert Hofstadter. 
!-iofs-:adter offers a brief but r:evealing ''A Note o n the Da o f 
Sasein " fr·om hi s "Translator' s Appendix" o f his trans lation of 
Heidegger's 1927 Marburg lectures entitled The Basic Pro blems o f 
?hencm.::>nology. 
The Fate of Place, pp. 244-284. 
Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
translation, introduction, and lexicon by Albert Hofstadter 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982), 300. 
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t' c llowing Hofstadt:er, Dais the "the ability to oper: up." More 
9~~cise~y. Da is the ''let-be-unveiled as uncovered or disclosed is 
cr--:..:: :..bilit.y t.o exist as the Da." \ BPP, 334 ) T~e German adverb "da" 
2 3~ be mean many things: as spatial or l ocational "being-here" 
::,:-:.:1 " being - the r·e " and as temporal ''being-chen,'' "being-when" 
~ :;der ~e i degger's usage in Being and Time, t~e Ca , although Eirs: 
i.::::r-::duc ed 1n its spatial and l. ocat.ional characcer, eventually 
~eighs in ~eavil y on the s1de of a temporal bias without. a ccg~nt 
J~mc nscrat:o n c f why the ''Da's" temporaL conscicuti o n ::akes 
~~i ~ ri~y ~ ver its spatiaL constitut:.ion. As Hofscadt.er points o ut: 
~hese te:nporal connotations fit i.nt o Heidegger's 
~ sage, but the aspect:. first stressed in 
Being and Time is a spat i al one. Later, when 
the role cf time and temporality, especially 
Te:nporality, is comprehended as constitutive for 
: he Dasein's being, the notion o f the Da takes o n 
a temporal sense which does not appear so clearly 
=tt:. the beginning. \See, :or instance, the connection 
between ecstasis and openness, p.267 [*The Basic 
Problems of Pho=>nomenologv] . ( BPP, 3 3 5 ) 
::::pa tiaL .. ty is disclosed as the being c·f Da. Spatialit.y is 
constituted as a possibility by the d:!..sclosedness of Da. Only 
Albert. Hcfstadter, "Translator's Appendix: A Not.e on the Da 
and the Dasein," 334 .. 
As Heidegger's notion of -Da' is suggestive of both spatial 
and temporal examination, so Heidegger' s notion of Presence in 
t hese Marburg lectures is suggestive of both spatial and temporal 
analyses. - Anwesen' : "to be present, " and - Anwesenhe it:.' : 
"Presence" is essentially ambiguous; that is, beth terms can be 
applied to beth time and space. In these Marburg lectures, 
Heidegger certainly obscures spatial presence in favour of temporal 
presence. 
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:hrough the disclosedness of Da can pragmatic spatiality be 
::.·~nder·ed possible, and "only so can the human being be ~here' as 
· :- here' in its being towards beings which are ~there' " (Bl?P, 
as openir.g l\P I 1 primordial placial ~ c learing' 
is the o ntol og i cal conditio:!. r:::;f the pragmatic 
.... .. -. ...... - ~ ..... .. - . ~ 
~ t- ._;. .__ - -l - - .._ ! :..5 
::: .:t ~.s -: h e e:-:istent i al struc::·~tre that constitutes Dasein's pragmatic 
':!:.-:: ._:; Cl.t. .:::l·:Jgical r o le of Dasein is t c be i:::.s Ca; r:h::~t is, to be 
- ...... .::::: - •. :: ~ .-::a 1.·-:: d ' ·:J !:" j i s c 1 o sed cons t i t :..1 t ion w h i ·= h make s : h c o n t -;_ c -
~-nagrnatic :::iist.i.nc tions of ~here' and ~:::-_here ' .3. p 0 ssibil:..ty. T r· 
c-:: ccme :Ja l.S to ::e r~ndered in ' :")penness'. _r1 t:his ~ssen~:a.l 
:Lsc~osedness, "t~l e spatiality or: the world becomes possible within 
whi ch 0elngs c an be distinguished from their being and ur1derstood 
0y way o f :heir heing and so encountered as the beings they are, so 
::-.~o. at hLlmar. : -:)mpcrtment toward them as beings becomes possible." 
·: 9P!?, 
Da is the existential condition or "essential disclosure" that 
makes the pragmatic spatial 'here' and 'there' a possibility. The 
ability to "let-be-unveiled" is the capacity to exist as the Oa. 
The ,::apacity to exist as a Da is the source of the pragmatic 
Basic Problems, 335. Hofstadter goes furcher in stating: "The 
German for to be Da is Da-sein. The entity, the being whose role 
i~ is to be ( its) Da can therefore be called Dasein. Here 
Heidegger uses a Sein-word, a being word, to denominate a Seienden, 
to name certain beings, those whose role it is to sustain this mode 
of being. Dasein's role is to sustain Da-sein, and that is why it 
has this special ontological name." 
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spacia~ity of the world . Therefore, as the Da is the existential 
.::~:F:ii::.icn cf L'asein's pragmatic spatialicy; Heidegger says, "Dasein 
~s i L. s :J.isclcsedness." , BT, 171 ) And at chis point in Being and 
Ti11e, Casein's spatial disclosedness is strictly conscituted by the 
~xiste~cial placial openness o f the 'there' c r Da. 
T~e encicy which is essentially ccnscituc.ed 
iJ ~/ Oe :i..:lg-i!l-the-~~;or ~d is i ~selE in e,J el.-~.' C ~?tse 
" ._ , _ - --- " 
...... ~.:.e L-:: 
~ts '::t:.er·-::' ~ *DA: .. Z\ccot:ding to che tamiliar signiL.c.:tc.i....::.n 
:J : :he '.vord, the 'thet·e' points t:o 'here' ::t:ld a ' yonder.' 
T~1e -hen::' of an -I- here' is always understood in a 
~elac.ion to a 'yonder' ready-to-hand, in the sense of a 
Being towar-ds this 'yonder' a Being which is de-
severant, directional and concernful. Das~in's 
e:-:ist.=>ntial soatiality, which :.hus determines its 
'locatior>', lS itself grounded in Being-in-che-world. 
The "ycnder" belongs definitely to s o mec.hinq ~ncountered 
within-the-wcrld. 'Here' and ·yonder' are possible only 
in.::. ':here' -that is c. o say, only if chere is an entity 
whic~ ::as mad,~ a disclosure of spatia:.ity as the Being of 
the 'there'. This entity carries in its ownmost Being 
che character af not being closed off. In the 
~xpression 'there' we have in view this ~ssential 
disclosedness. By reason of this disclosedness, chis 
entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there ( ·oa-
S<3in' ) of the world, is 'there' for icself. 
When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the 
lumen naturale in man, we have i::1 mind nothing other than 
the existential-ontological structure of this entity, 
~hac it is in such a way to be its "there." To say that 
i.t ::..s "illuminated" ["erleuchet"] means chac. as Being-in-
the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not 
through any other entity, but in such a way chat it is 
itself the clearing ['Lichtung']. Only for an entity 
which is existentially cleared in this way does that 
which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light 
or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, Oasein brings 
its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there", it is 
not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; 
indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its 
disclosedness. (BT, 171) 
1tlhat is striking about this passage is Heidegger' s account of 
53 
~xist~n~ial spatiality being the 'clearing' or 'disclosedness' of 
:~~ 'there' or Da of Ca-sein. That is, Dasein's disclcsedness i s 
::..:-~~ existencial constit'...lcion of Dasein' s antic-pragmatic spacialicy 
-~1 3~ino and Time, Dasei'l's existent.ial. st:!:"'...lCt. ' ..ll:.·e is Eirsr. 
__ ; - ' -: :.. ~ ...:t 
. : -~ , 
.:-::Lct~..--..:::1.!.. 
, - .. .: ..... - . . ._:; : .. . 
- t. - , . - I 
~---~..;..-y, ~· !... ..- :. I LV -.. ......... - -l. ..._ ..__ .. .&. ~- · .:; 
:-!::wever, i-t~idegger ::io~s noc. - :.:o!1necc ' che 
~xis::.ential spatia: account of t he Da to his pragmac.ic a!1alysis o f 
spa:.iali:y. Instead of grounding onc. ic-pragmati c 
:=:pa :.J..3lic:.y in the ~xistential struc t u re of the Da , 
~=c~~pts ~ o ground Dasein's pragmatic spatialicy in ~xistential 
-:~·s::tr:~,=· :.--::mporalicy c.~1 rough its ...:o nstituc.icr.al st!:"uc cure cf c a.!.·e. 
f..:. !::nul a::. i e n o f ec sc. a c. ic time ca n prcv ide c. he just if icat. icn fot· 
s~a:ia l :~ereness bei'lg derivable from ecstatic cemporal c.hereness. 
~n ~ ~Jer : 0 oive Heidegger Eull benefit of the possibility o ~ time 
.3s ~he singular primordial consc.itution of ~asein, of time being 
::~ere tas.:.c t.han spatiality, of spatiality being der.i.vabl,:: from 
·.::.:~i ~, ':.JA ·.vill examine Heidegger-'s formulation of ecstatic time, 
which will include his other relevant formulations of ecstat i c time 
besides thac. given in Being and Time itself. 
( iii) ecstatic Time 
Dasein is so constituted that time is its definitive acc.ivity. 
The ~nic.ary extensity of being alive is time's segmented point and 
continuum, stasis and flow, originating from one unified formation 
of being, namely, ecstasy. Paul Ricoeur economically summarizes 
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c~mpora:icy's unifying function in Being and Tim~ in the following 
The first one says that the question of time as a 
'.Nhole is er:.veloped, i:-t a manr..er that remains co be 
.:;xplicated, by the basic structure of "Care." The 
second c ne says that the unity of the three dimensions 
;:; : o::irr . .:: f•..tture, past, and prese!1t i s an ecstatic 
'-l r:i:. 'l u-: •,vhich the mutual e:<teri o rizat..:.. -:w: of :hese 
-=:L;::,L .:i~~,:::; ~l.. - 0 LC~J.::; fL· ~.: . .tL'l L.~-1 CiL- -,-e:i.--i Ci-L ~Zl.ij,S.:_C::~~C:i.t. ~""'·:_~~4 ~i-L~:: 
a.ncther. ?inally, the unfolding of th.:..s ecstatic unity 
reveals , i n turn, a constitution of time that may be said 
to be l3yered, a heirarchization of the levels of 
tempora l ization, which requires distinct denominations : 
tempo~ality, historicality, and within-time-ness. 
2 ~ r : u~ purpcses, we will assume the ~alidity ~ f Ri coeur's first. 
;n~ :h~rd o o i n ts concerning time's .:;labcrate uni~ying const i tuti o n 
3 u t. s i. n c e •,..; hac. we a 1· e a f t e r i1 e r e i s t h.:: de t a i l i n g o f 
:-:<?~.:iegger' s notio n o f ecstatic time and its use 1n Heidegge1::' s 
at ::.e:npt ed ::i~~:::i·lat:. on o f !Jasein' s spatiality, we will restrict 
- J~ rselv.:; s to the st~ucture o f ecstatic temporality itself. 
I:--. :::<,=. ing :tnd Time, the question of Being-a-whale, the 
::::.::··.t :.::::: ~_,t·al :_mity ::-.ha t ir.tegrates Casein's exis::.ent.ials, l·=ads to 
:::.~~ ~cstati~ -whole ' or uni ty of temporalty. The question of time 
beco mes the question of Dasein's structural wholeness: "the 
p o tentiality-of-Being-a-whole can be carried back to the power 
o f -...;ni :ication, articulation, and dispersion belonging to time." · 
Time maintains Dasein's unity through its ecstatic character. 
T.:;mporality can be designated by the Greek term ekstatikon: 
Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative Volume 3, translated by 
Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988), 63. 
Ibid., 68. 
"T-:::mporalic.y is the primordial ~outside-of-itself' [Ausser-sichl in 
_; :;d ::n- i.t:se lf ." (BT, 377·, The essence of t:ime "is a process of 
::..::m~oralizing in the unity of ecstases." ( BT, 377 ) Ecstatic unit.y 
i. s, as ~au l R icoeur furt. her paine. s ou t:, "t hat. of the differences 
.:u:.o r:a ,.:-.c stases . This differentiac.ion is intrinsically implied by 
The passage from the future to the pasc. and to the 
at. and :he same t. i me "-lnifica c.i cn and 
Unit.y is maint.ained :hr::::ugh the i:::.e!..-play of 
:~e :enses' differences -each t:cward each. The int.erplay of past., 
;r~s~nt. and fut.ure constitutes t:~e "who le' of temporalizat:ion. Tte 
·.vL.~- ~-,.:-. ::-;f time is the unifying fourth dimension of time. The whole 
·ecstatic-horizon' o f Dasein 
~: '::'.s:i:~tt.ed by r::.he dynamic interpl .:<y of the t.hree tenses. The 
whc~e ,~ t:ime main::.ains unit y and is itself asymmetrical it is 
itself an opposition, an oppositional unity that unites the 
~el3ti2n ~ f opposic.ions between tenses. 
Without reason, idea, concept, schema, o r centre o f synthesis , 
ecst:atic t.ime "needs no support or pillars," because "the unity of 
t~~ ~cstases i s itself e cs tatic." (MFL, 207 ) Ecstatic time is 
transcendence ic.self. The ecstatic activity of ~temporalization' 
itself comprises the possibility of being. Radically immanent 
temporalization has no ground beyond its instances. But this does 
no t mean that. Heidegger' s notion of time has the problem of 
'distributive unity' That is, ecstatic time is more than any 
Ibid., 71. 
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parc12~Lar time, and cannot be defined by its instances because, 
:ike Kane, Heidegger takes time as an aesthe~ically given whol~ or 
: ..micy . 
7ime is always mo~e than its instances i n ics 'futural surge'. 
~ ::::.s Lt::::..:t-al surge is the o ncological limit o f present =tnd pasc. 
·: . .:::!l:pc::..-3.1:.::-. '/ is such that human be2..ng is so ccnstitut:.r=:d as co 
~at· ::::_ ,.:::::..pat.-:: i:-. tr=:mporalit:.y' s t:.emporalizacicn: "the free oscil l at:.i o n 
: i-:e ·,.;hol-.= o f pri:nordial temporality; time reach"2s and :ouches 
~:s-=: l E." ., :v!FL, 2.08) The pri•Jrity of the present collapses under 
~ ~~ ~e gger's notion of cntclogica : temporalization. To be alive is 
i.~ --" ~c.::;iecced into the future. It 1..s the future, not :he 
:~e ~r~sent it would b~ 'Nothing', therefore, any descripti o n of 
:-.. t1 t::: a.:::stheti c event of temporalizaticn is necessarily devoid of tr.e 
~c s:. t. i ·,-e .::o n te:--,c. o f presence. Only negativo=.: cracings ·::f t=-:e 
: :. tc.-...;t· ity cf 3eing are render·ed possible. For Heidegger, che surge 
~ [ ~osence define s presence. Thac which is revealed as presence is 
:ons:::itut.ed by the surge of what necessarily cannot be present: 
fu tut-ity . 
Futurit.y so defines human existence, in its ecstatic-
horizo:1al' constitution of being, that the activity of the pure 
relational structure of the differences becween past, present and 
!:u::ure maint:ain s unity. In The Essence of R>=>asons, Heidegger 
stat.es: 
The Concept of Time, 16E. 
the project: of world and preoccupation with 
being, as ways of grounding, belong co one 
temporality which they joinc.ly institute. "In" 
time, the future is anterior and is o nly temporalized 
insofar as past and present: are also temporalized 
in :he specific unity of time; the three ways of 
grounding which arise from transcendence bear a 
corresponding relationship co one another. This 
cc r~~spondence exists because transcendence is 
t·scced in the essence of r:.ime, i.e., i n ics ecscatic-
rluL iLulla.":. -...:vil;:;;L..i._tuC..i.vtl. 
:::csce1sy, from che scandpoinc of human being or Dasein, lS 
~~derscood as t~e s~rge, the 'going out' or ·screeching along' ~E 
::_;_:r.e. T :_ rne · ecscatically-e lastic' because human being's 
:.s :uc u ra l. That :...s, as ~Ne ar·e Eutural 
~·, -; n sc:.c ·.; c.:..an, so che present becomes bo th the site of the J:et:.urn c f 
and the site of everyday empirical 
~xperience. Past here is not the 'no-longer--present' but the 
l:e':u!::ning o f authentic futural Dasein to itself in the dynamic 
ecstacic unity. 
Heidegger's project: reverses the conventional interprecaticn 
~i time as ir~eversible and homogenized presence. That: the present 
~s e~e measure of past ( -no-longer-present' ) and future ( c he 
indecerminate -not-yet-present' l is rendered ontologically invalid 
or ·lnauthentic' according to Heidegger. Heidegger claims that 
=he constant repetition of present centred existence denies the 
3uchentic futurity of being, which maintains human unity through 
The Essence of Reasons, 109. 
· ·r take this concise formulation from Dr. James Bradley's "The 
Nature of Existence: Strong or Weak?, " (Memorial University of 
Newfoundland Philosophy Colloquium, 1997), 9. 
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:Oeing a constant return to its past in the present. 
A l'-':...:man being's "~xpectancy" of r::.he future, says Heidegger, 
"is :1ot: a mode of :O~ing conscious of time but., in a primordial and 
;~ nuine sense is time itself." (MFL, 203 ) To be alive is to be in 
E~t: ~t ral -moti o n'; t h at is , "time neither passes nor· remair:s bt..:.t. it 
• ·- - - 1 : ... - - · : - - - , c _ ........ ....... ~--""""'------ --::--·· { ~ .. .._.., , \.__; ..... ., ~. ._ -;:: ~~L ~ ' -' L._L...:..~"-C..:l -1-..:JC.:.J-1... 
... ••q ,.-... - ~ """"' ... ~ I 
. . ..... _ '- ..:..... • ..J • .;. As Heidegger f o rmulat~s it:: 
~x~~c :ing o~e·s own capability-f o r-being as mlne, 
::a'fe alsc corr.e c o ward myself alr.:::ady and precis~l·! 
~ ~ ~ ~ugh expeccing. ~his appro aching on~sel~ ~n 
.:tdv:=mce, fr o m o ne ' s own p o ssibility, i.s ::he primarj 
ecstati c concept of the fucure. this having-been-
:--, -:;ss t.emporalizes icself o nly :rom o u: o f and in :he 
f·...::".J.re . (Mf'L, 20 1::: ) 
~ : :-:: passage !':ro m :~;.e future to t:.he past and present: is a " c oming-
: ,.:: ~~/3t/is" :~at alr-?.ady has the past .3nd pr<::sent cc nt.=:>ined within it. 
::.~. :: ·.vh': sno uld ti;e f u :ure ha,;e such a privileged pcsition? Co uld 
~~ ~ : ~ s: 3S cc ~re c tly say t hat :he present has the future and past 
~~n:al~0a ~n it, and the past has the present and future conta i ned 
i :t ~c ? Why jaes a particular tense ( the future ! have a necessa~y 
pr~ ~ rity in the whole of cime? Heidegger claims chat che futural 
or iencati c n o f existence collapses the priority of present-tense-
:: e n cred existence. Indeed, the priority of t.he fut.ure does replac e 
::.he p:iority of the present, but does not maintaining a fut".J.re-
tense-priority encouncer the same problems as present-tensed-
priority, namely, the priority of any tense over the other tenses 
fractures the asymmetrical unity of time. As Ricoeur points out, 
"De we take as self- evident that the fact that the past is 
determined and the future open? This asymmetry separated from its 
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l:.-? :::.-:ner1eu t: i :::a l cont. ext. does not. permit us to appre he::1d c. he inc :r: ins ic 
r.::: l a:icn bet.w.::en t:he past. and the future, however." · 
I wi ll put. aside the dense problems arising ou t o~ Heidegge :r: 's 
Ecrmulac.ion of fut.ural ecsc.atic time i ts e lf . It is enough for the 
purpose of this thesis to have demonstrated that Heidegger•s notion 
of ecstatic time attempts a unification of Dasein's complex and 
layered structure of 'being-as-a-whole • without any appeal to 
Dasein•s existential spatiality. Lee u s now re turn to Heidegger's 
.~tt.e~pced derivat. i on of spatiality from time in sec ti o n 70 of Being 
entitled "The Te mpcralit.y of the .Spat.i.ality t.h.?Lt Is 
Hei.degger- claims that " Dasein's s~atiality is 'embraced' by 
t..-::mpor3.li.ty in the sense of be ing exist.enc.ially founded upon i t ." 
· . 3~, 418 i What i s Heidegger' s d emonstrati.on of his c laim? As 
Heidegger f o rmulates i t : 
Tempora lit y is the meaning of t.he Being of Care . 
Da sei!:1's consc.itution and its ways to be are possible 
on t ologic3. l ly only on the basis o f temporality .. . 
Hence Dasein's spe c ific spatiality must be grounded in 
temporality. (BT, 418) 
As a creature o f c are, whose very meaning is temporal in character, 
Dasein cannot but be founded in temporality. Dasein's spatiality 
":nust be grounded in temporality" in order to keep time as Dasein' s 
Time and Narrative Volume 3, 70. 
This section of my analysis owes a great debt to Edward S. 
Casey's subsection I I of his chapter "Proceeding to Place by 
Indi rect ion" in The Fate of Place, 256-259. 
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~nicarv sc~uctural formation. If Dasein's spatiality cannot be 
demonscrated co be a derivative o£ time, the whole project called 
"Be .i.ng and Time" collapses because time cannot unify Dasein. 
''.Spatiality is existentially possible only through 
:empcra.":.i:y, ''claims Heidegger, but any demonstration of this claim 
~:::: pL<l·e ::ime ." : BT, 418 ) Is Heidegge~ pror.esti:-'.g r. oo much ~ere? 
~~idegger admi::s chat a Kantian priority of time over spatiality ls 
destructioE o f cog~it.ion in faVOUl. o f 
c;--::sc:-:-:::i.:-~:=csc.atic r.emporality . Further, : o ~ d.i.ssol•Je' spatialicy 
~~ : c :::me Ls equally untenable because it is impossibl e and net, as 
~~.ijegger would have us infer here, because ~e is drawing back from 
If dissolving spatiality i nto t.ime LS 
T am sure Heidegger •.vould b"" more than willing to 
i--::mGnstrate spatiality's disappearance into time! 
~E Heidegger canno t deduce spatiality from time or dissolve 
~:opacialitj' intc pure cime, how is spatiality to be derived from 
cime ? 
Heidegger refers to his 'demonstration' as an "existential-
analytical inquiry as to the temporal conditions for che 
possibility of the spatiality that is cha.racceristic of Dasein." 
; BT, 419 ) What are chese temporal conditions'? Instead of an 
exhaustive analysis that demonstrates the existential temporal 
constitucion of Dasein's spatiality, Heidegger, following again the 
stumbling of his 1925 Marburg lectures, gives us a series of 
statements without demonstration, e.g . , "Dasein can be spatial only 
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a:: caTe," and "Only on the basis cf its ecstatico-horizonal 
~.:::mpcralic."f is it possible for Dasein to break into space." (BT, 
Does the ecstatic nature of ti~e help Heidegger derive 
~:.· r.:;:_:nd-=:d in an ecst.ar.ically 1.·etentive awaiting of t.he 'hit.her' and 
'::hit.her' that: are possible" and that "both bt-inging-close an:::i che 
~st.i~ating and measurement of distances within chat which has been 
:i~-s~,,~l·~d 3r1d is present.-at.-hand wit.hin-the-'No rld, are grounded _rl 
:1 :naking-presenc. belonging to the unity o f chat temporality Ln 
·..;hi ·.::h directionality too becomes possib~e. 11 ( BT, -!20 ) But Heidegger 
i s ~s nat ~ake i: c lear what the analysis of 'hither' and 'thir.her' 
3:1.i.r.s by ceing described as "an ecstar.ically rete:1tive awaiting, 11 
~u c h less how these two modes of Dasein's spatial regionalization 
are grounded in :emporality. ~'loreover, in the case of bringing-
close, de-severing, and directionality, Heidegger does not offer 
any demonscration of how these modes of Dasein' s spatiality are 
grounded in the 'making-present' attributed to unifying ecstatic 
:::.emporality. 
Heidegger admits that "the function of temporality as the 
f8undation for Dasein' s spatiality will be indicated briefly," (BT, 
420 ) but such unpersuasive analyses of the sort just examined are 
revealing of Heidegger's failure to derive spatiality from time. 
r:' u rther, Heidegger states that these unsubstantial analyses 
exposing his inability to derive spatiality from time are "no more 
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:ha.n lS necessary for our later discussions of c.he on tologi ca l 
11eaning cf c.he coupling together o f space and time." t BT, 42 0) But 
Heidegger never returns c.c an analysis of c.he ·coupling t o gether' 
:J f spac e and :ime in Being and Time and he later admits in "T ime 
:1:-:j 3~.:.:--~ ·-j" · :':.. 9C: 2 ) :hac. his ac.:empt c.o deri'te space fr·om r:.ime in 
- ,;: - ~ ~ ·- - - ·~ ~ ,......, ..: ...- - ..: - .. - -- - - - - ';..- l - ....,.., r"'"\ ....... """:. \ 
.:: ·= -- ~ --. ·-· ~ L . ..J l- S r:; ~ .. J.'-'1 •-l.L.-...4 .. ..:.. 1~ 1C ~~ ,_.,L4...__ . .:; .~. . ~""1. "' '"" - - :. , .. _;. 1 
!1ei '-iegge !: 's t-ecoil Et-c :n Das ein 's exis::.ent ial spat.ialic.y is s o 
r- :.-c:. r:ounced c. ha t i:: l eads Ed•,.;a rd S. Casey t.o conclud•:? t.rVl.C 
SPina and rime exhibics, ac. the level o f explicit 
in t ention , an o verall effo r: c. o delimit. Dasei~'s 
s ~ac. i a l iz i ng p o wers by subordinat. ing c.hem to the 
;oL.:caci'Jely great.er dynami c s t. o!:" , better.- , ecscat ic s · .)t 
temporali t y . In perf o rming r.h.is s ubo rdinat.ion, the 
boc k e mbodi es a f orm o f fl igh t - a shrinking back bef o r e 
:hG spatial st.ructures of Dasein, a s if these structures 
~cc a s ioned a special p h i losophical anxiety in Heidegger 
h i ms e lf du ring the p~r iod c f i::.s composition. 
Heidegger fails to derive spatialit y from time because 
Casein's spa tiality has an existential structure o f its o wn 
ii.stinc: t:t-or.-t cemporalit.y. Dasein' s primordial disclosedness, 
· :~ t= ·'.':me s s :J r p l a c i.:l l · c 1 e a r i n g ' i s i t s • e x i s t en t i a l spa t i a l i t y ' I B T , 
. ·-, . . 
.- , - . Heidegger should have grounded his pragmatic analysis o f 
Dasein 's spatiality on existential spatiality. Instead, Heidegger 
erroneously attempts to derive bot.h antic and exist.ential 
spatiality from existential ecstatic temporality in order to 
~naintain the hegemony of time in human existence. This -error' 
~eads to a series of problematic questions left unanswered in Being 
and Time: 
l. If spatiality cannot be derived from time, can time alone unify 
Casey, The Fate of Place, 259. 
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existence? 
:. =~time 3lone cannot unify Dasein, does Heidegger's ·fundamental 
J nt c lcgy ' collapse? 
=: c uld spatiality and t.ime t o gether be exist:=ntially 
~~ns:ic~:ionai o E human being? 
- 4 .. • .. ' • 
-, . ··- -~ u --'- \..1 :::i ~ .:t L -'- ct .!. .:.. L 'f ct : L \..1 L. it l tt::: ' :::i 1 ~ . . . ..... - ....... 1.i.U~u~..:l.Lo. - ·~ ... --- ..... ~-c .. ~ .J. . :;, ..._ <_; • L '-- ._; 1 
~nd ~xis:~nce in general beyond the confines of human Dasein, have 
:t t· ~ _la :i : Jr. 'between' them wichout one subordinati n g the other? 
!s ~eidegger's flig h t from the o riginal 'Da' a covering of the 
;r 
..:.~ .._ b e mo1·e c o gent: to derive e c st.at ic 
~ri mo r~ i a l spatial o penness of the 'there'? 
time f r e m the 
~0idegger's failure tc deri v e spatiality from time o pens up 3 
:ne:aphysical ~ui c k.sand that threatens to devour any prior ity o f 
: im-= i n :m o nt ology o f existence, and leads hi~ to ·turn' hi.s 
:r:.:.::ki.ncr 3.'-Nay from his o nt ological project gi·-.ren in early le c tures, 
3eing and Time, and Kant and the ~robl~m of Metaphysics. 
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V. Summary and Transition 
SL::nrnary 
~arc On~ cf this thesis can be summarized as fellows: 
:-:e.:..degger c·lai:ns he has deconscructed c.he need for a synth~tic 
- · L 
-yo-- ............................. -. ..... . 
~~ • .__; ._.....,.lt-''"""'f ....J.---.J I 
:; ~ .. 'i:.:11s ::e r:eeds ::mly time to -::onduct a ' ... mified on tol ogy oE 
existence; ~eideaaer fails to derive Casein's spatiality from time; 
=i r:d :.~12 t.:.:ne - ~l c•3etnonic unification of e:<i.::;t.ence appears to collapse 
~ n :~e basis o f the inability to derive spa~iaiicy from time. 
I will examine H~ic!egger' .3 
- e xplanat.ions' of the relation and pr.:..arity of time and spatiality; 
~is prsblematic formulation of political spatiality; Heidegger's 
~na~ysi a 0 f Aristotle's concepcion oE spacialicy; and his account 
~f ~he o r.:..gin o f space. These analyses present Heidegger's attempt 
:. c re - co~ceptualize spatiality apart from modern calculative space 
as an indirect result of his struggle to determine the nature of 
:.he relation between time and spatiality. 
2VENT 
I. 
In the essay "What Is Metaphysics?" (1929 ) , much is made of 
T~1e ~Da' is "that place of human being within which 
:1::tn ~nd:.ll-eS, as at heme, in the enduring," and further, "~Being-
:: : ... >= t·e' names that •.vhich should first. of all be experienced, and 
subsequently t.houghc of, as a place - namely, the location of the 
I'":" r"" _ ~ · - - II 
- · 1.. ~~ ...1...!.!.':::! ~ 
T .. _.,:-l----~~1- .... . ... ....- - - _, .. _ 
r: C.: ...&. ' -"' C '::j ":j C::: ..:... a:> '- u ..o... !. ! .._ '-I •- ~ L ~ 
,, .- , - __, - It t-' .l.. '--"'- c 
i~~e c t c onEir~ation t~at Ca-sein's ontological spatiality \ in :he 
:..:~r:c~uaq~ c: E Being and Time ) is much me:!:.-.:: irnpc!::tant: c~aa Being and 
Buc despit:e the shift. ~ o the pr~ority 
=~:he ·ra', Heidegger's brief remark on time is indicative of the 
!=t- o o~e:-n ::-::: faces in explaining the relation beL.ween cime and 
s~a::::a_;_:._t'/: 
che interpretation of time is the horizon of 
every possible attempt to understand Being 
Time is decisi~ely present i n the history of 
Being, without being recognized or thought about. 
~a this Time, space is neither co-ordinated nor 
met-ely subordinaced. iWr•1, 274-275) 
W~at ~s remarkable about this aside is that Heidegger admits 
t.hac his att.empr: to subordinace spatiality :.o time in Bt=>ina and 
~iP:ie is not ::Jessible. What. is not clear is what he is referri ng 
~ c ; o n: o logical Da or pragmatic-antic spatiality. Heidegger's move 
to the "truth-place" of Being, the open "Da', is what is called 
cntalogical spatiality in Being and Time. If the "place" of t.ruth 
is t.he spat.iality he is referring to here, or if its antic 
Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" reprinted from 
Exist.Pnce and Being, translation by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick (New 
Ycrk: Henry Regency Company, 1949) in Existentialism From 
Dcstoevsky To Sartre, editor Walter Kaufmann (New York: Meridian 
Books, l975i, 261&271. 
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s~ac.:.a:.ity, rcr that matt.::r, neidegger offers no -::xplanation of 
what che ~~lacicn between spatiality and time is in c~1is essay. 
IE spatiality is neither 'co-ordinated' nor 'subordinated' to 
time, what is its relation to time ? Heidegger passes this question 
::v.::::- 1!1 silence in "What. is tv1e t.aphysics? '' :te idegger does make 
·,,; ~ n t -:: !.· s ~ rr: e s t. .:: r , l. 9 :3 S - :3 1) , a t c he U n i v e r s i t y o f !? r e i be r g i n a s e r i e s 
:-:-::i.degger stat:es that the ~uest:icn "•.vhat is a thing? " includes 
-:.~-;-::: ~u..::st:.ons "what .:.s space ?" and "what is time '? ". ne 3.SkS ;:he 
.~ ue st::i o n he avoids in "What Is ~'let::aphysic:s?," namely, "how and ·.vhy 
3!.·.:: s9ace J.nd time con joined?" . .. Heidegge:t:'s problematic revision 
~ - ~ne rel3ticn bet:wPen space ~nd time is as follows: 
we vJil: '::::JiVe the composite "Zeitraum" a rr.ean1.ng 
that is designated to indicate t he inner ~nity of 
space and time. Thereby, the real questi o n applies 
co the "and" [*relatior. ] That ·.,.;e should name time 
!:lt·st, that we say Zeitra·..1m and not Raumzeit, should 
indicat e that time plays a special role in this question. 
But that: should not mean at all that space can be 
ded~ced from time or thac it is something secondary to 
i t . ( ltJT I 16 ) 
Is Metaphysics?,'' Heidegger readily admics that 
spat:i3lity cannoc be subordinated t:o time. This is another direct 
conf1rmacion that his attempt to derive spatiality from time in 
Being and Time is not tenable. But Heidegger still cla~ms that 
time has a 'special' directive relation regarding spatiality, i.e., 
we say Zeitraum and not Raumzeit. ' Given that Heidegger has 
admitted that the 'Da' (ontological spatiality ) is the ground of 
What Is A Thing?, 16. 
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r:-.~inki:1g, it. is unclear what 'space' he is referring to in his 
: ,J nn u l at ion o f ' Z e it r a urn ' . 
In chis lecture, as in his attempt to derive space from time 
l~ s~ing and Time, che expectat.ion is that Heidegger will explain 
whac cime is, whac space is, and how che relacion between chem is 
. . ·- -J -- . - ..... - .... -. -l - . . .... 1.- - \. .... ~ .... ~ ... -- - · ~ -
_ .. • .. '-.-4 '~ :. .- ....J .._ ·.._., .._. . ......_ ...J '-"' '-' • " .._ • ... .._l '- • .. .._; '-" ...:L .. o. ~ -.. -~ .. . --,.-.,~..., h' -~ ..4- · ~ ~ - .... -J .... ---.A. ...... _ ... _....; 
:: a.:; ; s9eci.:1l leading relation regarding space. He idegge r m'.lS c 
i~~o nstrate how the time-space relation i s Zeitraum and not. 
~aumzeic as the priority of the 'Ja' strongly suggests. 
:::·oes Heidegger succeed in tr'.is lecttn-e where Being and Ti:ne 
:c=t:..>:c: ·: -:'::ac ~s, d c es he explain ho w space and t.ime are r:el.:tted? 
What Heidegger do 0 s 
ins tead is :a c riti c ize Descartes and reject the nation that s9ace 
~nd :ime are external to things. For Heidegger, space and time are 
scmeho w -interior' to chings. What does 'interior' mean here? 
Space is not only around a thing but directly 
in it; but this space is occupied, filled up . 
. . . The thing takes up this space, encloses 
t.his space by its surface, in itself, as it.s 
interior. space is not an exterior frame . 
. . . Our ouesticn has been whac the interior 
of a phy~ical body looks like; more exactly, 
the space 'there'. The result. is: this interior 
is always agai~ an exterior for the smaller 
and smaller particles ... where does the 
interior begin and the exterior end? Does 
the chalk consist of space? Or is the space 
always a cont.ainer, something of an enclosure, 
of which the chalk consist.s? (WT, 19-21) 
~eidegger answers his quest.ions as follows: the thing 
only fills space; a place is always placed 
into the ~hing. This placing in of space tells 
us exactly that the space remains outside. 
Whatever occupies space always forms the 
border between an outside and inside. But 
the interior ~s reallv onlv an exterior lying 
f u rther back. \Strictly speaking, there is 
no o utside or inside within space itself ) . 
But where in the world wou l d there be an 
ou tside and inside, if not in space? Perhaps, 
however, space is only the possibility of out side 
and inside but itself neither an interior ~o r an 
exteriar-. :'he stateme:lt "Space is :.he possibility 
o f inside and outside" might be cr~e. What we 
call "possibi lity " s ci L. 
l. :uio:::f.i.n.i.ce . '' r: u:::;si u .i. l..i. Ly:: ~d!l :1\c::ctl! lll oL 'y" ;__ :,.i.,:ss. 
We ar-e not o f the opinio:1 that we have dec .ided 
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wit h such a statement:. the questi o n o f the r-el ati o n 
ber.wee:1 the thing and space. . . . ft.Je •,vere concerned 
:o re~lect o n whether space and time are ~exter io r' 
c-:: things 01- n o t. :. WT, 21i 
=--:e i.-=ie qge!::' s notion ·.J f the relacion o f a th ing c. o i r..s "place" :lnd 
"sr:;:.c":: " :.s .:ts -=tuickly closed as it is o pened up. ft.Jhat is the 
~Lstir:_-::ic· n o etwee n ''space" and "place'' such that the r·e ca n be a 
- 9iac ing c f space'? If the 'placing of space' f o rms the between o f 
1 thing such chat it ca n have a discernable inside and o utside, is 
~ne ::--.1ng tr:e "pl ace" a f t.he 'plac ing of space'? That ~s, '.vhat 
::1ak~s ':t :bing a thing is it s in-being ·.)f "place" e n bor:.h ~hysi c 3.l 
:tn.ci Gn t ciogi ca l ::..evels. Ont-'J l·.Jgical and physical "place" 
<: cJn s :::. i: :.lte the 'bo rder', the o pen, that both separ.-ates and holds 
:2gether the interior and exterior of matter and the o nco logical 
difference 'between' being and Being. 
Heidegger quickly retreats from this place-prioritized 
9 0 siticn on the nature of a thing and turns to time. Heidegger 
asks, "in what relation do things stand :o time?" ( ~-iT I 2 .,, 
"'"' 
But he 
of fers li ttle by way of answer here to this question, and nor does 
he say anything particularly cogent about the difference between 
"space" and "place" and the relation between "space-place-time" and 
a thing. What started out in this lecture as a bold attempt to 
'?Q 
3.:-;.swe~· ::he question of "space-place" and time's relation quickly 
J~ssipa::es inca an unsacisfacccry and ~ndemonscrated claim chat 
"cnly 0 :1 accounc o[ this position [*Zeitraum] do particular t.hings 
become just there ( je diesen) ." d·JT, 22-23 '1 ?ollowi~g a pacce~n 
s~c in his earliest Marburg lectures, Heidegger fails to recognize 
-. J. ~t .._ 
_ ___ .... t .. .: ... _ -- ·-- · · - --~ ~ __ , .... _ ..J .... ........ ..... -- - .............. 1 ~--
,'::JVU l C:l-1.L....I...J. .4 ":j '--I Y r::!. .;ll.L\..4 '-' '"C.:... \..4'-..IC..::J 1..1..._,"- 1H"-4 i' .. ~ 
-r::e i denti:.•.: of :::.hings is cerc.air.ly in·:ol•:ed ~n c.he "space-
;:i ~~ ,:e" .?tr.d c~:ne relacicn, ouc Heidegger-'s attempt C ·:J arciculate t.he 
t·e:..acicn oer::.ween "space-place" and time is never cogently explained 
II. 
~eidegger examines spatiality again in ::he summer of 1935 at 
: :-: t !.··::: du ·::: .:. e n :: c Metaphysi c s." First printed in Germany in 1 9 53, 
".-\r, Int~·:Jduct:.:!...on to J'v1etaphysics" is still surrounded in political 
The essay is a rich mine o f thinking r-egarding 
H~idegger's leap into c.ruth and politics. The key to Heidegger's 
·= ~: m:~·o•Jersial reading of tru::h and politics is his analyses of 
spa::iality, more specifically, political spatiality. 
Heidegger turns to the pre-Socratic philosophers Heraclitus 
and Parmenides in order to trace the fundamental quest ion of 
Mt:!taphysics: "Why are there essents?" Heidegger claims that "the 
essent was called physis'' in Greek thinking, and that the Latin 
translation of physis as nature, 'natura' -to be born, thrusts aside 
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che original meaning. · According to Heidegger, the word 'physis 1 
:.:ienotes 
self-blossoming emergence l e . g. the blossoming 
o f a rose ) , opening up, unfolding, that which 
manifests itself in such unfolding and preserves 
and endures it; in shore, the realm of chings 
that emerge .:md linger on .. physis means the 
power co err.erge and endure. : rM, 1:2 1 
and "meta," in 3reek, 
:r.eans c.eyond som;.:;;thing. Therefore I "phi loscphical inquiry int o the 
t.··::alrr; o f being as such, meta t.a physika; chis enquiry goes i::::eyo nd 
:.!:.::: -::s3er.c, i.e is metaphysics." :. IM, 14 :• 
> :esci ·.Jn ing the ground cf mecaphysics "move s u s i ntc: che 
and "casts a new space over ever·ything and 
.:._ :: c ~:: ..::•.re CfC hi ng. " ( !M, 24 ) 1/Jhat casting space' means is not 
explained here, but perhaps, by engaging c.he o pen ·oa• "place" o f 
.:;ur there-being in questioning the ground of metaphysics, tr.e 
~ .. !_- ·Jund of -=::< i sc.ence, we transform o ur o ncic space o r wor ld o f 
everyday experience. 
~-=i.degger refines the question of metaphysics to "•.vher·::> is 
being 3icuaced?" ( IM, 29 ) Heidegger 1 S immediate answer is grounded 
in the context of technology, with Germany as the site of National 
Socialist revolution whose "inner truth and greatness" is the 
"-:::ncounter between global technology and modern man. '1 (IM, 166 ) 
l?e rhaps, He idegger 1 s formulation of the pel is can give us 
scrne understanding of his apparent apology for National Socialism. 
For Heidegger, t:he polis is the "foundation and scene of man 1 s 
· Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, translation 
by Ralph Manheim (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), 11. 
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being-there," it is "the place, the ther-·2, v1herein and as which 
h ist~r-ical being-there is. The polis is the historical place, the 
-: he2..·.=:: in wr.ich, o ut of ·,vhich and f o r which history happens." ( I M, 
::.:s · 
Heidegger has a double there-bei~g o perating in ~his essay. 
..... ' - - -.. ...-.. -~ I t l •-- 1 ._ .... - II - C ~- - -. ; ..,..... ~ .....,. -l - ~ .~ ...- ..- 1 : --., ._ ,....... -. I 
~;. .:,r-_; U C \ t-J~"""''- C ..._, .._ >...,~.._\ - .:.:JC-..o..a. 1 .._ l .... "'--'L ...._ .... . _- t"'"-...J..L.-'-._) _.,.....a. 
:~ere-beinq. These two enfold .=::ach oth.=::r with the p o lis having the 
~est p c wer cr physis at :he .=::xpense o f individual being-:h.=::re. How 
-:: :--..:: -:w , ~:_. ::u·-:: s :.; pposed t o oe related is not directly ·=xamined in ''An 
:::t !'::::;d L:. <:.: Ci2n -::.:- :vlet:.:::tphysi c s." What ca r. be sa id is t!:at t!.-"'.e p ol is 
:aKe s p~ior ity o ver individual Da - sein, chat is, whatever conflict 
~he re is between the polis and an individual sides heavily o n c.he 
s ~de ~f the po lis. Why? 
Heidegger o ffers no explanatio n besides that the polis, in its 
has exponent i ally more p ower. 'T'' -~e ac: o f 
~-: ..=:i :. q- :!1ere ::t ::.he ;;tate does net 9rou nd itself i.n the primacy o r 
~he i ndividual human subject because Heidegger claims he has 
jecanstructed the need of the cognitive subject dS the basis o f 
metaphysics. J:f the basis of metaphysics is not the rational 
subject, where is the ground cf existence to be located? In ''An 
I:1t.ro d u c:::.i o r. to Metaphysics," Heidegger locates the basis of 
metaphysics in the there-being of the polis not in the 'Da' 
there-being of individual human beings. For Heidegger, what counts 
in existence is power or physis as such which Heidegger interprets 
as the power of the polis, 'ein volk', as opposed to there-being 
power of individuals. Physis means 
- .~ 
~ 1 ) the emerging and ar~sing, the spontaneous 
unfolding that lingers. In ctis power re st 
and mcticn are o pened o~ c cf origina l unity. 
This p o wer i s che overpower ing presence chat 
i s no t yec mastered in thought, where in that 
which is present manifests itself as an essent. 
3ut the power first issues from concealment; 
l .e. in Greek: al 3 theia (unconcealrnent ! . ( IM, 51 ) 
12 1 .S~nce :he esser,t a.s such is, i c places itself 
it ! Ul l~ t_ I L l Led ~ ~CLO::::ll~ , -:i l_ . - L_ ~:C: ia_ . ._ L~ r::: 
~E :ruth i s possible ~nl y in :Jr.e 
phys:i.s. 
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wic~ th~ Greek essence o f being as 
:.;ec•.veen ~hysis and al ·:: heia The essenc :.s 
~:--: ;:;of a!:: as i t. i s. The t. n . .i.e as such i s essent. 
mea~s: The cower chac manifes ts ~cself scands in 
·~mconc·=a l:TI.en t. In showing it se lf , the unc o ncealed 
as such c~me s to stand. Truth as u n- concealment 1 s 
nee an appendage c o being. 
c r ·ue 
This 
Truth is inherent in the essence of being. To 
be an essent- thi s c0mp r omise s to come !:.O l i ght, 
appear o n t he scene, co cake o ne's <its, p l ace ~sic h 
hin -sce .:..l en > ( IM, 36 - 8 7 ) 
t !..-ue bec a use it has ::he most p o wer- t 0 - oe . 'To take 
:ne 's place ' as a pol~ s is destructi v e because there i s only power 
as the basis o f action. Power is truth and truth is the basis o f 
But Heidegger appeat-s tc hesitate over th is po li s pm.;er--
truth r-egime, where "we have embarked on the great and long venture 
2 f demcli shi~g a world that has grown old o f rebuilding it 
authent~cally anew .. the violent act of laying ou t paths in to the 
o=:nviro n i ng po wer of the essent, '1 ( IM, 106 & 132 ) when he examines 
the ·::J reek not ions of 11 chc ra 11 and 11 topes 11 • 
Heidegger describes "place" as belonging to individuals. 
That wherein something becomes refers to what 
we call 11 space. '' The Greeks had no word for 
"space . " This is no accident; for they 
experienced the spatial on the basis not of 
extension but of place (topes ) ; they experienced 
it as cho ra, which signifies neither place nor 
space but that which is occupied by that which 
stands chere. The place bel o ngs to the thing 
itself. Each of all the various th i ngs has its 
place. That which becomes is placed in this 
local "space" and emerges from it. ( IM, 54 l 
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r: a "place" belongs to the thing itself, is there an inherent 
-::.::r.si. or: oet.ween what is my own "place", what is ..::ach ou r o wn 
----- .. -C .. 1 ~ '-'v"Yr:::.._ _"-..L ...... - . ·~ --~ ........ l._.;_;, 
1'1,1- , _. ~ - ..; _.. ....... "': • ~ 
• ~-· - ..._ ~ .- •I•!:"-'-. f I 
indivlduals come into conflict wit~ the power of a pol i s :hat 
s.::.::~:s tc jescroy them, are they n:::.t obliga':.e .::i to prese~-'ie and 
pr~ t.:: c : thems..::lves by resisting that. p o lis ? IE the "poli s-pl::tce" 
::'o:t-"..=:at-=:ns the inherent. given of the "person-pi.ace" that '.JI/e each 
~. :..:rs·:=l.•Je s ar-::, what "ola.ce" takes priority? 
~ c r Heidegger, the cnly means o f assessing the value of such 
~ Ju .::sti o~ is power. The polis has more power and therefore che 
Individual "places" function for che 
This power-truth-polis configuration 1s 
~~i~forced by J..cgos. 
!:-:ei::iegger· draws a further relatior.. bet·..;een ::tl·· theia, physis 
3.nd J..ogos. He claims that logos is at its source "al ·c· t.heia and 
phys is, being as unconcealment.. " ( Ifvl, l 0 2 ) He idegger present. s logos 
as ::.he permeat.ing power of physis that. is a 'gathering' t.hat 
maintains a unity of unconcealment ( al ~ cheia ) and concealment. 
Logos "maint.ains the full sharpness of their tension." (IM, 113) 
Logos : .. mi tes / ga:hers the chaos between the oppositions of 
cor..cealment and unconcealment as the emerging power of physis. 
Logos unconceals as truth, al§theia. Truth is unconcealment and it 
is intelligible as the 'event.' of logos which has gathered through 
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:~le -::me2:gen:: power of physis: "Ini::.ially the logos as -3athering is 
:~e event cf unconcealment, grounded in unconcealment and serving 
~~ . , IM, l35 ' 
Hei-.iegger claims t.~ac. "being-human is logos, :he gathering and 
3ppr-::hending o f che being o f the essent: leg ei n, cc collect, 
= ~~ s~rength of its essentia: relation t.a l o ges in t.he sense o f 
Pa r Heidegger, humanity is 
the s i te wh 1c h being requi~es co jisclos e itself. 
Man i s the sit.e of openness, t.he there. The essent. 
ju ts int.o this t.here and is fulfi l led. Hence we say 
that ma!1' s being is in the sc.rict sense of the word 
"being-t.here." The pe::::-spective f o r the o pening ot bein':J 
must. be grounded originally in t.he essence o f being-there 
as su ~.:: h for the disclosure of being. : IM, l T_) 
" being- there " is fully soaked in the trut.h ~hat. 
:_: :: c·::) nc.:::als .3s the power ·:J!:: the poli.s, •..vhich LS "the disclosure of 
i.:e ~ :tg ." ~be i ·.:Jgos c f indi·.Jiduals functi::ms as a site c f openness' 
: ~ :heat~e Jf ~perations fo~ :he pol is. ~o r Heidegger, humanity is 
ne t seen as individual "places" or sites of ir.dividual emergent 
unco nceal ing power-truth that we each find ourselves being. 
Rat.her, hu~anity is that which 'hears' t.he logos-unconcealment of 
~ower - truth of the polis. Humanity is humanity only insofar as it 
i s dwelling in the terror of the polis's power as the disclosure of 
t.ruth. 
III. 
Heidegger' s turn from the spatiality of the polis as the 
origin of human being and his crit.ique of modern calculative 
spatiality is grounded in his examination of Greek thinking on 
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s~at:.ality ar.d temporal:.ty. Also, in his examination of 
~~ !.-.:. s:. c~ r. l e ' s flhysics, Heidegg.::r explai:1s wha:: he means 
't o pology', the "logos" of "topes" o r the language of "place." 
In the winter semester of 19 41, Heidegger states 
· The modern habit of think i ng t ime t oge ther 
~"' t h ''s pace" ;already prefigured in che beginn:.ng 
o meca.pi1ys i.cs wic.n Aris::.oc.ie ! J..e acis u s asc.ray . 
~s r according t o this way of chinking time is 
considered s olely i n terms of extensi o n, and this 
as a c ounc.ing up of fleet i ng now-points. Thought 
ir: r!lodern t.erms, :.ime i s a paramet.el.- , liJ.:e space . 
a standard scale according tc which something is 
measured and estimated. Space and cime are 
essentially related to "calculation. rr 
( --:: ' However, in :.']re~k ·<, ,l ·-··.- c t .. .' , mean s whac c o r l.-esponds 
c :J · : : o ,_: , to t he p l ace '"he r e o::: a. c h r es p e c c i v e 
by 
being belongs. :<. ,· · o (: is the always favorable and 
3r 3nted time as distinguished ~rom the untimely. ~ - • . 
n~ver means a serial o rder of now-points o ne after the 
e ther, tut che allotment character t~at lies within 
:ime itsel f as what is a lway s proper [sch i cklich] 
send ing ~schic kenden] , ·3-rar.t i ng, and ordaining time. 
We io no t apprehend "t ime" when we say "Time is " 
1tJe a!:·e closer to apprehending it when we say "It is 
time." That al•tJays means it is time that this happens, 
th is comes, this goes. What we thus address as time 
i s it se lf the kind of thing that directs and allots. 
Time is the allotment oE ~resencing for what presences 
in ~ach case. Time is the expansion cf the respectively 
enjoined abiding [Wei le], according to which what 
p~esences is always some th ing momentary [jeweiliges ] . 
I:1 overcoming the unfit of ic self, che momentarily 
presencing - - ~ : ) r 'i corresponds to the en j oined 
abiding of transition. By g i ving what is fit to 
enjoinment, and by each one mutually acknowledg i ng the 
other, each respective presencing corresponds to t he 
allotment of abiding . That beings are in the respective 
c orrespondence of their "being" to "time" means nothing 
other than: Being itself is lingering, presencing. 
13 ) Presencing is abiding, and its non-essence lies in 
the lingering that would like to persist unto a final 
duration. The essence of being repels this limit. In 
ab id ing, which is always essentially only an abiding, 
being extricates itself from the unfit, and, through 
elusion, saves that One and Same as what enjoins, 
which is egress and pervasiveness and disclosure for 
77 
every being. · 
I r-1 chis dense passage, Heidegger appears tc be saying that "pl3.ce" 
:: c p o s ': is -where each respective being belongs' and "ti:ne" is th3.t: 
'N'::i ,~h c ·.:·:r:responds to the "place" such that t:.here is an -enjoined 
:t c.:..J.::..e1g' .: E "plac e" and "t:. i me" in ;t bei:1go "Time" gives ar.d al l ocs 
-:-~1 : =' i::-::d ab.:..ding ·::lf "place" and "t i :ne" 0 
"?la.ce" cannot be derivr::d fr o rn "cime" ''Time" assumes ics 
- ,_.,:: -::r:e' ·.:n: "r:;lace'' i:1 ot·der co allot ~md grar.t dur3t:.i o n. A.l though 
-: : ~ -:: -::T' ·.:i n •?r'.t' ( *t:.he "couplir.g" of Being and Time ) of "time" and 
";::.. ~~ -=" is n ..:c:-::ded Eo r the preser:ce cE a beir1g, "p l ace" is prior in 
That is, in existence, "place" 
j u r .ati c n. The st:.range nature of "place's" -firscness' is -::xa.mined 
~:: Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's Physics. 
rte i degger's analysis of Ariscotle's Physics B, 1 was given in 
:~ :E: ::.::st u:imester at F'reiberg in 1940 0 Heidegger claims that 
'' . 1\ri.st::.Jtle's PHYSICS is the hidden, and therefore never adequately 
st:. u died, foundar.ional book of Western philosophy."· · :n his 
examir:ation of Aristotle's notion of Physis or -Nature', Heidegger 
makes an indirect reference to Aristotle's -topics' as the method 
~::>f analysis. Topics are the "region(s } in which the question of 
Martin Heidegger, Basic Conceots, trans. Gary E. Aylesworth 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 103-104. 
Martin Heidegger, "On The Being and Conception of :tJ l'; r;'c 
in Aristotle's Physics B, 1," translation by Thomas J. Sheehan in 
Man and World, Vol.9, No.3 August 1976, 224. 
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has co be lodged" such that "the proper force and we ight. of 
.:Y.J ~- language" does not "replace t.he Greek " but serves "to place us 
~~= = che Greek and in so doing co di sappear into (AP, 2275.:226 i 
-::-.:pi e s ar ·:: t.he proper "p laci ng" in language ·:::Jf "places ". 
I~!. c hi s e ssay, there is "place" and "placing". "Place" is the 
- - ·- - ..... . ...... . - -· ·- - - -.-- .............. . 
1._-...J i. l. .:= '- .... ._ ._~. ~,.... ..- .l.L ':::j ·.:l '-' t,.... ...... •./ ..J.. ._ 1 . 
:::o 0 s C."-~ r ·? -=: h a. r a c : -:: r c f " p l ace " a. n d " p .:_ a c i n g " can p.:: r haps be c l a r i f i e d 
0y Heid.::gger 's incerprecacion cf the Gree k notion o f Nature itself , 
Heidegger translates the Greek term ~ o r -Nat~re' co mean 
":::..?t:: ·,.;hich ::_e c.s something orig inat:e fro m it s.::Lf." · ?.P, 22 1 ) The 
i. s "p lace " and the cri9inati cn fro m :.cself' is 
'' p lac i. ng" . There is -the self' (pla ce! and there is ·sel fing ' 
:-1-=:idegger' s ~:: xam ination of l?hysi .s -lodges ' itse.:.f 1n "place", 
This absence •)f "t ime" is all the more striking ._.,hen 
.:; :1.:: r.-.::::nembers chat Heidegger' s l e ctul-·?:S 1n che la te 192 'J Is o n 
. :>.rist:ot leIs notion o f presence i n Basic Probl.=-ms of 
Pheno meno l o gy are almost exclusively "time" hegemonic. 
"!?lace" and "placing" are the two key concepts in his 
formulation of Aristotle's notions o f motion, differentiation, 
presence and appropriating. "Place" 
i s something different from the modern 
conception of the change of location of 
some mass in space. T ~ ·J no;.; is the :lo tj , 
the place where a determined body 
belongs. What is fiery belongs above, 
what is earthly belongs below. The places 
themselves - above, below (heaven, earth) 
are special: through them are determined 
distances and relations, i.e., what we call 
'
1 space, 11 something for which the Greeks had 
~ei':her a word nor a concept. For us c o day 
space is not determined through place, out 
rather all p~aces, as constellations of points, 
are determined by infinite space chat is 
everywhere homogeneous and nowhere discinccive. 
But something thac continues to occupy the same 
place and so is not moved in the sense o f change 
of p l ace, can nonetheless be in the process of 
be ing moved. Fo r example, a plant chac is r ooted 
"i.n place" grows 11.r.creases ) or wichers :decreases ' 
. .. Vt" t:. ~ iC wi.t l!e: t:.i. ilS t .LC::~ Lli C: ::.ca. ·v--::5 Ji· y· u.~, ~~ l. C 
g~ee~ becom~s yell o w. The tree that is mo ved in 
=!i.e t. •tJo fold sense of r: · · · .: and ·,:.:.c : .: :.s 
s i multaneously ac resc 
:r.a: stands there. \ AP, 
ins o f a:t- as 
2 2 9 ) 
it. is 
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.. \s i-leidegger sees it o ut in chis essay, movement. is :-1o c c o be 
inc erpreced as ~xternal change o f Cartes i an posit ion o f s o me ~ass 
~ ~1 i D.f init. r2 spac ~. ~'1ovemenc is i nterna l t o che "place" where a 
i~ce~mir.ed bo dy belongs. Movement ~s appropriately internal to 
"ol aces". rl!ovement is "a mode of Being" that:. "has the c haracter o f 
·=met-ging i nc a presence" such c~ac the ''origin and o rder-ing o f 
c hange" has "ch i s ordering within i:self." ( AP, 230 ) 
The emerging inca presence of the internal ordering of 
differentiati o n into the identity of a special "plac e" is 
c haracterized by beingness, ousia or o '.1 · :·: · '(. Heidegger re j ects the 
trans lac ion of o i; : : L ,~ ( as substance or ..:!ssence. Rather, '1 o:·.r.:, : , .(, 
beingness chat which distinguishes a being as such" is "in a 
word: Being." (AP, 238\ Heidegger, in an anticipation of his later 
analysis of Ereignis, maintains that, for Aristotle, the word 
0':.• · < "still retained its common meaning whereby it signified house 
and home, possessions, capabilities, we might also say 'one 1 s 
present holdings, ' 'real estate, 1 that which lies present. 
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: and ] t he v ery ly ing-present itself." U\P, 238) !?or Heidegger, 
Being has t.he dual character of t~e "place" of what is present, 
:hat which ~ies there, and a manner and mode of becoming present 
~:se:..f, i.e., the "placing-of-place ." 'Thereness' or Being of a 
i:~ .:._ r1o .:._ s t. he origin, order ing and end ·:J f its o wn ide:1t it y. 8.-::ing 
If..- 1 ~ - - - J1 
~ ~'-1,'- r;.:,.:=J 
ccn:t..:.. :::ula:r self-differentiatingly ident.i ca l being-theres. 
8-::ing i s the appropriate ''plac:.ng" of a being such that. iL is 
jiff-:o: rent i ated from all o ther beings. In chat "placing", t he self-
~de:!t:.i ,:al :iif:er·entiating emerging into presence, Being constitutes 
c-hac wh i. ch i s as oei ng as a part:icular "plac e", as a part.i cu lar 
ide n t it.':' o r - this ' . 
!3-~.:.:tg limit s ·:::J r "places-p l ace", but this "is not limit in the 
sense of the outer boundary, the point where somet h ing ends. ~imit 
is always that which limits, determines, gives footing and 
stabi l i ty, chac. by which and in whic h somet.hing begins and is." 
· .A.P, 2 45 :: Being l:mits, defines, o r "places" internally self-
dift:erenc.iating identical there-being by "coming into the 
unhidden," o r further, "becoming-present [Anwesungj in the sense of 
coming :orth into the unhidden, placing itself into the open." \ AP, 
245&247 1 Being "places" itself into the 'open'. The 'open' is the 
"place" of limit, of what internally differentiates as origin, 
ordering and end of being such that ic. maintains identity. · In 
short, Being appropriates, "places" what is special, in the open 
· ·Aristotle (Physics Bk4., Ch4., 212a20) says that "the 
innermost motionless boundary of what contains is place." 
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"pla ce" o f oeir:g . 
.:.r: huma n ::er:ns, what is speci ally "placed" by Being in che 
.:> pe:: "place" of humanity lS .\ , ' : 'y o -~· . Language i s noc a property or 
among others. Language is that. ''distinguishing 
..:: :G:cact eris::: ic o f the Being of man chat he has, and holds himself 
o -: '· i..ugo s ; \ M.t", 2.3.1. : 
:::;:::..::::~ ::::~ !:e, :he o pen "place", c f humanic.y s uch chat human it y i s 
~:-,c..:::t-r-•. :.lly s ·=lf - differentia.tingly i Jent ica.l as t.he o rigin, o :t:·dering 
'lr:d -2nd ,::, f ic.s being . 
, c, ,_ :neans to collect o r gather· i.n such a way as to bring 
d iffer.:..ng scattered t h ings inco an idencir.y and "to bring t o rch 
c h.:..s un ity as gathered, i.e ., above all as bec o mi ng present; thus 
c ~ :nan:..:est :..:::. i.:s ·.: 0mi:-1g present." .AI?, 252 i In shcrc, Being is 
seen internally to beings themse l ves as the act cf revealing o r 
uncor-.cea. li ng o f .' .. ·,o ,: . ·~o~ i s the relat.ion on which alone what 
is presenc. gathers itself internal to beings in such a way as t o 
re'leal Being, i.e., "to speak the Being of beings." (AP, 253 ) 
The word i.s t he ground of humanity's relation to beings as such. 
Beings are that which is gathered and revealed internally as the 
''p l.ac ing" o f Being in the open "place" of human being, language. 
Language is 'appropriace' or proper to human being as the open 
"place" of Being's "placing", the event of unconcealing and 
2oncealing that is the relation of human being co beings. 
Heidegger examines 'appropriation 1 in the example of a table: 
Buc it isn't just any wood that has the character 
of appropriateness for a table, but only this wood, 
.. 
-
.. .. 
.·:=t~;: 
" 
.-
..._ 
selected and cut co order. But the seleccion and 
cue , i . e., the very characcer of appropriacion, is 
decided in terms of "production " of "what is to be 
produced . " But to "produce" means, both in greek 
and in the original sense of the German Herstellen, 
to pl -3.ce something, as finished as locking thus and 
so, forth, into presence. ·:·.\n i *matter ) is that. 
which is appropriate and orderable , chat. which , like 
flesh and bones, belongs to a being that has in it.self 
:he o rigin and ordering of ics being-moved. Eut only 
:. :: ~--: C: :_ :-.. g ; ~ .:i ~ : .::. :. 3 :i :: 2 :. :-:; ·:.' :--.. .J. +: ~ ~ ~ .- :.. :-: ~ :-. : 
::r2_';en :.::a.se ar.d how it is. •AF, 253 5c. :s~ .: 
1 ~ .-. 
;...::l. ·- ~;,q" l.nt.o " place " of ::1 oe ir.q is :he ~'l~nt c:J t 
!._- c c r·.:. a. t :en The "placin9" int.o " p:;.ace II LS ::he int.er-nal ly 
~- .::::e r:-::n::ia ~ ·.:-rderability chat is always a particular being, a 
~h·:: "pl.acing" into "place" is the -End' '·: ·· :.o:;) of a 
~:-:::.:.:lg, an ..::nd that is not ::he sto~ing point o f external mo\'emr::nt of 
: :~ . :~.ss -"-~ s ::::me ::::ccrdinat.ed ~oint in infinit.e homogeneous space . 
- -::nd' :_s begir:ning 0 f being-~oved 3.s the 
::J.•)at.hering and storing up ,'Jf movemen t " such chat a being is 
i:1 ter·:1ally sel~-origina.ting in order t ·o be itself, to be its end, 
::: ·J be , .. ,.ha:-was - it-to-be ··a finally appropriated being. (AP, 251J ) 
T:1e act. of :::hanging, the event of appropriati -on, itself "breaks ClUt. 
.i.!itc t.r1.::: cpen" in such a manner that "the emerging appropriatior.. 
I.. . 1j.l. w '\ o f the a.ppl·opriated ~ .'Sl!' _' l : (tl'.' ; ) gathers itself up and 
"has" it. self 1. :·' :~'""· ·- .' as in its end." (AP, 257 ) Heidegger translat:es 
Aristotle Physics l' , l, 201 b 4f. as "The having-itself - in-the-end 
of the appropriated as appropriated ( i.e., in its appropriation) is 
clearly ( the Being) of being-moved." (AP, 257 ) Being's "placing" 
·r follow Dr. John Scott of Memo ri a l University of 
Newfoundland in translating Aristotle's teleological principle t o 
ti e n e i nai as being-what - wa s -it-to-be a thing. 
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:.::1to ''place" is 'chis' being's internally appropriated 'having-
~ts~lf-in-t:he-end' ~'!oreovec Being is the end, the origin and 
~ rderable preceding condition of finality and immanent: Einiceness 
. .::; [ 'this' being's presence, self-placing or "being- o n-t he-way," cf 
: ~:;-c ~, :t tir.ally .3.f:' prc·priat:~d beir1g, that. is, ct 11 self-placi ng'' 
b~coming what-was-it-to-be 9resent itself cy I.Jeing "the 
b.:: c:~mi :--,g-present of a becoming absent." ( AP, 266 i The end is absent 
t r .:.r.-t ;:· '!:.·.::.sence , but -absent' does not simply mean -void-there' 
~ :--:: :? .~ti ·.)n c: 3. thi ng i tse l f; r-ather, i:Jecoming-absent const.it ut: ~s 
~0comina-cresent: internal t o a placed being as t~e appropriating 
The lack must be - the·ce' i.n :Oe,=oming-
5-H-esent in order that. becoming-present: is rendered a potential. 
~ac k c r absence is the necessary desire or 'rage' tc exist. given 
i. :~ t::rna l ~y ::.o ceings sue~ that t~~y can become what: they are. 
:-:ei.jegqe'!:.- says that this ''becoming-present-by-becoming - absent 
:·:Jr,s titutes a mode of Being." (AP, 266) 
~eidegger's reading of Aristotle's Physics is a significant 
moment in his thought.. Heidegger turns to Greek philosophy for 
co nceptual re-alignment on the nature of spatiality and he appears 
to break with the modern conception of spatiality. Heidegger's 
dep~rt~re from the scientific-modernist project of the quantifiable 
homogeneous metric space of technological mastery is made 
beautifully apparent in his essay entitled "Building Dwelling 
Thinking." 
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IV. 
Heidegger poses two guiding interrogative questions at t~e 
"oe·,3.:..nning ·::>f his essay "B '..ti lding Dwelling Thinking," namely: 
l. What is ic co dwell? 
~. How does building belong to dwe:ling? 
~.:..rst, ~hac ~~ d welling? 
t-:eidegger asks che quest.ion, "do houses in chemselves hold any 
,Jua:t·a.n :.ee t~at dwelling occurs in them?" \ BOT, 146 ) Heidegger 
e:.:: a:n.:.:..es r.ne terms "building" i r,oun ) a~d "building" \ verb j : 
Yet these buildings tha:. are nat dwelling places 
remain in turn decermined by dwelling insofar as 
they serve man's dwelling. Thus dwelling would 
in any case be the end that presides over all 
bu ilding. Dwelling and building are rela~ed 
::ts end and :-neans. (BOT, 14 6) 
-:' h ..:: " ,},.,.·elling p l ace" precedes any poss.:.bility :or :.he construction 
J ~ physical enclosures ~r shelters. Heidegger rejects this common 
.:Es::.:..::cti o n becween building and dwellinq as a ~means-end' 
::..::lacier., because "building is not merely a means and a way toward 
::hve i ling co build is in itsel: already to dwell." (BOT, 146 ) 
What is the source of che confusion regarding the ~means-end' 
interpretation of building and dwelling? 
:'~e covering of the "building as dwelling" relat.ion is a 
sympt.om of the technocratic appropriation of language. Our 
assuming to be t.he "shaper and master" of language is invalid, 
because it is language which is the "mast.er" of humanity. 
Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," 
Lanouage. Thought, translation by Albert Hofstadter 
Harper and Row, 1971), p.l45. 
Language 
in Poetry, 
(New York: 
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~s ~he source of our dweiling. Language the open ing of the open 
p~ace', the Da of our being of Being . 
Heijegger's dissection of the meaning of key archaic terms is 
i:1dic~tive of proper "place" dwelling. Heidegger traces the Old 
:-:i.:::i: ~-=~·man -~~o ~·d bauen, "whi ch mea.r.s :o dwell," fJ t" "to stay i.n 
SCT, 1-1:6 ~ Heidegger examines what i~ means to be a ~uman 
namely, 11 to be .:; :n.tman be ir-.g means 
.... n :1s a mortal. It :neans , , l avJe.l. ~. 
;:J:c c :::ct, - ·~ · preserve and care for. 11 ; BOT, :..-!7 ) Tc ouilj, as 
iw-:::.:. .:.1. ::q, :.s ::o prese r'fe and nurture, 3.nd co no': oe consumed i. n a 
"~-_'i ··~e~~ :::: :nak.:.ng :hi:-1gs. The 11 care " :nean ing o E :Ou i::. di:-1g -· dwell ins 
:: ,1s !:eer. ·::: .osc\_j,r·ed in fa.'J ou r cE t ·:= chnccr·.:n.ic ll ccnst.r:.Jcti on . 11 
3uilJing-dwel l ing as the ca re and nurturing o f special liv ing 
~:1cer-r.all:l "placing" "places" has been violent.ly appropriated by 
:-.echnoc r:ac i c building-dwelling as construct. ion of inanimate 
A river is nat a giver, sustainer and :a.ker of 
_ i :e : .:J be preserved and e'fen worshipped as a sacred place. A 
:- ~·.'e~- is a source of energy, a source of resour·ce : c be controlled 
3nd harnessed as a sit~ of construction. 
Ther~ is a tension between dwelling-building as the 
cultivation, preserving and sparing of living "places" and 
dwelling - building as the construction of inanimate things. 
Heidegger states in On The Way to Language, trans. P.D . Hertz 
New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 112, that 11 language, in granting 
all this to man, is the foundation of human being." 
The "placing 11 of "places" is what Heidegger calls 'Nature' 
in his examination of Aristotle's Physics. 
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Heidegger only examines the latter dwelling-building and ·,.;hat 
should be proper to it. Heidegger's main point in chis essay is co 
rnake the construction-building of ir!animate "places" not 
:~:.r . .:=::.-en:.ly destr-uctive of cultivac.ed living "places". 
~·lit::. h.:..s r:ecollective t::.·acing of bauen, Heidegger derid,:::s 
~ l '_tmar:.i:. '_l' s ignorance of :he power .:tnd "mystery" of r::.he "primal 
~al::." of words chat bot.h hide and t-eveal r.he truth. ?or 
Hei:Jegget-, we si~ould l isten for t.he "place" 'tJhere language "talls 
sile:.:," cecat.:.se it lS there that che truth cracks through. 
~is ten tc what language says :..n the wot·d bauen we her·e three 
~~h.:. :tg S II ; 
l. Bui l ding is really dwelling. 
2. Dwelling is the mar!ner in which mortals 
are on the earth. 
J . Building as dwellir.g unfolds into the building 
:.hat cultivates growir.g :.hings and the building 
t!1at erects buildings. 1.3DT, 148 ! 
"Build:..ng as dwelling" of human beings is the condition of the 
p o ssibilicy of either building as -cultivation' of living things or 
the construction of material enclosures. 
What does this dwelling-building entail? 
Heidegger traces what is properly recollected in the meaning 
c; f a word. This time it is the Old Saxon wuon, and the Gothic 
wunian. The Old Saxon word wuon, like bauen, means to remain in 
"place", while wunian tells us much more of how this remaining in 
"place" is "experienced." Briefly, Heidegger traces the Gothic 
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word to r:1ean "peace,'' 11 free, 11 "preserved from harm and danger," and 
11- ..... :: !.·ee ac c..1a ll y means t.o spare. " (BOT, 14 9) 
What. is chis -spar~ng'? 
R.::al sparing is not. only negative, e.g., as t.:J spare a cat 
~r~m b.:: i ng ~un over, but. also posit.ive. Positive sparing "takes 
~~ r~t.Jrn it specifically t.o i:s essential being; when we -free' it. 
· 3DT, 
:~ ~ ~~e pc si:iv.:: sense of spdring is preservat.i o n, a removal o f 
i ~oedi~ent.s that returns a thing to i t.s o wn ~ature. Sparing is the 
:: :ul t i vat ing, ~=tnd care of living and inanimace 
:: c~ ns ;:- ruct ed 11 pl ac:es" . Fut·t.her, "TCJ dwell, to be set. at peace, 
s p~e re :hat saf~guards each thing in its nature. The :~ndamer.tal 
:: :1a!. · :~ c :::.er ·::: JwelL.r.g is this sparing and preserving." •. BDT, 149 ) 
This "spal.-i~g and preserving" is :he essence of humar1 d•..;elling "on 
the ear·t.h." ( 3DT, 149) 
At this point ir. the .=:ssay, Heidegger introduces his 
"f o urfold" manifold of "earth and sky, divinities, and mortals." 
. i3D':', l4 S 1 These four maint.ain a unity or "primal oneness. 11 Each 
~lement. maintains it.s cwn identity only insofar as "we are thinking 
the other three along with it." The unity of the fourfold cannot 
Ibid., pp.l49-150. Let us look a little closer at 
Heidegger' s poet.ical expression of each element: earth "is the 
serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and 
wat.er, rising up into plant and animal;" sky "is the vaulting pat.h 
of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter 
of the stars, the year's season's and their changes, the light and 
dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and 
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b~ separaced inco discrete elements and acomistically analyzed. 
~ac h element maintains its identity only insofar as the other three 
ay..=. held in the dwelling nearing discance of t:he whole of the 
: :::~~.J l.: f cl d. Human beings are "in the fourfold by dwelling," and the 
-::_-:::m.::: rl t:::tl c o nstituer:t o f dweliing i s "t ::J spar.:: a:1d presenre . '' I. BCT, 
- '' :..-W '::" .L -- : ~ ~ .. . l . . . · - . L L .!.~! ! T\....L ~ !. y ..... 1 • • • - • • - t.... - \ -~ ~ .. - l .. ~ . .... - · '"- '- .t..L\..J...A.'-j~ .. ....... .. ~-" ~ .......... ...... ':: 
:: :: ere b y, "safegua.rd[ing] eac h c. h i:1g in ~ts o wn natu!:e." ( B:JT, 1 4 9) 
t::1ink i s :: o iwe l l as a human. To dwell as a hu man is t o 
~cl c~ v::t t:e a:1d spare o ur ~pen Da. I ~ be~ng o ur open Da, we preserve 
::. !:-: i r: g s i r. ;: h e i t- e s sen c e s by r· e co l l e c t i n g w h a t needs t .~ be o f a 
::. :: i :1 q t c be a ': h i n g , l . ~ . its proper or appropr i ate nacure. 
Y-l h at: is th·3 re l ati '.:>n •::::- f :,umar. being's i t:--,inking ) -dw.::lling-
~r~ servati on' t o che e l ements o f the f o urf o ld unit y? First , human 
i:.::eir.g s dwell co "save the eart:h'' o r "cc set s o mething fr.::e i:1:::. o its 
: wn -::sser.ce," which is contrary t o the usage o f earth tor 
"bo undless spoliation." (BOT, 15 0 ) To save che earth is n o t to 
" •.ve .:u: i t ·-J ut,'' but to preserve, c ulcivate, and 'spare' it ~ bot.h 
pcs~ti ve a n d negati v e ! Secondly, human beings dwel l to "r-eceive 
sky as sky." \ BOT, lSO ) We should not interfere o r attempt. :::. o 
~~ansform the natural cycles - we should accept "their blessing and 
inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of 
t:-te ether;" the divinities "are the beckoning messengers of the 
godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in 
his presence or withdraws into his concealment;" and mortals "are 
t he human beings. They are mortals because they die. To die means 
t o capable of death as death. Only man dies, and indeed 
c ontinually, as long as he remains on earth, under t.he sky, before 
the divinities." 
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:!1eir- inclemency." (BOT, 150) Third, we dwell ~o "await. the 
::iivi:1ities as divinities." (BOT, 150 i We hope fer chei!:" coming and 
do :we make :alse idols for worship in che meantime as a response 
"the signs of their absence." (BOT, 150 ) F'oLLrch, human 
:..::~i!:l:jS d•t~ell ::hroL:gh i:1it.iar:.ir.g "their 0'.-vr. essential nat~!:"e - c.heir 
.i~ .::;c.h. rt i. 3DT, 151 ) This :.s not to say we shcLLld ir1itiat.e deat.h; 
t: .:n:.::et· , i.n ou r dwelling-sparing-preserving we prepare the way Eo~: 
:::: .::: ~nd as Guod. ~ood death means the acceptance, cu ltivating and 
~;ar :~s ~f ou r essence as mortal fragil~ beings. ~~ach i.s n e t the 
·: .::: i.-.i, O!..it ·.:::L•r " a ,.,n essenti .J. l nature." Death is the still absence 
-; : ·.vit:!1drawal that gi•.1es t:he light: of presence, and r·equires 
;!::es-:::r·.ring :md sparing' because it is evo?.r present. ·:tS the 
:cndition f a r l ife. 
!-tow does hurr,an being's dwelling preset"'Je the unit: y of the 
~w~lling preserves the fourfold by bringing 
the essence of the fourfold into things. But 
t:hings themselves secure the fourfold only when 
they themselves as things are let be in their 
essence. How does this happen? In this way, 
chat mortals nurse and nurture the things that 
grow, and specially construct. things that do not 
grow. Cultivating and construction are building 
in the narrower sense. Dwelling, inasmuch as it 
keeps the fourfold in things, is, as this keeping, 
a building. With this we are on our way to the 
second question. (BDT, 151) 
Dwelling that "preserves the fourfold," and thereby, brings "the 
essence of the fourfold into things'' is a building as cultivation 
of living things and a building as the construction of non-living 
things. How does the dwelling-building of mortals "bring the 
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ess-:::nce of the fourfold into things?" 
:n order to provide an answer for th~ abov~ question, 
~-:::~d~gger begins Part II by restating the second of his 
~nterrogative questions, namely, "in what 'tJay does building belong 
::. c dwelling ? " : BOT, lSl ) I:1 order to pro·Jide an answer to this 
.::~:; r.st~· ·..:cc:.ng c:r.ir.gs and enquire: •tJhat lS a built thing?" 13DT, 152 • 
:-:eii-::g9er u s-::s ch-:: example of a bridge to ''serve as a.n examp l e tor 
, .. , . ~.-efle -..::: ::.::. o ns . '' BOT, 152 ) The bridge "gather·s t o itself in its 
)•tJ n '.tJay ear:::-.~1 a nd sky, divinities and mortals." : BOT, 15 3 1 The 
h~idge in its essence gathers the fourfold i nto a primal unity. 
'.:'!;e bt·idg.c? - ~. et be' in its essence maintains ::.he fourfo l d as a 
• :: :--. i ::--.g I • 
·r~e br:.dge as a thing that gathers the fourfold into a u nity 
is J dwelling-building-construction that stands in the l andscape as 
!?a t· t ':> f r:-. he l andscape. The bridge in its essence gathers the 
Ec urfcld as a unity; it gathers the fourfold as its essence as a 
::. ::. .:.ng: 
Earth - The bridge gathers the earth as landscape 
around the stream. 
Sky - The bridge is ready for the sky's weather 
and its fickle nature. Even where the 
bridge covers the stream, it holds its 
flow up to the sky by taking it for a 
moment under the vaulted gateway and then 
setting it free once more. 
Mortals - Now in a high arch, now in a low, the 
bridge vaults over glen and steam - whether 
mortals keep in mind this vaulting of the 
bridge's course or forget that they, always 
themselves on cheir way to the last bridge, 
are actually striving to surmount all that 
is common and unsound in ~hem in order to 
bring themselves before the haleness of the 
divinities. 
Divinities - The bridge gathers, as a passage chat 
~rosses, before the divinities - whether 
we explicitly chink of, and visibly give 
thanks for, their presence, as in a flgure 
oE the saint o f the bridge, o r whether that 
di?i~e cresence is abs:ruct~d 2 r ~ ven pushed 
... - ·- ... ,_ ...... 
· 00J./ ..l.. ~ ~-..!... ::.:..) : 
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:'h·~n :nortals dwel l , 'tJe bring the fo·~trfold ~ssence i!'lto :~ings. 
;.;h.::n mo rtals dwell we r·ecollect what is p!:oper o f <:J c.r o pen. 
~a n<;Juage is proper Cl t o ur open. The bridge is a :hing (dwelling-
cui.li i~:g- ,.::o ns:::::.-:..tcti.on ! . a 'gat hering o r· assemi::-ly ' o f ear-c.h and sky, 
mc r:als 3nd divinities. Dwelling gathers t he f our f o ld o f earth, 
sK~·. ~ ~viniti~s and mortals into a unity that is a thing. 
::!i'; :...:ied in _t t.s essence as a "mere bri dge" o r: an obj ective 
materially -::xtended o bjec t, and later the br-idge can :Oec o me a 
s ymto~ constructed by subjective musings. The split o f the bridge 
i:1t:: ":nero:: bridge" and symbol "does not. belong to it." •. BOT, 1 53 i 
:::·._, c r: a sp l it -r!_olates the bridge's essence as a :hing, namel y, th~ 
jdcher-ing cf t~e fourfold as a primal unity of recolleccive 
dwe l :ing. The gathering of the primal unity is the essence of t.he 
bridge as a building-dwelling-construction-thing. 
The bridge "is a thing of its own kind," because "it gathers 
the f o urfold in such a way that it. allows a site for it." (BOT, 
-sit:e ' appears to be Heidegger's principle of identity and 
difference. Site is the condition of individuation. Things are 
different from other things insofar as they are different 
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~xpressions o f che dynamically generating c onstitution 0f sic~. 
~he Ecurfold unity, i.e., earth and sky, mortals and divinities, 
2o mbined wi t h the generative aspects o f building-dwelling, namely, 
sice and space prov ide :he scru cture o f u nity that 
: c ~ s : i=~c e s che di ffer enc e and ident i ty o f t h ings. 
D o~ ,....,r-r n U . .:\ .;~ 0 ,--. ~ ,.- -=- ~ ''..::0 
-----:j t ____ ._..._::;::j--- --".:-
J. •.velli:--1g chir:g is the "origin of space." \TB, 23) Tr.e - o rigin of 
s p ace' .:..s f e: und in ''Bui l ding Dwe l ling Thinking." The f c llmv i ng 
~uc cac ian i s He i degger's accounc o f o rig1nal spatial i t y o r 
Cnly s omething that 1 s i t se l ~ a loc ac ion c an 
n1c1.K.e spac e f o r a site. The locac ic:J. i s no c 
a l ready there befo re the bridge is. Bef o re the 
bridge stands, there are o f course many spots 
a lo ng the stream t hat c an be occupied by something. 
One o f them pro ves t o be a l ocation, and does so 
bec ause o f the bridge. Thus the bridge d oes not 
f i rst c ome co a l ocation to stand in i t; rather, a 
l ocation c omes into exist.=::nce o nly by virtue o f the 
bri Jge. The br i dge is a thing; i t gathers the f o ur fo ld, 
b ut i n such a way that it al lows a si t e f o r :he fourf old. 
By t h is site are determined the l ocalities a nd wa ys by 
whi= ~ a spac e is pro vided f o r. 
Only things that are locatio ns in this manne~ allow 
f o r spaces. What the word for space, Raum, designates 
is said by its ancient meaning. Raum, Rum, means a place 
c l eared or freed for settlement: and lodging. A space is 
something that has been made room for, something that is 
cleared and free, namely, within a boundary, Greek peras. 
A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as 
the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which 
something begins its essencial unfolding. That is why 
the concept is that of horismos, that is, the horizon, 
the boundary. Space is in essence that for which room 
has been made, that which is let into its bounds. That 
for which room is made is always granted and hence is 
joined, that is, gathered, by virtue of a location, that 
is, by such a thing as a bridge. Accordingly, spaces 
receive their essential being from locations and not from 
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11 Space • II 
Things which, as locations, allow a sic~ we now in 
anticipation call buildings. They are so call~d 
because chey are made by a process of building-
construction. Of what sort this mak i ng - building 
- mLst be, however, we find out only after we have 
first given thought to the essence of t hose things 
which of themselves require building- as the process 
by which they are made . These ch~ngs are locations 
that al l ow a site in the f ou rf old , a site chat in each 
case ~r8vlaes r o r a space. rhe reiatLon ~ecween 
~8cat i an and space lies in the essence cf these 
t~ings as lccacions, but so dces the rel ation o f 
c. he :..ocat io::-, co the man 1tJho lives at. ~.hat. lcca t ion. 
3D~ I l5 4- 15 s :· 
.:.:-:c inc iding l oca t ior., and constitu tes the site ·of the fourfold's 
;..:r.r: . .:;..:.. ct.:..r-,g i nto space. The thing-location-site-space dynamic is 
:::..:t·c::e1:: o!:·ed i ::::at.ed on mortals as building-dwo:::llers. He idegg·~r 
-~ mo.:.ovs t"tJO intert·ogative questi,:ms co further examine h1s notion 
:·E si :::.e, :1amely, "what is the r:elation b et•..veen locat i o n a::.d space?" 
:,n,J. "wi:ac. i s c he r:e:;.ation betwee!1 man and spaco:::?'' (BOT, 153 ) 
~h~ ~·~lation bet:ween loca tion and space is predicated ':m a 
The :::.h:i.ng "allows a space into which eat·th and heaven, 
ii'tinit.ies and mor-tals are admitted." (BDT, 155i The space all owed 
by a thing has many positions near or far from it. These postings 
may be treated as measurable distances between positions. 
Dist.ances (Gr. stadion ) have already "been made r:oom for" in 
the sense that a space constituted by positions of ''intervening 
in tePials" i s such that the "nearness and remoteness between men 
and things can become mere distance (*Lt.spatium], mere intervals 
of intervening space." (BOT, 155) Space's transformation into "mere 
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:listance'' or spatium is che beginning, for Heidegger, of che 
i~proper covering of the true essence oE space through geometric 
.:t ppt-o priat i o n . Through this covering of "pure space, " human 
essential relacion c o things and locaci o ns is 
Space, as spatium, :t·eprese:it:s a c:,.ing ~erely ir_ a c one ingenc 
;:c s~t.i :J n, w:,.~ch " c an be CJ ccupied at. any cime by s o mething else o r 
L· ..::: pi.a •:: ed oy a mere marker." •. BOT, 1 55 ) ~urr.:.her, r:h e mar.iE o ld cr:ro:::e 
di~ensi on s o f breadth, height, and dept.h all o ws for abstract.ion o f 
s Da c e as spatium o r intervals. !-teidegger examines che Eurcher 
~ L- -?t r. sf o "t.-:n.::~t ion ·.) f space from thr·ee dimensi o nal spatium co c he 
" :=t nal y r.:.ic - a l g.::bt·aic relacions" of space as extensio. 
T he s u m c onclusion .:Jf '":he geo-mathematical appr-o pt·iat io n o f 
s p -?t c e is cr_at c h e space ''contains no spaces o r p l. a c es . " 1. 3DT, l SS · 
~ he pro gression o f the geo-mathematical notion o f space as 
"ct ni·Ie:t.·.saL.y applicable . numer·i c al magnicudes" o f extension can 
i:-, !1':) ''' ·3.'/ b e the "ground of che essence of spaces and locations." 
•. 3 CT, l. 5>S ' This ty-pe of space-chinking has buried the ching. 
n~idegger's projecL is LO uncover Lhe essence of locacion or 
"place" that has been veiled by the progression of the 
analytical / machemaLizing of space; more specifically, at Lhis 
p o int, the unveiling of the relaLion between humanity and "place". 
I am equating che cerm "locaLion 11 with the term "place" at: 
this paine in the analysis because of "location's" identity of 
function '.Ni th the concept ion of "place" previously examined in 
Heidegger's analysis of "Zeitraum" and Greek philosophy. 
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:;,Ihat is the proper relationship between humanity and "place"? 
H~idegger pucs forward the ~allowing relational axiom between 
:1'Jmanicy and "place- location''; "Man's re l acion to locations, and 
': r.l· c ugh l :JCa C. ions to spaces, inheres in his dwelling. The 
~~:3cicnsh~p becwee~ man and space is none othe r than dwelling, 
\ 0~7, .J.. ..J I I It -., - . , - II - 1.. .... ...... . . - .. L..... -. -. -- - ...... - .: - 1 1 .. .. =--ct\....e I '-'"' '- '-'L4':1•11..- •.:::.:::J ..:J C:::4j. I,...._~....L....J..f 1 
:a. 9!:.·i c t·i ·~1ichin o ur exiscence. Human beings "persist. chrough 
sca c es" ::.:---,r:o u::rh -~ur dwelling with loca ti or. s and chings. We sustain 
" nL .:a. c e " chro ugh "scaying constantly wit:h near and r·emote locations 
.1. r: ci : r-. i n q s . " '. B OT, 157 ) We s uscain the essences of di stant 
~ · :.:-::: ati..x. s :md things through dwe:lir.r::r. I:-1 short, in lar.guage 
lvhen we dwell we let. ::iistant 
Lsca ci.~r.s 3nd chings be in their essenc e. 
Jwel:ii~1g i s the preservation of the na ture c f thi ngs and 
l ·; c ati ,::ns de•1oid of exploi.tive technocratic spa t ial quantiticacion. 
'ti·~ ~uaLify "places" oy bringi,1g the four fold unicy in t c things when 
we d wel l i n o ur o pen "place" of language. We do not quantify 
spaces if we are truly dwelling. 
This essay does not directly confront the possible conflict 
between dwelling-building-construction, i.e., Heidegger's bridge, 
and dwelling-building-cultivation o f living things and locations. 
Heidegger does not examine dwelling-building as the care of l~ving 
loca tions. What Heidegger does is say that building-construction 
need not be destructive to living locations if we would only dwell 
in the proper "place" of language. If we dwell properly in 
language, then technocratic spatial destruction of living locations 
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;::ar: be avoided. 
Bu~ is contemplation enough? 
What about act~on, resistance, protest and politics? 
1bcut a. r.·enewed cont:ract with natu re as a force of nature, a.s a 
o~esence of humar:ity on the ear~h equal ~o that of the sea? On 
.:i--::s~:_--::)'/·? r.· ::. o st-'.epherd o f c.he earth ·, fr :.Jm quantifying a.bstr.·a.c::. or s o f 
.:rua!..i:ying dwellers of "place" ; , humani ty is st:ill :1eld 
':h.:: ea:cch cr nature. In short, spa tial exploitation and 
plac~al shepherding seem from the same source. That source is the 
-::t· r.- ·2neous "placing" of humani:y extetT'.al to the r-::st o f being by 
As l o ng as this thinking is rooted in 
tb~ s same tradicio n of outsidedness of nature by history, be is 
:e ·.:.:h:--.o ·:ra~ic exploiter or the pro testing shepherd of BeiEg, t~e 
~3ge will continue. 
r~ our -time', history has entered nature, and sur history has 
entered nature creating the need for a new view of humanity as a 
']eo l ogical internal force of: nature, not as shepherds outside 
watching, waiting for Being. Thinking "place" call s for the 
dest~u2ticn o f history as an irreversible succession of discrete 
..::v~nt s that has a beginning and an apocalyptic end called the 
t~chnocratic cblivion of the earth as property resource. 
v. 
Summary and Transition 
Heidegger's problem of explaining the relation between 
spatiality and time within his fundamental ontology leads him to 
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~xamine spatiality apart from cime. This apparent failing of ~ime-
hegemonic philosophy is significant because it leads Heidegger to 
c r~cique che modern conception of spatiality as f i rst explained by 
Ga l ilee and Newton. 
He i degger's indir~ct pach fr om a failed on~ology ~c a serious 
- - - ~- - - -. .: . ...... --. -l - ... - - ~ ._. ...... r ...-
..:J..J..- C • .:. ....... ~ ..: '-'- ol i ....... "'-A ~ .-4-!..J... .:J il \ ~ 
iebace 0 n che distinc:ion and signi~icance bee ween 
physical- :echnical 11 space" and on co-t: heo- logi c al 11 p L1ce 11 • In "Die 
!( :..mst :..t nd der Raum, '1 Heidegger mak~s his challer.ge t o :nodern 
::.:dcu laci v e spatiality explicic in che c o ntext o f sculpcure or 
11
·1!.· t is ti c spac e." 
Gianni Vat t imo argues thac 11 the 19 6 9 lecture signals the 
climatic moment of a process of rediscovery of ~spatiality 1 by 
Heidegger," The End Of Modernity, trans. Jon R. Snyder (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 79-80, 
~LACE 
I. 
Heidegger quotes Aristotle's Physics ac the beginning of his 
-:::.ssay "Di.::: Kunst und der Raum" '. 1969): 
It appears, however, to be something overwhelmi~g 
and hard to grasp, the topes - that is, place-space. 
~-=~degger appears co be picking up where he left of ~ in his 1940 
This time Eeidegge~ l imits ~is 
~ xamina~ion of spatiality to sculpture: 
Sculptured structures are bodies. Their matter, 
-:-.·or.sisting of different :naterials, is va!:iously 
earmed. The f orming of it happens by demarcation 
as setting up an incl o sing and excluding border. 
Herewith, space co~es into play. Becoming occupied 
by the sculptured structure, space receives i ts 
specia~ character as closed, breached and empty 
volume. A ~amiliar state cf affairs, yet puzzling. 
The sculptured body embodies something. Does 
it embody space? Is sculpture an occupying of 
space? Does sculpture match therewith the technical 
s : :i-::;r:tific c0n•.:ruest of space? i l\S, 3 ' 
:-::-:: i:::as i ·.: :ruestion this essay ::.s addressing is whethe~ ·we :::an 
c :.:>nc eiv.:::, in the l·ealm of sculpture at: least, o f a spatiality 
.iiffer·=nt from che modern technica l space "•...,hich l':eceived it s f i rst 
.:ie::.-.::rm inat io :-1 f1::om Galilee and Ne·.vcon"? ~ AS, 4 .1 Hei::legger 
~xpl.:.ci::.ly quesc.ions the validity of the 'technical scientific 
c.:...::.nquest of space' : 
Space - is it that homogeneous expanse, not 
distinguished at any of its possible places, 
equivalent. toward each direction, but not 
perceptible with the senses? 
Compared with it, are all other articulated 
spaces, artistic space, the space of everyday 
practice and commerce, only subjectively 
conditioned preconfigurations and modifications 
of one objective cosmic space? (AS, 4) 
rvlartin Heidegger, "Art and Space," translation by Charles H. 
Seibert in Man And World, Volume 6, 1973 (3-8): 3. 
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~c=<:J:r:ading the 'artist.ic space' of sculpcc.;.re, and the space chat. 
"muse show forth from space it.self" via the sculpt u re, Heidegger's 
answer is chat authent.ic spatiality is not. a derivati v e mode of one 
c1·:: saic cosmic space. (AS, 4-5 ) If original spat.iality is nee to be 
~ )ciqed :.:1 :alculacive r.ousing, ,,,here can 'tJe discover a· ; ginal 
- ·- --;- : ..... ~ . .-.. - ... - ........ -. -. -- -. t-'..._,_._)1_...,6,._....; II ~ - . - ~ • ~ .,...... -.,_ I I .~ ~ _l '- -- -t ....... - ._ : . '::! ~ ··~- - · ·-
.sc .. :tr: ia L .:_ t.\·": 
. . 
Once it. is granted that art. is the bringing· 
~nc o -the-work of cruth, and truth is the 
uncc nc ealment. of Being, then must. not. genuine 
space, namely what uncovers it. s authentic charac ce r, 
begin to hold sway in :!1e work o t graphic art? '.AS, :i• 
:\:.::: ~s :::ce 'br i ng:.ng-int.o-t.he-work -J f truth' insofar as it: is che 
If we cake the "emer·gency 
~..::tt.t~ " ·)t l isto?.n~ng t.o l .:tnguage, in the word "space" we hear· t ha t 
Clearing - away (Raumen l is uttered therein . 
This means: to clear out ( roden l , to free 
from wilderness. Clearing-away brings 
forth :he free, t.he openness f e r man's 
settling and dwelling . When thought in its 
~wn special charact.er, clearing away is che 
release of places toward which t.he fate of 
dwelling man turns in the preserve of the home 
o r in the brokenness of homelessness or in 
complete indifference to the two. Clearing-away 
i s release of the places at. which a god appears, 
the places from which the gods have disappeared, 
the places at. which the appearance of the godly 
tarries long. In each case, clearing-away brings 
forth locality preparing for dwelling. Secular 
spaces are always the privat.ion of oft.en very 
remot.e sacred spaces. 
Heidegger's int.rcduction to the distinction between genuine 
spatiality and physical-t.echnical space has a forceful theological 
charact.er. Aut.hent.ic spat.ialit.y is "t.he release of places at. which 
a god appears." (AS, 5) 'Secular' homogeneous spaces "are always 
the privat.ion of often very remot.e sacred spaces." (AS, 5 ) 
Heidegger invokes piet.y as the tone of his examination of 
spat.iality. The difference between secular and sacred spat.iality 
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Clearing away is release of places. (AS, 5) 
Genui~e spatiality is the 'sacred' spatiality of human dwelling . 
Heidegger asks us to think space theologically, co think space as 
:.:: : "Die 36tter sind da!" The design of 'sacred' spatiality is the 
.:..:::.:t.:ica[o:? int-::.t·play between "Clearing-away'' (Raumen), "the open" 
.-.. •• c..1 :._,,o::: ·• _, ~e ,-,.i.i cS"' :.das Offene, die Offenheit ; , , _ j - -, • I , _ _ •- •• I I f:.J .l. (:t,1.,_.1::: 1 ..I.. .....J\..... ..::t ...1... ....L L f 
· Ortschaft i and "region" (Gegend }. 
' .-:.·leari!1g away' is "releasing making-room •.Einraumen ; " '.Nhic!: 
;:_a c es. 1.:\S, ~ ! 'Releasing making-room ' is a twofold 
L S :he d iffet·ence between the absence and presence of gods. To 
~ n ter sac red space is to enter the presence of a god. The secular 
' t echnical scientif:c conquest o f space' is, in some sense, th·~ 
destruction o f the gods. Modern space is godless. 
I n The Sacred and Profane, trans. Willard Trask (New York: 
Harc ~urt Brace J o vanovich, ?ublishers, 1959 ) , 22-24, Mircea Eliade 
expresses the distinction between 'sacred' and 'secu l ar' ( *Eliade 
-:::=; ~ ~ s it - ;:::ro fane' ) space in a way very similar co He idegger: 
?~r profane experience ... space is homogeneous 
and neutral; no break qualitatively differenciates 
the various parts of its mass. Geometrical space 
can be cut and delimited in any direct ion; but no 
qualitative differentiation and, hence, no orientation 
is given by virtue of its inherent structure. 
Yet this experience of profane space still includes 
values that to some extent recall the nonhomogeneity 
peculiar to the religious experience of space. 
There are, for example, privileged places, 
qualitatively different from all others a man's 
birthplace, scenes of his first love, or certain 
places in the first foreign city he visited in youth. 
Even for the most frankly nonreligious man, all these 
places still retain an exceptional, a unique quality; 
they are the ''holy places" of his private universe, 
as if it were in such spots that he had received the 
revelation of a reality other than that in which he 
participates through his ordinary life. 
'' JL·.:; nc ing ar.d arranging": 
l \ Making-room admits something. It lets 
o penness hold sway which, among other things, 
grants the appearance of thi~gs present to 
which human dwelling sees itself co~signed. 
2) Making-room prepares for things tte 
9ossibility to belong to their relevant 
whither and, out of this, to each other. ;.:\S, S ) 
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Einraumen lets the openness o f p laces. This openness discl o s ures 
:ne =~ntent o f ~ur everyday experience o f our surroundings. This 
~~>-::n:-".ess .:::o t p l aces m-:tkes the iJelcng.:.r.g "to ::.heir r.·el e van t whi.ther" 
The relevant whither' where places belong is 
·..:a lled -region ' • Gegend) . Makir.g- r oom grants the o per.ness that 
vi·c:L:ls places. Places themselves grant the o penness that yields 
"Place .a .l ways o r;ens a r·eg ion in which it ·::rat. her-s the 
:-:h.:.r.os :.n t~eir belonging together.'' •.A..S, {j ; Places 'gather' c ~.e 
tr1inos that. properly belong together into regions. - ,~athering' 
.Versammeln i 
comes to play in the sense of the releasing 
sheltering of things in their region. And the 
reg::.on? The older form of the word runs "that-
which-regions" (die Gegnet). It names the free 
expanse. Through it the openness is urged to 
let each thing merge in its resting in itself. 
This means at the same time: preserving, i.e., 
the gathering of things in their belonging 
together. (AS, 6) 
Regions are opened by gathering places. Regions let openness 
In his "Conversation On A Country Path," in Discourse On 
Thinking, translation by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1966), 6Sff, Heidegger tells us: "die Gegnet 
that-which-regions regions all, gathering everything together 
a:1d :.etting everything return to itself, to rest in its own 
identity ... . It appropriates man's nature for its own regioning." 
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s~c~re chings 1n identity with themselves as individuals. Regions 
also preserve the ·community' of things in their relation with one 
another. 
The ope nness of making-room yields places. The openr.ess 
~ - ~:aces yields regions. The openness of regions preserve things 
11li!.ac is this mysterious ·openness'? 
:-teidegger never explicitly answers this -: p..1~stion in this 
essay . But Heidegger does give a somewhat ind irect definition of 
.::> penness' in his "A Dialogue On Language bet·.veen a J:tpanese and a:1 
Tl'.e .Japanese explains the japanese '.vords -: k i' and 
~~: literally means ·breath' and has the same root meaning 
::.~~...~ ~a:.:.!! -spiritLlS' Erom ·spiro', to brr::ar:he. rn chis 
:i i.:::; ~ .:Jgue, ::.he Japanese explains ·I k i ' as ''the r.onsensuous shine 
che gracious the breath of the stillness o f 
:. \..! m i no us delight . " (OWL, :.4, 43&44) ·Ku' names "emptiness and the 
· CWL, ·Emptiness and the open' mean "the same as 
no thir.gness . that demands uncommon concentration. emptiness 
lS the loftiest name for what you mean to say with the word ·aeing' 
II i OWL, l8 .!d 9) There is a significant interchangeableness 
about. t.he terms ·emptiness', ·openness' and ·aeing' that ;,.Jill 
become meaningful as the essay nears its end. 
Heidegger subtly reverses his conception of place as a product. 
of ~he openness of making-room. Making-room takes "its special 
·Martin Heidegger, On The Way to Language, trans. Peter D. 
Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). 
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character- f:::::-om the reign of gathering places." \.A.S, 6 '1 Heidegger 
mak-=s -space' (Raumen/Einraumen) a product of place. Place is 
g~nuine spatiality. Heidegger's replacement of Raumen/Einraumen 
wit~ Ort/Ortschaft as the ground of spa=iality has five immediate 
~~~~cts en H~idegger's concept of spatiality: 
'
1 search for the special character o f 
:learing-away in the grounding cf locality; 
meditate an locality as the interplay oE 
places; 
· • take heed that and hew this play receives its 
~~ference to the belonging together of things 
Erom the regions free expanse; 
~ ~ recogniz2 that things themselves are places 
3nd do not merely belong ta ~ place; 
":J : ;?lace is net located in a pre-given space, 
after the manner of physical-technical space. 
The latter unfolds itself only through the 
::-eigning of places of a region. (.A.S, 6 ) 
-~hysi:a~-:echnical space' cannot: reduce place to bare '.::'alculative 
9ositicn of mass in an interstellar homogeneous expanse because it 
is place '::.hat precedes and conditions the possibi li ty of space 
through the relational interplay of places in a region. 
~laces do not occupy space. 
Physical-technical space receives its possibility from the 
play of places. The interplay of places are things themselves and 
the community of their shared relations, the region. Places, "in 
preserving and opening a region, hold something free gathered 
This was previously formulated in his lectures on Aristotle's 
Physics in Part Two, III. 
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a~au~d them which g~ants the tarrying of things under consideratio~ 
anci a dwelling for man in the midst of things." (AS, 7 ) Humanity 
participates in the interplay of places by being individual places, 
a~d c~rough =he complex mesh of relations found in the reg ion of 
i.::di';i::iual human beings, i.e., families, cicies, provinc.::s, 
-1 ::,>:u.·:. ·..: r. :he ~~r'.~ral ::.nterplay o f all ocher thing-pL1c es and 
~eidegger: does not discuss the s i gnificance of vie•tJi!lg 
: :~_tmanicy as a complex interplay of places. Heidegger returns to 
Heidegger says, "sculp c :..tre 
Sculpture would be che embod::.ment of 
l\S, 7 ' :::f sc...t::..pt.ure .is net ::h-=.: 0r::cupation <:CE .::al .:ul.ati v -= 
c::·:s:.cal s9ace, :::.hen ~ vol ume' would c·~ase t. o b-= t.he 3.Ut:hent.ic 
"p lace seeking and p::.ace forr:-.ir.g characteristics of sculptured 
embod iment.'' (AS, 7 ) 
I~ we can no longer employ volume or any other mathematical 
description o f space, what can we say about place embodying 
2 ::. n.: c t ~1 r-:: s ? Hei d egger says we must see ~emptiness' as a 
preparation of place and not as a failure to fill up a lack or gap. 
Heidegger turns to language for a hint on the nature of emptiness. 
In "Letter On Humanism," from Basic Writings, intra. David 
Farrell Krell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978 ) , 233&235, 
Heidegger says: "ethos means abode, dwelling place," and ethos 
"names the open region in which man dwells. [*If] ~ethics' 
ponder the abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth 
o f Being as the primordial element of man ... is in itself original 
ethics." 
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T:O..e Ger·man verb ''to empty" is leeren. Heidegger hears in the word 
leeren ''the original sense of the gathering which reigns in place. 
Tc empty a glass means: To gather the glass, as that which can 
c ~ ~cain s ome thing, into its having been freed. To prepare for 
1. AS, Emptiness is ~he p l ace embodying 
s~~~cc~re cf sculpture, "emptiness plays in c~e manner o f a 
seeking-projec:ing instituting of places. an 8mbodying 
~ri~ging-i~co-:he-work of places . che embodiment o f the truth 
.::t a~:;in]· in it.::; work of ir:.scituting places." i .n..s, 7-8 ) 
~~pciness' name the way o f che instituting o f plac es. 
a~ing grd~ts :he o penness of places. Places' ope nness yields 
'Ft·ee gathering' is the interplay o f 
places ' belonging together. Being places places. Being is genuine 
spat:. a1..:..t y . 
II. 
Heidegger rejects modern physical-mathematical space as 
.itL'<~t.hen:ic spaciality. Original spatiality is grounded i.n Being, 
:?.:.. J.ce ,:tnd Reg ion. Th is triadic structure constitutes the 
instituting of places, and through the relation between places, 
t·egions. Being is -emptiness' or -openness' that insticutes 
places. Being maintains the relation between places as the free 
expansive interplay of a region. 
Heidegger's formulation of place is significant because it 
of fers a cogent critique of modern calculative spatiality. 
Heidegger ' s thinking on place is informed by ancient and medieval 
philosophy, theology and aesthetics as opposed to contemporary 
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~hysics and mathematics. Heidegger radically distinguishes place 
E~cm modern calcula~ive space . This move is significant because, 
.:..1..:<:·:: ius c.:--,inking on time, it challeng-=s the omnipresence dogma o f 
5ci~nce and :echnology o n o ne o f its most fragile co n c epts, space. 
neidegger's thi~ki~g on genuine spatiality is importanc 
T:-,a':. .:..s, the heg-=mony of ~odern ·.:alculaci~fe spaciality 
Eirs:: :.r.sticuced by Sescartes, Ne'.vton, and '.Jalileo ac.tempt e d to 
-• :119c ':' :._ = se l : o f :::he •:oncept o E place as found .:. n '3reek a.nd Medieval 
·_:~ .:.. :~ ~:i:-.q. :-:::.s was a 't:evclution' .:..n wes;::.ern c ulc.ure . 1r/hat :.:ii:i i:: 
q1e an ? Ale xand!:e Koyre summarizes: r.h.:..s -revalue. ion' 
·::a n be described roughly as b1·inging fort.h the 
de s tr~ction o f the Cosmos, that is, the 
ji3appearance, ~rem phil o sophicall y and 
sc ien:ifically valid concepts, of the conception 
of the ,,,orld as a finite, closed, and hierarchically 
o rdered whole . . . and its replacement by an 
i~definite and even infi~it.e univer se which is 
bound together by the identity o f its f undamental 
csmconent.s and laws, and in which all t hese 
c om~onencs are placed on che same l e vel o f being. 
-:'his, in turn, implies che discarding by sclenc.ttlc 
thought o f all considerations based upcn value-concepts, 
such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim, and 
finally the utter devalorizacion of being, the 
divorce of the world of value from the world of 
facts. · 
The ·::c ncepc of place was once r i ch with debate on t!l.e value 
~r:. ternal : o the world. The question 'where?' had the qualitacive 
value of proper dwelling on the earth as beings of Being. Place 
recognizes the valuative nature of being. Modern spatiality 
emptied out the values of place and replaced them with the facts of 
Koyr§, Prom The Closed World To The Infinite Universe, 2. 
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space. Space recognizes only calculativ~ external position of 
Things and communities of things are r.oc i:1t.ernally 
'laL.tabl e pl::tces; ::hey are as Heidegger says ~standing t·esel.·ve' 
[Bestand ] for instrumental apprupriation of property resources. 
O f course, Heidegger's and Koyre's critique of moder:1 
:.:1 :.. .:·.1 lac ~'re spatial it'/ c an be argued against:. Did n·:)t ~he l 7th 
:: -::nc ~lr'j sc.:.encific revolution .:ttt:empt to cu1:b c~e excesses cf 
::O: .tt>=:t·s:::.:~ c:m and religious fanacicism in Eavour of ver.·ifiable 
... ;,;: - - •- I 
- .::t ~- ;,_ :. rracio nal o pinion? Did not this scientific 
~evolu tion he:p crack the strangle hold cf repressive ~hierarchies' 
suc h as the Church and aristocracy and pave the wa·1 for d~mocracy? 
::;~--.1 :w e moderni ty tur·n towa1·ds an open uni're:r:s~ o f novelty, fl:eedcm 
~:1a p~~gress over a finite, scatic, and repressive world? 
~~ese :hing s ~ay be true o f modernicy, but the violent 
e xcesses of modernity have been uncover~d in con temporary western 
cu lt.L!r~ l i }:..:: the excesses of the medieval world in the 17th 
ce ntury. Martin Heidegger is a thinker who both participated in a 
'Jiol ent excess of modernity (National Socialism) and pointed to the 
hearc of one of its dark secrets, che destruction of divine place. 
Eeidegger takes place from ~he shadow of modern space and 
rests it in the light anew. 
~ S S~S CR I ?T : ? LACE FRAGMENTS 
When the seventh day dawned I loosed a dove 
3nd :et her go. She flew away, but fi~ding 
no resting place she returned. Then I leased 
a swal~ow, and s he flew away bu~ finding no 
t·esting place she returned. I loosed a raven, 
she saw that the waters had retreated, she ate, 
she flew around, she cawed, and she did not 
..::Jn~e back. 
"!J tnap.:.s htim ' s Flood :vlyth, '' The Eoic ct' Gil:::ramish 
i/0 
With the separation of heaven and earth, 
all dichotomies were prefigured, light 
with ics sun and moon and stars fil l ed 
che space between heaven and earth. 
Spa c e gee its name lying as it did between 
-:.: :es--:: ": '.N0 '.Ni cie bowls ~f heaven and earth . 
. -\s it was lying becween them, it was called 
ancar1 .:..:sa "that. ~ies or shines between." 
- Stella Kramrisch, Soac~ in Indian Cosmogonv 
and in Architecture 
1::..1 
112 
W~ may begin with a trui sm: Space i s everywher~. 
• - i.s the where and a l s o th.:! situatio n elf t h ino s. 
~veryt h ing is somewhere because it is situated, -
oec ause it is in relati o nship. Be i ng is being-wit h 
, ·.::c -esse ) but a.:..s o being - in ( in-esse \ . This amounts 
: ~ ~eccgnizins thac Spa c e is everything, but not "a l l 
J E ~verything'. Space co- exists with everything. 
~pace s u rrounded by Space is u nco ncei v able, C8Uld we 
say parap~rasing Arist o tle. But how could it be 
~ therwise ~ithcut destro ying all intelligibility tc 
3pac e ? 
F' c r this reason we begin with an o pen JaC.e. 
Properly speaking we canno t ente :c an cpen gate . I t is 
na g ate at all. We are already in - and equally o ut. 
- R. ?anikkar, ThQr= Is No Outer Wi t ho ut Inner Soac e 
And so far as regards these statements of the 
?eripatetics, it seems likely that the ~irst 
3od is ~he place of all things. For according 
t o Aristotle the First God is the limit of 
~eaven .... And if God is identical with Heave~'s 
limit, since Heaven's limit is the place of all 
t~ings ~ithin Heaven, God - according to Aristotle 
- will be the place of all things; and this, too, 
~s itself a ~hing contrary tc sense. 
- Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos 
Peripatetic theory of pl~ce rested upon two 
essential propositions: According tc the first, 
the place of a body must contain the body. 
According to the second, the place of a body 
~usc be a motionless thi~g. for it is the fixed 
term to which all local movement is referred. 
- ?ierre Duhem, Medi~val Cosmoloay 
113 
!nscfar as it considers the place of a 
body as r~placed by another body when the 
3mCient matt~r moves locally, this op~nian 
~s ~ru~. tut insofar 3S i~ admits the co rruption 
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-:;f plac e because oE ;:his :.ocal movement, it is false 
ic proceeds from the false thought that place ~s a 
relation really distinct from ~he containing body. 
- William of Ockham 
-what. is Go d ? ' 
i s length, width , and height.' 
- St.. Bernard of Clairvaux 
1 15 
When we shall have enumerated those names 
and tit~es appropriate to ~t. this infinite, 
immobile, extended [entity] wi:l appear to 
be not only something real but ~ven something 
Divine (which so certainly is found in nature • 
tn~s w1li g1ve us ~urther assurance that :c 
2annot be nothing since that co which so many 
and such magnificent att~~ouces pertain cannot 
be nothing . Of this kind are the Eollowing, 
which meraphysicians attribute particularly to 
116 
the First Being, such as: One, Simple, immobile, 
~Cerna~. Complete, Independent, Existing in itse:f, 
Subs~ sting by itself , Incorruptible, Necessary, 
Immense, Uncreaced, Uncircumscribed, 
Incomprehensible, Omnipresent, Incorporeal, 
All-penetrating, All-embracing, Being by its 
essence, Actual Being, Pure Act. 
Ther~ are not less than twenty titles by 
which the Divine ~umen is wont to be designated, 
and •..-th.:..ch pel·fect.ly fit ::h:..s i.nf~r.i:.e i.nterr:al 
place ! locus ) the existence oE which in nature 
we have jemonstrated; omitting mor~over :~at 
:h~ ~~ry ~ivine Numen is cal:ed, by the Cabalists , 
MAKOM, r.hat is t:lace i l ·.Jcus ! . Indeed it •.vould b~ 
~st~nishir:g and a kind of prodigy if the rhing 
abou: which so much can be said proved to be a 
mere nothing . 
- Henry More, Enchiridium metaphyiscum 
The earliest indication of a connection between 
space :wd God lies in the use of t~e te:!::"m "place" 
1makom 1 as a name for God in ?alestinian Judaism 
~f the first century. 
- Max Jammer, Conceo:s of SoacP 
for the Hebrews the name of this Infinite 
was Makcm; as it is that of St Paul's 'it is 
nearer to us than we are tc ourselves. ' 
- ~oseph Raphscn, DP ente infi~ito 
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~lace is a part of space which a body takes 
u9 and is according co che space, either 
absolute or relative . 
Issac Newton, Mathematical Principles 
)f Natural Philosoohy 
t:1ese Gentle!nen maint.a.i:l r.net-efore, chac Space 
~s a real absolute Being. Bur. this invclves 
:~em 1n great difficulties; fer such a Beinq 
muse needs be Sternal and Infinite. Hence So me 
have believed it to be God himself, o r, one of 
his Att:r:ibutes, his Immensity. But. since Space 
·::cmsist.s of ?arts, it is not a thing which can 
Ce l u ng : (J :Jo(j. 
Space is Something absolutely Unitarm; and, 
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withou t the Things placed in it, One Point of Space 
jaes not absolutely differ an any respect whatsoever 
:rom Another Point of Space. Now from hence it 
fo l 2.cws, \ supposing Space to te Something in it 
se2.f, b~sid~s che Order of Bodies amo ng themselves ) 
chat it is impossible there should be a Reason, why 
~od, preserving the same Situations of Bodies among 
themselves, should have placed them in Space after 
o ne certain particular manner, and not otherwise; 
why every thing was not placed the contrary way, 
for instance, by changing Sast into West. 
- :::;octfried Leibniz, The Leibniz-Clark 
Corr-r::soondence 
Co ntemporary physics has taught us that the 
centre of space is everywhere; and ancient 
2osmo logies, Eastern and Western, have cold u s 
1 19 
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reaso ns and with a different understanding . Our 
first space centre, however, is not everywhere: 
after ::he •.vomb, it is home, the place in '.Nhich we 
happen ::o be born and begin to grow up and discover 
ourselves. In these first two respects we are like 
e ther an i mals; 1n t. h e third, probably, not. In the 
course of time, our place o f birth is replaced by 
•"J ther spaces we live ir1. Our subsequent spans o f 
life consist of a succession of 'cenc.res o f space' 
I c takes a long time before we mac.ure and transcend 
t he many h o rizons that help us discover ttat our 
9ersona l , regi o nal, c ul::ural and traditio nal spaces 
-:tre in!:initesimally small parts of the wider space i. :1 
whi:.: :: --:> 'lerything liv es and mo ves t::e space of t::.he 
u niverse. 
::'rits Staal , The c~r..tr~ o f Space: Consc.t-ucti c n :tnd 
C'iscoverv 
In che days of the Apocalypse the old drago~ 
'N d '::iJ t·-:: ,i. t ._; ·.idy tl~ i.::; ::Jl.·cy. :-ie wa::::. L'='-l, 
~~ca~se he represented the cld way, the o ld 
~ o r~ of power, k~ngship, riches, ostentation, 
and lust. By the days cf Nero, this old form 
o f o stentation and sensat ional lust had truly 
enough become evil, the f o ul dragon. And the 
Eaul dragon, the red one, had to give way t o 
=he white dragon o f the Lagos - Europe with the 
glcriL.cat ion cf white: the white dragon. It 
ends with the same sanitary worship o f white, 
but =he white dragon is now a great white worm, 
Jircy and greyish. 
- ~- H. Lawrence, Aoccalyos~ 
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The Mediterranean separates two worlds in me, 
one where memories and names are preserved 
i~ measured spaces, the other where the wind 
and sand erases all trace of men on the open 
ranges .... without help or deliverance, on 
a ~ortunate shore and in the light of the 
first mornings of the world, and then alone, 
without memories and without faith, he entered 
:he warld of the men of his time and its dreadful 
exalted history. 
- Albert Camus, The First Man 
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I dream of the intellectual destroyer of evidence 
and universalities, the one who, in the inertias 
and constraints of the present, locates and marks 
che weak points, the openings, the lines of force, 
who incessantly displaces himself, doesn't know 
~xactly where he is heading nor what he'll think 
':::~.':~!:"~'=.•.' ~-='":3 1_!S~ h.~ i:== t=.--::'0 .:1t:t:~!:.t:i~ . r-=? t: •:• ~h-7 
p~::es..-:nt 
- Michel ~oucault, Foucault Live 
~ t we :: r, ink , a f:: e r .:tll, that ::he boat 1 s a 
:loating piece . ::;f space, a place •.vithout a 
c ace, that exists by itself, that is -:losed 
ln on itself and at the same ::ime is given 
over to t~e infinity of the sea and that, 
from port to pert, from tack to tack, from 
brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the 
colonies in search of the most precious 
treasures they conceal in their gardens, you 
will understand why the boat has not only been 
for our civilization, from the sixteenth century 
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until the present, the great instrument of economic 
jevelooment ... but has been simultaneously the 
greate~t reserve of the imagination. The ship is 
:he heterotopia par excellence. In civilizations 
without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the 
place of adventure, and the police take the place ,::lf 
pirates. 
Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces 
the end of a~l che ~xploring 
Will be to arrive where ·.,ye st:a1·t.ed 
And know the place for the first time. 
- T.S. Eliot , ?our Quart:~t:s 
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~oec: 
Why can't we take to the sea anymore? 
We have kill~d all che fish as we will 
kill. everything else. Inscead cf pre.sePring 
and shepherding the sea we have mastered and 
violated her. We must return ta ~er what we 
have taken and beg forgiveness . 
We ca~noc be ~aster or .shepherd anymore. We 
have become a force of nature. We cannct cake 
L~ the .sea again uncil we l earn how cc be a sea. 
We have to again find our place. 
124 
finding new land 
I 
~~ere :he rock scands 
~na c nere ic erodes 
~: th c~e bite of brine, 
E ~ e 8h, bl~od and bone i:Jeating, 
b~acing its armour; 
n~c with sc one dulled ebb and flow 
h~lj i n the crash of tides; 
i._;,_. L_ L:i -::: !...ctlt•i L. it luu u [ lllc:ll t0Cy '-!U..i.(;;.;.C:l1L ·,s I 
~uickening Eaint forgotten f ires 
J n ~ e ng f o rsa~en shores 
·.vhet: ~ music played 
::' :c 1· a :ncmen c 
..:: ::..: ·::: . 
:: ::--=!.:e we !.·e d. •::heeked ycungscers 
c . iL i:J...::tween shadows 
~nder bent mothers nursing, 
nursing fish flakes 
~n :he sett i ng sun; 
:he re head, guts, burgundy blood 
propelled from splitting tables 
~:,t8 :he brink 
~~ :he sett ing sun; 
:he !.-e names l:a ve bodies 
a nd memories 
still 
sealed on garden, beach, rock 
ar:.d barren 
in the setting sun; 
there we widows in windows peer 
aver the sea and wait, 
wait for the secret 
f ound past the horizon 
i ~ the setting sun; 
there our palms are cut 
with compass points: 
the left a barb of maple leafs, 
the right a fist 
clu t:ched hard 
in the setting sun. 
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III 
~~ere t~e sun weeps 
Cl0cd a:1d shadow 
as t:.h.=:: dove 
j,=tyk~n~d 
jies 
I ',i 
:~ere w~ ghoscs dance 
.:tnu r:_i-:ere ci1e wind sin(_Js 
t~ c t:.hu~ ~nglia ~ire 
fish seal gull 
r··..:und ~::o·~n~i 
::: !l.o rus bene 
.:::hc r'..ls ash 
d rJ \vn '"'est. 
~::. c~w~ 'tlest. 
126 
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